Which of the following statements are true about teleological ethical theories?

               TELEOLOGICAL AND DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES

By: Ronald F. White, Ph.D.

All descriptive theories attempt to explain and/or predict natural phenomena. Human behavior is a natural phenomenon and therefore subject to descriptive theorizing. However, we regard some human behavior as good and praiseworthy and other behavior as bad and blameworthy, therefore moral philosophers or ethicists must employ both descriptive and prescriptive theories. Descriptive ethical theories explain and predict existing beliefs about good and bad behavior. In contemporary moral psychology, evolutionary biology has taken the lead. Prescriptive, or normative ethical theories, explain, or justify, why certain acts ought to be considered right or wrong. If there is anything “easy” about studying ethics it’s the fact that there are only two kinds of prescriptive ethical (moral) theories: teleological and deontological theories.

TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORIES

All teleological ethical theories locate moral goodness in the consequences of our actions. According to teleological (or consequentialist) moral theory, all rational human actions are teleological in the sense that we reason about the means of achieving certain ends. Moral behavior, therefore, is goal goal-directed. I have ice in my gutters right now. I am deliberating about when and how to get that ice out in order to prevent water damage inside the house. There are many strategies (means) that I might employ. Should send my oldest son, Eli, up on the icy roof today? After careful deliberation I finally decided not send him on the roof because it is slippery and he might fall. How did I decide? Well, I took into account the possible consequences. There is nothing inherently wrong with climbing on the roof. What made roof climbing the wrong thing to do at this particular time and place were the possible consequences. So from the teleological point of view, human actions are neither right nor wrong in and of themselves. What matters is what happens as a consequence of those actions. Thus, it is the consequences that make actions, good or bad, right or wrong.

From a teleological standpoint, stealing, for example, would be deemed right or wrong depending on the consequences. Suppose I were contemplating stealing a loaf of bread from the neighborhood grocery store. My motive alone would have nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the act. What really matters lies in the potential short-term and long-term consequences. If my children were starving, and if stealing a loaf of bread would immediately prevent them from starving, then I might seriously consider stealing. But I’d have to know if the consequences would significantly harm the grocery store? What would be the odds of getting caught? If I got caught, what would happen to me? Would I go to jail? Get fined? If I went to jail, who would take care of my children? Therefore, even if my motive (preventing my children from starving) was praiseworthy, the act of stealing might still be wrong because other actions might be more cost-effective in bringing about the desired consequences. Perhaps I’d be better signing up for food stamps or asking the storeowner to give me day-old bread. On the other hand, suppose that there were no other options and that I invented a foolproof system for stealing bread. Would I be wrong for doing it?

Teleological moral theories must somehow connect the consequences of human actions to moral concepts such as good or bad, right or wrong, and moral or immoral. The hallmark of teleological moral theories is that they connect these moral concepts (right and wrong) with pleasure and pain, or happiness and unhappiness. Hence, moral acts are considered good, right, and/or moral in so far as they lead to pleasurable consequences; and bad, wrong, or immoral if they lead to painful consequences. The historical moral doctrine that associates pleasure with moral goodness is called hedonism. Now once we admit this leading premise of hedonism, we find ourselves faced with a number of thorny issues. 

When human beings experience pleasure or pain, we immediately acknowledge that both are subject to greater or lesser degrees. Hence, according to many hedonists pleasure and pain can be quantified and therefore their doctrine seems amenable to quantitative analysis. Most hedonists observe that pleasures can be measured in quantitative terms such as: intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood.  In general, the intensity and duration of physical or bodily pleasures accompany the fulfillment of basic biological functions, and therefore, are largely magnified by deprivation; that is to say, being hungry, thirsty, or horny. 

The human orgasm is generally acknowledged as one of the more intense pleasures that human beings can experience. Unfortunately, given that an orgasm only lasts a few seconds it lacks temporal duration. The intensity of the pleasure associated with eating pizza is much less intense, but it lasts about thirty minutes and therefore its duration is much greater. Some pleasures are more likely to lead to other pleasures later on; hence the distinction between long-term and short-term pleasures. The pleasure associated with reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics registers low on the intensity scale (it may occasionally even fall into painful zone) and it takes about a week to read it, and therefore it has considerable duration. In fact, I’ve read it 20-30 times and have experienced new (low intensity) pleasures every time. But what makes reading Aristotle worthwhile is the fact that it opens the door to the intellectual pleasures associated with the world of philosophy. However, the intensity, duration, and fecundity of pleasure are often subject to the laws of probability; that is to say; there is often a quantifiable likelihood that some human acts that one would anticipate to be pleasurable turn out to be painful, and some normally painful acts turn out to be pleasurable. Generally speaking, eating pizza is usually a reliably pleasurable eating experience, however, sometimes we do overeat and/or get a lousy pizza.    

Intellectual pleasures, which typically lack in intensity, register high in duration and fecundity. But if you happen to read at a third grade level, the likelihood of you ever “cashing in” on the experience of reading Aristotle is remote. Nevertheless, most (but not all) hedonists favor “higher” intellectual pleasures over “lower” physical pleasure. However, they also acknowledge that the “Good Life” ultimately consists in a good mix of higher and lower pleasures. Even philosophers must occasionally eat, drink, and have sex. On the other hand, if you live life wallowing like a pig in the lower pleasures, your life will probably be shorter and the variety of pleasures experienced will be very limited.

Since hedonists argue that morality consists in choosing pleasurable consequences over painful consequences, then philosophically, we must decide whose pleasure counts. There are two traditions here egoism and altruism. Both theories are subject to descriptive and prescriptive philosophical analysis.         

Egoism is the hedonistic doctrine that holds that the “Good Life” consists in the experience of personal pleasure. Altruism is the hedonistic doctrine that states that the “Good Life” consists in cultivating the experience of pleasure in others. Of course, both doctrines are subject to two lines of philosophical questioning. Descriptively, we ask, “ Are human beings selfish or altruistic by nature?” Prescriptively we can ask, “Is human selfishness and/or altruism good?”

 First of all, let’s be honest and admit that the descriptive question of whether human beings are selfish or altruistic can be resolved based on empirical observation. When we do objectively observe human behavior over the course of human history its hard to ignore the fact that we humans do, perhaps more often than not, pursue personal pleasure, and often do so at the expense of others. Let’s also admit that human beings also occasionally sacrifice personal pleasure, and even endure pain, for the sake of others; and that we’re much more likely to exhibit altruistic behavior in reference to our close relatives than toward strangers. Therefore, in human nature we find a lot of egoism and kin altruism. Finally, let’s also observe that most religions and moral codes encourage their followers to increase altruistic behavior and decrease egoistic behavior. In short, descriptively, human nature propels us toward egoism and kin altruism while human culture propels us toward ideal altruism toward strangers.    

Prescriptive egoism takes the view that selfishness is not only universally evident among human beings (descriptive egoism) but it is also good (prescriptive egoism). The most common defense of prescriptive egoism can be found in Western economics, which is based on the premise that human beings act out of self-interest and that free market capitalism provides the most efficient and humane way to distribute resources. Hence, when two rational self-interested human beings forge a contract based on mutual self-interest, we call that reciprocal altruism. We’ll talk more on libertarianism when we talk about the principles of liberty and justice.  

In sum, teleological theories generally require that we anticipate how pleasure and pain (or, happiness or unhappiness) will be redirected as a consequence of our actions. Therefore, teleologists, are usually hedonists who believe that all morally good acts promote pleasure and that all morally bad acts promote pain. In the social context, the obvious question is whose happiness counts in this cost-benefit analysis? Again, an egoist believes that moral decisions ought to be based on how one’s personal happiness or pleasure is affected by that decision. An altruist thinks that moral decisions ought to take into account how other people are affected: more on that later.

DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES

There are many philosophers who reject the entire teleological agenda by arguing that moral goodness has nothing to do with the pleasure, happiness, and or consequences. Deontological theories are by definition duty-based. That is to say, that morality, according to deontology, consists in the fulfillment of moral obligations, or duties. Duties, in the deontological tradition, are most often associated with obeying absolute moral rules. Hence, human beings are morally required to do (or not to do) certain acts in order to uphold a rule or law. The rightness or wrongness of a moral rule is determined independent of its consequences or how happiness or pleasure is distributed.

 It's not difficult to see why philosophers would be drawn to this position. In ordinary life, we often encounter situations where doing our duty toward others does not necessarily increase pleasure or decrease pain all around. In early nineteenth-century America, many members of the anti-slavery movement argued that slavery was wrong, even though slaveholders and southern society in general, economically benefited from it. Suppose, also that the slaveholders were also able to condition the slaves to the point where they actually enjoyed living under slavery. From a teleological perspective, slavery would appear to be an ideal economic institution. Everybody is happy! A deontologist would argue that even if the American government conducted a detailed cost/benefit analysis and decided that slavery created more pleasure in society than pain, it would still be wrong. A deontologist, like Immanuel Kant, would argue that using human beings solely for the purpose of increasing the pleasure of others is simply wrong, even when they seem to consent to such an arrangement. Therefore, deontologists believe that right and wrong have nothing to do with pleasure, pain, or consequences. Morality is based on whether acts conflict with moral rules or not, and the motivation behind those acts. An act is therefore, good if and only if it was performed out of a desire to do one's duty and obey a rule. In other words, act out of a good will. Hence, slavery is wrong, not because of it's negative consequences, but because it violates an absolute moral rule, "Never treat a person as a means and always treat a person as an end." The problem here is: "How does one generate absolute moral rules apart from the distribution of pleasure and pain?" In the Western tradition there have been two approaches to the establishment of deontological principles: divine command theory and natural law theory.

DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

Divine Command Theory states that the moral goodness of an act is based on religious authority alone. Hence, for many Christians, killing another human being is wrong simply because it violates the Judeo-Christian God's 6th commandment. In short, the rightness or wrongness of the act is based on the truthful pronouncements of an outside authority, that is to say, "It is wrong because God or one of God's designated spokespersons said it is wrong." Divine command theorists argue that moral rules are universal because all human beings were created by the same omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent God.  These rules are usually encapsulated in ancient sacred texts written under divine inspiration. Rational theological discourse, therefore usually focuses on whether a specific person or group, that interprets this God-given moral rule, speaks with legitimate religious authority. Or sometimes, theologians even debate over the authenticity of the sacred texts. But they don’t analyze the distribution of pain and pleasure. Theologians might also inquire whether acts such as: killing in time of war, killing a fetus via abortion, or executing a convicted mass murderer are violations of "Thou shall not kill?"

However, in the history of the human race, many religions have held their own particular religion to be universally true and everyone else's false. So even though many of us approach morality from the standpoint of divine command theory, we must recognize that the only possible basis for rational discussion and debate is over the actual meaning and authority of the moral rule.

Sometimes divine command theory also relies on teleological considerations. For example, many religions also use the omniscient, omnipotent, and goodness of God as a means of rewarding compliance and punishing non-compliance. God rewards believers and punishes non-believers. Sometimes these positive or negative consequences are felt in this life, (in the form of good or bad fortune here on earth); sometimes the consequences are felt in a subsequent life (in heaven, or hell where either eternal reward or eternal punishment is administered by God.)

NATURAL LAW THEORY

In the Western deontological tradition moral rules have also been derived from human nature. The fundamental assumption here is that moral goodness can be derived from some set of descriptive, natural facts. This approach has always been attractive because, like divine command theory, it claims to provide an objective and universal standard. Moral rules based on natural law, like the dictates of science, are portrayed as existing independent of personal, social, or cultural beliefs. Natural law theory (or naturalism) is often invoked in support of divine command theory, secular humanism in the Western Enlightenment tradition, and even evolutionary biology.

 The key is to identify natural attributes that provide the basis for knowledge of moral goodness. We might argue, for example, that human beings are rational by nature and therefore any act that is performed after sufficient and effective reasoning is good. The assumption is that all rational persons will arrive at the same moral conclusions if only they reason properly. Moral disagreements, therefore, turn out to be a conflict between rational and irrational agents. For example, suppose I were to discuss the issue of slavery with a slaveholder and attempt to convince that person to liberate his/her slaves. If we are both rational, eventually I should be able to convince that person that slavery is wrong. Then again, if I fail, I might decide that either: a.) I did not argue effectively.  b.) The slave-holder is simply irrational, and therefore, unable to follow my rational argument. Convinced of my righteousness, I might decide to forcibly liberate his/her slaves. I might even decide that the irrational slaveholder is not a person worthy of moral consideration and simply kill him/her in the process.

Other natural law theorists say that all human beings naturally seek to possess private property and therefore any act that interferes with the pursuit or holding of property is wrong. So if you try to steal my guitar, you are violating the natural and moral law that states that I have a right to keep property that I own. The slaveholder might argue that my attempt to liberate his slaves violates his right to own private property. I might retort that slaves are not property but persons.

Finally, evolutionary biologists have sought to empirically identify the genetic characteristics that comprise human morality. Typically, they argue that moral behaviors involving kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, sympathy, and consolation are evolutionary traits that have contributed to human survival.

The basic problem with naturalism is determining which human behaviors or attributes are empirically consistent with our nature. Are human beings really naturally rational? Do we really naturally pursue private property? Are we natural hedonists? Suppose we are, in fact, all three. What happens when those natural impulses conflict? Is it not possible for me to irrationally pursue property or pleasure? What happens if my lifelong pursuit of private property interferes with my personal happiness? Even if we could establish an exhaustive list of natural human attributes, how would one go about deciding which ones can serve as the grounding for morality? After all, one might argue that human beings are also naturally selfish, xenophobic, erotic, sexist, and violent. Some philosophers have attempted to contrast natural acts with unnatural acts, arguing that human beings by reason of rationality, alone are capable of acting unnaturally. This line of argument is often linked to theological premises that blame our propensity to perform unnatural acts on the fact that God granted human beings freedom of the will. Unnatural acts, for example, might be attributed to our failure to subject our free will to other natural constraints such as reason or conscience. However, once we become engaged in the theological debate over freedom of the will, the prospects for arriving at a consensus on a specific moral issue becomes much less likely.

 We might also argue that just because human beings are naturally prone to perform certain acts, it does not necessarily imply that those acts are morally good. That is, there may be a difference between a descriptive  "is" and a prescriptive "ought." Philosophers call this the is/ought gap. To confuse the two, they argue is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. For example, if it is true that human beings are, in fact, naturally selfish, does that fact necessarily imply that selfishness is morally good? If human beings are, in fact, naturally selfish, does that suggest that egoism is true? Again, what happens when natural selfishness conflicts with other natural human attributes such as: our natural propensity to live in communities, or possess private property? 

Despite its inherent vagaries moral philosophy probably cannot altogether avoid naturalism in the sense that we surely must take into account natural human behavior in deciding what we can reasonably expect in our treatment of one another. Indeed, the history of human moral codes testifies that it possible to conceive of absolutely binding moral rules, based on natural law, that ordinary individuals, because of their biological or social nature, simply cannot live up to. A moral rule is called superogative or idealistic if it calls for a level of moral turpitude beyond the reach of us ordinary individuals. Many philosophers argue, for example, that it is simply overly idealist to expect teenagers to refrain from engaging in sexual activity: its natural behavior. However, many deontologists would argue that, just because teenagers find sexual activity pleasurable and pre-marital celibacy to be difficult, if not impossible to live up to, that doesn't mean that the moral rules pertaining to pre-marital sex are invalid. The rule is right. It's their acts are simply wrong.

In the Western philosophy deontological ethical theory has been dominated by two alternative theories: divine command theory and Kantian theory. Immanuel Kant’s major theoretical work, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, is widely accepted as representative of the most palatable form of non-secular deontology. It is also based in natural law theory.

First of all, Kant argued that morality is only possible in a community of beings that possess the natural attributes of rationality and free will. We cannot justly hold someone responsible for his/her actions unless that person is capable of knowing right from wrong; and unless that person is capable doing right and avoiding wrong. Kant’s not sure whether or not human beings do, as a matter of fact, possess the attributes of rationality and free will, but he is certain that morality is impossible without those attributes.

Recall that deontological theories are duty-based, and therefore elevate rules over actions. Now Kant acknowledged that human beings do, as a matter of descriptive fact, pursue pleasurable consequences in their life choices and that we can even discover general rules that maximize pleasure and minimize pain. (Look both ways before you cross the street.) However, Kant also insisted that we must recognize that abeyance to the rules that govern pain and pleasure has nothing to do with morality. Hence, Kant distinguishes between the rules that govern pleasure, which are relative to the tastes and inclinations of particular individuals; and the rules that govern morality. Therefore, the hallmark of Kantian morality is its universality. But how does one go about identifying the universal rules of morality? Well, Kant argued that we need to apply a rule, which he called the categorical imperative. In the Groundwork Kant gives us several different formulations, including: “always act on universal principles” and “always treat persons as ends and never as means.”

Now what does Kant mean when he says that we ought to act on universal principles, or rules? For Kant, and all deontological theorists, the morality of human action cannot be separated from intent. Morally good actions arise out of good intentions and morally bad actions arise out of bad intentions. Deontologists say that morally good actions are brought about by a good will. For Kant, a good will is a will that molds itself in conformity with absolute universal moral rules.

Recall that all teleological theorists distinguish between means and ends. In general, good ends justify the means by which those ends can be realized. Of course, rationality of action depends on weighing the quantity of pleasure derived from achieving the end against the cost of pleasures sacrificed as means. Kant argued that this cost-benefit analysis works well enough for the amoral world of pleasure, but it fails miserably as a foundation for morality. That’s because all human beings are rational agents in possession of free will, which bestows upon us infinite value. Therefore, it turns out to be irrational to sacrifice the happiness of a single individual or a minority group in order to make a majority happier. In other words, we cannot treat human beings as if they are things or property to be consumed in pursuit of pleasure. The easiest way to understand what Kant has in mind is to focus on the Kantian imperative stating that we must “always treat persons as ends and never as means.” He suggested that it’s best to think of humanity as if it were a “kingdom” composed of “ends;” that is a kingdom of ends. When we treat persons as means to our own ends we essentially de-humanize them and devalue them to the level of mere things or property.                     

RIGHTS

Deontologists tend to couch moral arguments in terms of rights. The concept of a right is an outgrowth of eighteenth-century Western Liberalism, which is based on natural law.  The idea back then was to buttress moral, political, and social arguments by insisting that at least some moral claims naturally demand the unquestioned cooperation of others. Hence, rights are contrasted with privileges, personal ideals, and optional acts of charity, which do not require our universal and absolute adherence. As you may have noticed, many contemporary issues in the United States focus upon purported rights: the right to life, right to die, right to privacy, right to bear arms etc. To deontologists, a right implies an absolute universal claim. However, rights cannot be construed as exceptionless unless we can also establish a corresponding universal exceptionless duty on the part of others. The absolute right to life, for example, is meaningless unless we can also affirm an absolute duty on the part of others to refrain from killing. However, that duty is often suspended, especially in cases of self-defense. Moreover, rights often conflict with other rights: as in the case of abortion where the fetuses’ right to life may conflict with the mothers right to privacy.  Therefore, some deontological philosophers conclude that that rights are best construed as prima facie universals, in the sense that they are to be treated as universals unless they conflict with other universals. Hence, it is a universal moral rule to tell the truth, but sometimes telling the truth might result in harm to innocent persons. Since we cannot always be completely truthful and protect innocent lives at the same time, we must choose which moral rule to uphold. Intuitively, we would probably agree that protecting innocent lives is more important. But I'm not sure why. Are you? .

So when deontologists invoke the language of rights, they necessarily also invoke duties (or obligations) on the part of others. A positive right is a right to actually "possess" something or achieve some worthwhile goal. A positive right, therefore, asserts an obligation on the part of others to actively assist. In contrast, a negative right is a right to "pursue" something or do something. A negative right merely entails an obligation on the part of others to refrain from interfering in that pursuit, but it does not necessarily oblige us to assist. If a person has a positive right to say medical care, then health care professionals and/or society have a positive obligation to fulfill that that right. If a person has only a negative right to health care, health care professionals and/or society merely have an obligation not to interfere in an individual’s pursuit of health care in a competitive economic environment.

 In general a society devoted to negative rights (see: libertarianism) will be marked by rugged individualism and competition. Conversely, a society heavy on positive rights (see: welfare liberalism) will be less so.

Most philosophers argue that rights and their corresponding duties must somehow be grounded. That is to say that, there must be some sanction or enforcement associated with that right. Divine command theorists ground human rights in the dictates of God, and threaten noncompliance with the wrath of the deity. (Unfortunately, God doesn’t always punish evildoers on earth, although he may have something in mind for later on!)  Natural rights theorists ground human rights in natural processes and warn of impending natural consequences for rights violations. Hence, if we do not take care of the earth, nature will retaliate with ecological disaster. (Unfortunately, Mother Nature doesn’t always punish wrongdoers either.)

Philosophers have also attempted to ground rights in either a legal system or in a moral system. legal rights are enforced by the power and authority of the government, and therefore, violation of a legal right usually carries with it a legal sanction or punishment. If you steal my guitar and get caught the government will throw you in jail! Of course, enforcement of legal rights depend on the state’s ability to find the right wrongdoers and punish them 

Moral rights are usually enforced by publicly invoking praise and blame. We praise individuals for morally good acts and blame them for transgressions. We identify models of moral behavior and encourage others to emulate that behavior. Conversely, if you steal my guitar, and get caught the community will blame you and perhaps ostracize you. Moral rights enforced only through moral sanctions are, obviously, rather precariously perched since many unsavory individuals are impervious to public sentiment. That's why many of the most important moral rights, such as the right to private property, and the right to life are also protected by legal sanctions. On the other hand, there are also many laws on the books that violate widely held moral beliefs. After all, slavery was once legal in the United States. It is now legal for politicians to accept campaign donations from major corporations. Is that morally acceptable? The relationship between legality and morality is philosophically intriguing. 

Issue to Think About:  Are you a teleologist or a deontologist: that is, are you more prone to make moral judgments based on consequences or conformity to rules?

YOU MUST BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THE FOLLOWING CONCEPTS?

teleological moral theories-

consequentialism-

hedonism-

deontological moral theories-

divine command theory-

natural law theory-

positive rights-

negative rights-

natural rights-

legal rights-

moral rights-