When discussing freedom of religion, what two parts are covered by the first amendment?

A guarantee of freedoms.

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” – The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

The five freedoms it protects: speech, religion, press, assembly, and the right to petition the government. Together, these five guaranteed freedoms make the people of the United States of America the freest in the world.
Before agreeing to accept the Constitution, the Founders of our democratic republic demanded that these freedoms be protected by an amendment to the original document – the First Amendment.
There’s no “legal age” you have to reach to exercise your First Amendment freedoms. They are guaranteed to you the day you’re born. There’s also no citizenship requirement for First Amendment protection. If you’re in the U.S., you have freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly and petition.
The First Amendment is neither “left-wing” or “right-wing.” It can be used to push for social and political change, or to oppose change. The First Amendment is for everyone.
The First Amendment protects us against government limits on our freedom of expression, but it doesn’t prevent a private employer from setting its own rules.
The First Amendment prevents government from requiring you to say something you don't want to, or keeping you from hearing or reading the words of others (even if you never speak out yourself, you have the right to receive information).
Students have the right to pray in America’s public schools, as long as there’s no disruption to school operations and no government employees (teachers, coaches) are involved.

Looking for a general overview? Here it is, from the First Amendment Encyclopedia.

LINKS

Speech

What does the First Amendment say about freedom of speech? Can speech be restricted, and if so, when? In this overview, a First Amendment scholar explains what sorts of speech are protected, where free expression may be limited, and why “[f]reedom of speech is a core American belief, almost a kind of secular religious tenet, an article of constitutional faith.”

Press

How did freedom of the press come about? Are there restrictions on press freedom? The ways in which this core freedom has developed in law are explained in this overview by a First Amendment scholar. In quotations from one court ruling, “‘[F]reedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment’” so that “‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.’”

Religion

The First Amendment introduced bold new ideas to the world: that government must not impose a state religion on the public, or place undue restrictions on religious practice, but must recognize the right of the people to believe and worship, or not, as their conscience dictates. This First Amendment scholar’s overview makes clear the many aspects of our religious freedom, saying, “That bold constitutional experiment in granting religious freedom to all remains in place, and in progress, in the United States.”

Assembly

Our right to gather in peaceful public protest – in marches, rallies and other assemblies – is another core freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment. As a First Amendment scholar says in this overview, “First Amendment freedoms ring hollow if government officials can repress expression that they fear will create a disturbance or offend. Unless there is real danger of imminent harm, assembly rights must be respected.”

Petition

This least-known First Amendment freedom is nevertheless crucial to our democratic republic’s form of government. “Petition is the right to ask government at any level to right a wrong or correct a problem,” writes a First Amendment scholar in this overview detailing how the right of petition works in our government, and the forms it takes.

First Amendment Encyclopedia

A comprehensive research compilation covering all aspects of First Amendment law.

First Amendment Center Archives

Archival site of the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center, containing news and commentary on First Amendment issues through 2012.

First Amendment Timeline

Significant historical events, court cases and ideas that have shaped our current system of constitutional First Amendment jurisprudence, compiled by the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center.

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Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) stands as the first U.S. Supreme Court case to expound upon the concept of academic freedom though some earlier cases mention it.

Most constitutional academic freedom issues today revolve around professors’ speech, students’ speech, faculty’s relations to government speech, and using affirmative action in student admissions.

Although academic freedom is regularly invoked as a constitutional right under the First Amendment, the Court has never specifically enumerated it as one, and judicial opinions have not developed a consistent interpretation of constitutional academic freedom or pronounced a consistent framework to analyze such claims.

The free-exercise clause of the First Amendment states that the government “shall make no law … prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” Although the text sounds absolute, “no law” does not always mean “no law.” The Supreme Court has had to place some limits on the freedom to practice religion. To take an easy example cited by the Court in one of its landmark “free-exercise” cases (Reynolds v. U.S., 1878), the First Amendment would not protect the practice of human sacrifice even if some religion required it. In other words, while the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act on those beliefs is not.

But where may government draw the line on the practice of religion? The courts have struggled with the answer to that question for much of our history. Over time, the Supreme Court developed a test to help judges determine the limits of free exercise. First fully articulated in the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner, this test is sometimes referred to as the Sherbert or “compelling interest” test. The test has four parts: two that apply to any person who claims that his freedom of religion has been violated, and two that apply to the government agency accused of violating those rights.

For the individual, the court must determine

Whether the person has a claim involving a sincere religious belief, and

Whether the government action places a substantial burden on the person’s ability to act on that belief.

If these two elements are established, then the government must prove

That it is acting in furtherance of a “compelling state interest,” and

That it has pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive, or least burdensome, to religion.

The Supreme Court, however, curtailed the application of the Sherbert test in the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith. In that case, the Court held that a burden on free exercise no longer had to be justified by a compelling state interest if the burden was an unintended result of laws that are generally applicable.

After Smith, only laws (or government actions) that (1) were intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion, or (2) violated other constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, were subject to the compelling-interest test. For example, a state could not pass a law stating that Native Americans are prohibited from using peyote, but it could accomplish the same result by prohibiting the use of peyote by everyone.

In the wake of Smith, many religious and civil liberties groups have worked to restore the Sherbert test — or compelling-interest test — through legislation. These efforts have been successful in some states. In other states, the courts have ruled that the compelling-interest test is applicable to religious claims by virtue of the state’s own constitution. In many states, however, the level of protection for free-exercise claims is uncertain.

Category: Freedom of Religion

← FAQ

The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” This clause not only forbids the government from establishing an official religion, but also prohibits government actions that unduly favor one religion over another. It also prohibits the government from unduly preferring religion over non-religion, or non-religion over religion.

Although some government action implicating religion is permissible, and indeed unavoidable, it is not clear just how much the Establishment Clause tolerates. In the past, the Supreme Court has permitted religious invocations to open legislative session, public funds to be used for private religious school bussing and textbooks, and university funds to be used to print and publish student religious groups' publications. Conversely, the Court has ruled against some overtly religious displays at courthouses, state funding supplementing teacher salaries at religious schools, and some overly religious holiday decorations on public land.

One point of contention regarding the Establishment Clause is how to frame government actions that implicate religion. Framing questions often arise in the context of permanent religious monuments on public land. Although it is reasonably clear that cities cannot install new religious monuments, there is fierce debate over whether existing monuments should be removed. When the Supreme Court recently considered this issue in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), and McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), it did not articulate a clear general standard for deciding these types of cases. The Court revisited this issue in Salazar v. Buono (08-472), a case which considered the constitutionality of a large white Christian cross erected by members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on federal land in the Mojave Desert. While five justices concluded that a federal judge erred in barring a congressionally ordered land transfer which would place the memorial on private land, there was no majority reasoning as to why. Three Justices held that the goal of avoiding governmental endorsement of religion does not require the destruction of religious symbols in the private realm, while Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this complaint.