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dinate to the chief governing bodies where there is a clear right to a vote; • Continue to ensure “major donor” (i.e., U.S. Government) representation on the key committees in the budget process; • Continue to work to ensure establishment of ceilings for development of the next budget, possibly with subceilings for subsidiary parts; • Work to create new committee mechanisms to serve these purposes if the existing ones are not effective or cannot be modified adequately; • Develop procedures for item-byitem review and decisionmaking on the components of budgets, rather than have delegations forced to deal with an entire budget package; • Continue to use mechanisms, or to develop new mechanisms as needed, to require the organizations, which now make their own internal decisions on the creation of new program activities and the elimination or curtailment of old ones, to present decisions on pri. orities to a representative group of member states for review or revision; • Reinforce efforts to make secretariat operations more transparent, where this appears necessary, in order to let member states have a clearer understanding of the real components of a budget proposal and on activities actually pursued during the preceding cycle (perhaps encouraging the establishment of new member-state evaluative mechanisms); and • Ensure that U.S. Government domestic agencies, and others involved in the substantive operations of the UN organizations, join officials at the Department of State in renewed efforts to evaluate the work of the UN organizations, so that we can make more concrete proposals for reducing, eliminating, or expanding specific activities or for starting new ones. All of these steps are possible, as they always have been. U.S. representatives to the UN's technical and specialized agencies have always advocated improved efficiency and effectiveness. There is no reason not to continue pursuing these goals. Indeed, there are important reasons, given the prospect for the foreseeable future of too few resources to meet seemingly unlimited needs, to press on with vigor in behalf of setting priorities more thoughtfully, employing budgetary discipline, and planning ahead. I understand that the purpose of the legislation of recent years was to help assure that the United States has major influence on important deisions
within the UN system, including those The extent to which the agency • The quality of the agency's re- • The level of domestic U.S. sup port for the organization and/or its Allocation of Resources programs; • The possible negative impact on • Organization performance in ful- The first decision was to pay in full Nations. The United Nations-ob- the U.S. assessments to the 30 smallest viously the biggest of the agencies— organizations in the account. These are accounts for about 34% of the require highly specialized and generally effecment for U.S. contributions. The other tive bodies requiring relatively small 66% goes to the UN's technical agen contributions. Their total requirements cies, as well as to other important or were $8.6 million for FY 1988. None ganizations such as NATO (North was above $1 million, and most were Atlantic Treaty Organization), the well below it. OECD (Organization of Economic Coop The next step was to apply the crieration and Development), and GATT teria I have just described to the re[General Agreement of Tariffs and maining 16 agencies in the account, Trade). which receive 98.5% of the appropria- But when the overall appropriation falls below the total requirement for tion. These were the UN, OECD, NATO, GATT, WHO, FAO, ILO, WMO, U.S. assessments—as it has for the IAEA, UNIDO, ICAO, OAS past 3 years—a serious blow falls on [Organization of American States), the entire account, including the UN's PAHO [Pan American Health Organizatechnical and specialized agencies. In tion), IICA (Inter-American Institute FY 1988, the appropriation covered 84% for Cooperation on Agriculture), ITU of the request ($480 million out of $571 [International Telecommunications million), which was a substantial in Union), and CCC (Customs Cooperacrease over that of the previous year, tion Council]. but it still left many of the specialized As a result of careful study of the organizations hurting. criteria, by the Department of State The question for all of us, Congress and other interested U.S. Government and Administration alike, is how we agencies, these 16 agencies were placed make payments to these organizations in four clusters, with each agency in when the appropriations are not suffi each cluster to receive approximately cient to meet the total requirements. the same percentage of the U.S. asAs you know, the Appropriations Con sessment. For example, the WHO and ference Committee Report (for the FY the IAEA will receive 100% funding, 1988 continuing resolution-PL and the United Nations will receive 100_202) asked the Department of State 75%. to evaluate international organizations The results of this clustering exer- cise form the basis for the reprogram- ming letter that is being sent forward by the Department. It is, of course, unfortunate that we cannot fund in full all of the organizations that we believe are serving us well, particularly consid ering the treaty obligations that attend ing funding priorities. The criteria that our membership in each of them. But, were developed included the following: in the circumstances, we believe the • The level of direct benefit or sub- outcome is both reasonable and fair. We stantive importance of the agency's hope that the Congress will be supportwork to the United States in political, ive of our approach, which was in fact strategic, or economic terms; Page 3Page 4
dinate to the chief governing bodies where there is a clear right to a vote; • Continue to ensure “major donor” (i.e., U.S. Government) representation on the key committees in the budget process; • Continue to work to ensure establishment of ceilings for development of the next budget, possibly with subceilings for subsidiary parts; • Work to create new committee mechanisms to serve these purposes if the existing ones are not effective or cannot be modified adequately; • Develop procedures for item-byitem review and decisionmaking on the components of budgets, rather than have delegations forced to deal with an entire budget package; • Continue to use mechanisms, or to develop new mechanisms as needed, to require the organizations, which now make their own internal decisions on the creation of new program activities and the elimination or curtailment of old ones, to present decisions on pri. orities to a representative group of member states for review or revision; • Reinforce efforts to make secretariat operations more transparent, where this appears necessary, in order to let member states have a clearer understanding of the real components of a budget proposal and on activities actually pursued during the preceding cycle (perhaps encouraging the establishment of new member-state evaluative mechanisms); and • Ensure that U.S. Government domestic agencies, and others involved in the substantive operations of the UN organizations, join officials at the Department of State in renewed efforts to evaluate the work of the UN organizations, so that we can make more concrete proposals for reducing, eliminating, or expanding specific activities or for starting new ones. All of these steps are possible, as they always have been. U.S. representatives to the UN's technical and specialized agencies have always advocated improved efficiency and effectiveness. There is no reason not to continue pursuing these goals. Indeed, there are important reasons, given the prospect for the foreseeable future of too few resources to meet seemingly unlimited needs, to press on with vigor in behalf of setting priorities more thoughtfully, employing budgetary discipline, and planning ahead. I understand that the purpose of the legislation of recent years was to help assure that the United States has major influence on important deisions
within the UN system, including those The extent to which the agency • The quality of the agency's re- • The level of domestic U.S. sup port for the organization and/or its Allocation of Resources programs; • The possible negative impact on • Organization performance in ful- The first decision was to pay in full Nations. The United Nations-ob- the U.S. assessments to the 30 smallest viously the biggest of the agencies— organizations in the account. These are accounts for about 34% of the require highly specialized and generally effecment for U.S. contributions. The other tive bodies requiring relatively small 66% goes to the UN's technical agen contributions. Their total requirements cies, as well as to other important or were $8.6 million for FY 1988. None ganizations such as NATO (North was above $1 million, and most were Atlantic Treaty Organization), the well below it. OECD (Organization of Economic Coop The next step was to apply the crieration and Development), and GATT teria I have just described to the re[General Agreement of Tariffs and maining 16 agencies in the account, Trade). which receive 98.5% of the appropria- But when the overall appropriation falls below the total requirement for tion. These were the UN, OECD, NATO, GATT, WHO, FAO, ILO, WMO, U.S. assessments—as it has for the IAEA, UNIDO, ICAO, OAS past 3 years—a serious blow falls on [Organization of American States), the entire account, including the UN's PAHO [Pan American Health Organizatechnical and specialized agencies. In tion), IICA (Inter-American Institute FY 1988, the appropriation covered 84% for Cooperation on Agriculture), ITU of the request ($480 million out of $571 [International Telecommunications million), which was a substantial in Union), and CCC (Customs Cooperacrease over that of the previous year, tion Council]. but it still left many of the specialized As a result of careful study of the organizations hurting. criteria, by the Department of State The question for all of us, Congress and other interested U.S. Government and Administration alike, is how we agencies, these 16 agencies were placed make payments to these organizations in four clusters, with each agency in when the appropriations are not suffi each cluster to receive approximately cient to meet the total requirements. the same percentage of the U.S. asAs you know, the Appropriations Con sessment. For example, the WHO and ference Committee Report (for the FY the IAEA will receive 100% funding, 1988 continuing resolution-PL and the United Nations will receive 100_202) asked the Department of State 75%. to evaluate international organizations The results of this clustering exer- cise form the basis for the reprogram- ming letter that is being sent forward by the Department. It is, of course, unfortunate that we cannot fund in full all of the organizations that we believe are serving us well, particularly consid ering the treaty obligations that attend ing funding priorities. The criteria that our membership in each of them. But, were developed included the following: in the circumstances, we believe the • The level of direct benefit or sub- outcome is both reasonable and fair. We stantive importance of the agency's hope that the Congress will be supportwork to the United States in political, ive of our approach, which was in fact strategic, or economic terms; Page 5
of the surviving democratic political elements in Nicaragua. Moreover, while the Nicaraguan President demands unilateral termination of support for the forces of freedom in Nicaragua, the massive flow to the Sandinistas of Soviet-bloc arms continues unabated. The United States remains fully committed to the achievement of democracy in Nicaragua and security in all of Central America as the essential conditions for a just and lasting peace in the region. The events which have unfolded since the signing of the Guatemala accord on August 7, 1987, have demonstrated once again that a strong Nicaraguan democratic resistance remains essential to the achievement of those conditions.
gime to comply with its obligation to establish democracy and to negotiate a cease-fire directly with the resistance. The request prohibits delivery of all lethal aid after February 29, 1988, which is the date on which current authority to deliver lethal aid expires. Thereafter, delivery of lethal aid may begin only if, after March 31, 1988, the President certifies to the Congress that (A) there is no cease-fire in place between the Government of Nicaragua and the resistance, (B) that Nicaragua has not met its obligations to comply with the requirements of the declaration of the
Central American Peace Process
The President today submitted a request to the Congress pursuant to Section 111 of the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution (PL 100–202) for $36.25 million of additional aid for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance (NDR) to sustain the resistance. The request ensures that the resistance can continue the pressure on the Sandinista regime to comply with its obligations under the Guatemala accord of August 7, 1987, to bring democracy to Nicaragua. All funds under the request are derived by transfer from existing defense appropriations. Ninety percent of the funds requested provided nonlethal aid, such as food, clothing, medicines, and the means to deliver it. Ten percent provides for Redeye air defense missiles, for use against the Sandinistas' Soviet-made Hind helicopter gunships and ammunition. The request prohibits the purchase of aircraft to transport aid to the resistance, but permits leasing aircraft. To ensure the availability of leased aircraft, the request authorizes the President to transfer not more than $20 million from defense appropriations to indemnify the owners of leased aircraft in the event of loss, but which will otherwise not be spent. The request also provides for electronic equipment, radar, and other passive air defense equipment to protect the safety of transportation. The request supports the Central American peace process by providing a clear opportunity for the Sandinista re
President Reagan believes that the outcome of the January 15 summit meeting of the Central American presidents presents important opportunities to further peace and democracy in this troubled region. At the San Jose summit, there was a clear consensus among the four Central American democratic presidents that the Sandinistas had not complied with the peace accord. By making his last minute promises, President [Daniel] Ortega implicitly acknowledged the accuracy of that judgment. The Guatemala City plan aims at peace and democracy for all of Central America. Its objectives, in combination with the pressures from the Central American democracies and the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, have prompted the Sandinistas to reluctantly promise to diminish their tight control over the Nicaraguan political system and to provide a glimmer of hope to the Nicaraguan people that democracy and freedom may eventually be established. The key issue is whether Daniel Ortega is really committed to genuine
democracy or just seeks the elimination of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. The Sandinistas' track record is clear and must be considered in evaluating the latest Sandinista offer. There is a need for openmindedness and hope, along with skepticism. We welcome the new promises, but note that while Daniel Ortega was in Costa Rica making them, his government was arresting prominent democratic leaders inside Nicaragua The focus is where it belongs: on the Sandinistas—their promises and their actions. The President believes that continued support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance will keep the pressure on the Sandinistas to move forward with genuine and enduring democratic reforms. The Nicaraguan democratic resistance is the best insurance policy for keeping the peace process on track and producing a democratic outcome in Nicaragua. This is not the time to falter in our support for the freedom fighters.
iText from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 25, 1988.
International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force June 22, 1985. Accession deposited: Uruguay, Dec. 15, 1987.
International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987. International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.3 Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987. Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. Entered into force Mar. 30, 1983. TIAS 10561. Accession deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987.
Antarctica Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Wellington Nov. 10, 1972. Entered into force, May 29, 1975, for recommendations VII-1 through VII-3 and VII-6 through VII-8; June 24, 1981, for recommendations VII-4 and VII-9. Notification of approval: U.K., Feb. 10, 1988, for recommendation VII-5. Entered into force: Feb. 10, 1988, for recommendation VII-5. Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Brussels Oct. 18, 1985.1 Notification of approval: Uruguay, Dec. 29, 1987; Japan, Dec. 25, 1987, except for recommendations XIII-10 through XIII–13.
Migration Amendments to the constitution of the intergovernmental committee for migration of Oct. 19, 1953 (TIAS 3197). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1987. Enters into force upon acceptance by two-thirds of the member states or as further provided in Art. 30(2)." Acceptance deposited: U.S., Feb. 19, 1988.
Annex V to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973: regulations for the prevention of pollution by garbage from ships. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. Enters into force: Dec. 31, 1988.
Patents-Microorganisms Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768. Accession deposited: Korea, Rep. of, Dec. 28, 1987.
Aviation, Civil Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. Accession deposited: Maldives, Sept. 1, 1987. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. Accession deposited: Maldives, Sept. 1, 1987.
Pollution Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. Signatures: Greece, Oct. 29, 1987; Belorussian S.S.R., Jan, 22, 1988; Ukrainian S.S.R., Feb. 18, 1988; U.S.S.R., Dec. 29, 1987.
Canals Protocol to the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal (TIAS 10029). Done at Washington Sept. 7, 1977. Enters into force for each state at the time of deposit of its instrument of accession. Accessions deposited: Barbados, Sept. 14, 1987; Germany, Fed. Rep., Feb. 9, 1988.2
Maritime Matters International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London, Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629. Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966. Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1971.) Accessions deposited: Burma, Nov. 11, 1987. Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975. Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987. Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. Accession deposited: Burma, Nov. 11, 1987. International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. Accessions deposited: Burma, Nov. 11, 1987.
Prisoner Transfer Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824. Ratifications deposited: Greece, Dec. 17, 1987;5 Switzerland, Jan. 15, 1988.5 Territorial application: Extended to Faroe Islands by Denmark, with effect May 1, 1988.
Terrorism International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 27, 1988.
Marine Pollution Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 9, 1987. Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972, on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter (TIAS 8165). Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.1 Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987.
Trade UN convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. (52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 11, 1988. Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. Contracting party status accorded: Lesotho, Jan. 8, 1988.
International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.3 Accession deposited: Canada, Nov. 6, 19874 Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 15, 1987.
Argentina Memorandum of understanding on the exchange of officers between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Argentine Marine Corps. Signed at Washington Oct. 7 and Dec. 3, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1987.
Germany, Federal Republic of Agreement extending the agreement of June 8, 1976 (TIAS 8657), as extended, in the field of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. Effected by exchange of letters at Bonn and Washington Dec. 15 and 31, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1987. Supplementary agreements amending the agreement on social security of Jan. 7, 1976, and the administrative agreement of June 21, 1978 (TIAS 9542). Signed at Washington Oct. 2, 1986. Entered into force: Mar. 1, 1988.
Netherlands Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Apr. 3, 1957, as amended (TIAS 4782, 6797, 8998). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 13 and Dec. 22, 1987. Entered into force provisionally, Dec. 23, 1987; definitively, on the date on which the U.S. is informed by the Netherlands that all necessary internal procedures have been completed. Agreement on preinspection in respect of Aruba. Signed at Oranjestad June 16, 1987. Entered into force: Mar. 11, 1988.
Peru Grant agreement for an agricultural tech- nology transformation project. Signed at Lima Sept. 25, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1987.
Canada Agreement extending the agreement of Aug. 25, 1982 (TIAS 10456), respecting cooperation in radioactive waste management. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Pinawa May 29 and June 25, 1987. Entered into force June 25, 1987. Arrangement in the area of natural gas hydrates research and development. Signed at Ottawa and Washington Dec. 11, 1987, and Feb. 16, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 16, 1988. Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with annex. Signed at Quebec Mar. 18, 1985.1 (Senate] Treaty Doc. 100–14. Transmitted to Senate: Feb. 22, 1988.
Guinea-Bissau Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bissau Jan. 12 and 15, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 15, 1988.
Rwanda International express mail agreement with detailed regulations. Signed at Kigali and Washington Jan. 15 and Feb. 8, 1988. Entered into force Mar. 15, 1988.
South Africa Agreement for cooperation in the development, building, installation, and operation of an integrated, real-time global seismic data acquisition system. Signed at Pretoria Dec. 1, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1987.
Dominican Republic Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Santo Domingo June 30, 1987. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes indicating that internal procedures of both countries have been completed. Agreement amending special access agreement of Dec. 18, 1986, relating to trade in certain textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo Oct. 19 and Dec. 16, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1987.
Japan Parcel post agreement, protocol, and detailed regulations of execution. Signed at Tokyo and Washington Oct. 2 and Nov. 3, 1958. Entered into force Nov. 3, 1958. Termination: Notification given by U.S. Feb. 1, 1988, effective Aug. 1, 1988. Agreement between the U.S. and Japan amending and extending the agreement of Sept. 10, 1982, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 10480), with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington Nov. 10, 1987. Entered into force: Dec. 31, 1987. Agreement extending the agreement of May 1, 1980 (TIAS 9760), as extended, on cooperation in research and development in science and technology. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Jan. 29, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1988; effective Feb. 1, 1988.
Spain Agreement on social security, with admin- istrative arrangement. Signed at Madrid Sept. 30, 1986. Entered into force: Apr. 1, 1988.
Tanzania International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Dar es Salaam and Washington Dec. 30, 1987, and Jan. 25, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1988.
Uganda Ageement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kampala Jan. 13, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 22, 1988.
Agreement extending the agreement of Sept. 20, 1976, as amended and extended (TIAS 10213), in the field of liquid metalcooled fast breeder reactors. Effected by exchange of letters at Risley and Washington Nov. 25 and Dec. 28, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1987. Agreement concerning the investigation of drug trafficking offenses and the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking, with attachment and exchange of notes. Signed at London Feb. 9, 1988. Enters into force on the date of exchange of notes setting forth the intention of both governments to be bound by agreement.
Free single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
U.S.S.R. Treaty on the elimination of intermediaterange and shorter range missiles, with memorandum of understanding and protocols. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 1987.1 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100–11. Transmitted to the Senate: Jan. 25, 1988.
United Kingdom Supplementary treaty to the extradition treaty of June 8, 1972 (TIAS 8468), with annex. Signed at Washington June 25, 1985. Entered into force Dec. 23, 1986. Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 4, 1988.5,6
INot in force. 2Applicable to Berlin (West) 3Not in force for the U.S. 4With reservation. 5With declaration(s). 6With amendments.
Secretary Shultz The Struggle Against Terrorism, Anti- Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Palm #1045). Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Seattle, Feb. 5, 1988 (Current Policy #1043). America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 2, 1988 (Current Policy #1040). The INF Treaty: Strengthening U.S. Security, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jan. 25, 1988 (Current Policy #1038).
Arms Control U.S. Arms Control Initiatives, Feb. 15, 1988 (Special Report #176). The INF Treaty: Negotiation and Ratifica tion, Ambassadors Kampelman and Glitman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Jan. 26, 1988 (Current Policy #1039).
East Asia Exchanges (GIST, Feb. 1988). U.S.-Japanese Relations (GIST, Feb. 1988).
Europe Fresh Look, Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 19, 1988 (Current Policy #1044). U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cultural and Educational Exchanges (GIST, Feb. 1988).
Chester E. Norris sworn in as Ambassador to Equa- torial Guinea, Feb. 17 (biographic data). Richard S. Williamson sworn in as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (bio graphic data). Shultz: interview on USIA's “Worldnet,” Feb. 18. Program for the official working visit to Wash- Silva, Feb. 23–25. Shultz, news conference, Helsinki, Feb. 20. Shultz: remarks at human rights reception, Moscow, Feb. 21. Shultz: news conference, Moscow, Feb. 22. United States, 1961-63, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961, released. Shultz: news conference, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Feb. 23. Shultz: statement, Ameri- can Colony Hotel, Jerusa lem, Feb. 26. Shultz: departure remarks, Amman, Jordan, Feb. 27.
Subject Shultz: interview on ABC TV's "This Week With David Brinkley,” Jan. 31. Shultz: statement, House Foreign Affairs Commit tee, Feb. 2. Shultz: remarks, American Friends of Turkey, Crystal City, Va. Shultz: address and question-and-answer session, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Seattle, Feb. 5. Shultz: interview on PBS TV, University of Wash ington, Seattle, Feb. 5. Shultz, Yeo: remarks at opening session of the 8th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue. Program for the official working visit to Washington, D.C., of West German Chancellor Kohl, Feb. 17-19. Shultz: address before the Anti-Defamation League Beach, Feb. 12. Shultz: news conference, Bal Harbour, Feb. 16.
Human Rights Secretary Schifter, Conference on Human Rights and Religious Freedom, Ven ice, Feb. 4, 1988 (Current Policy #1041). Implementation of Helsinki Final Act April 1-October 1, 1987 (Special Report #172, Feb. 1988).
Refugees icy: Reciprocal Impacts, Ambassador Moore, World Affairs Council, Los An- geles, Nov. 19, 1987 (Current Policy #1036).
United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization (GIST, Feb. 1988).
Western Hemisphere El Salvador: U.S. Policy (GIST, Feb. 1988).
Foreign Relations Volume Released
publishing the Foreign Relations series The Department recognizes the con- tinuing interest in the diplomacy of the Vietnam war and is expediting the pub- lication of the Foreign Relations volumes on Vietnam. The Foreign Rela- tions series is prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.
Copies of Volume 1 (Department of State Publication No. 9625, GPO Stock No. 044-000-02195-1) may be purchased for $21.00 (domestic postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents.
Press release 27 of Feb. 25, 1988.
CSCE Semiannual Report Released
The Department, on February 25, 1988, ical documentation on American foreign policy and the first volume recording the events and efforts of the Admin- istration of President John F. Kennedy. In 1961, the U.S. Government made over the terms and degree of American involvement in Vietnam. The Americanexperience in the Korean war, the con- tinuing turmoil in Laos, and the crisis in Berlin all had an impact upon the efforts to contain communism in South- east Asia. Despite measured military and economic assistance and a morale- boosting visit by Vice President Lyn- don Johnson, an increasingly pessi- mistic appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam by the early summer of 1961 gave rise to proposals in Wash- ington for the introduction of U.S. com- bat forces into the country. President Kennedy's military representative, Gen- eral Maxwell Taylor, visited Vietnam at the end of the year and came back with recommendations for wide-ranging re- forms of the Diem government and the dispatch of U.S. troops. The proposals set off a controversy among the Presi- dent's advisers, but by year's end the President had decided against sending troops. Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Vietnam, comprises 768 pages of previously classified foreign affairs records from the Department of State, the White House, and other government agencies. The Department of State is currently
On behalf of the President, the Secre- place, the report highlights the fact At the Conference on Security and they undertook as signatories of the points, recognizing improvements when Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid con- they occur and vigorously highlighting cluding document. Among the issues continuing Soviet and East European discussed are human rights and human- failures where they remain. itarian concerns; security and confi- This report is an important eledence-building measures; economic, ment in the continuing U.S. effort to scientific, and technological coopera- assess the progress and shortcomings tion; emigration; freedom of informa- in the implementation of the CSCE tion; and educational and cultural goals of protecting human rights, exchanges. strengthening security, expanding coopThe report acknowledges that the eration, and building mutual record of compliance varied among the confidence. East European states, but it makes evi- Free single copies of this 46-page dent that overall performance by the report are available from the Warsaw Pact nations in the area of hu- Correspondence Management Division, man rights and human contacts remains Bureau of Public Affairs, Department deplorable. While recognizing that of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. some positive developments have taken Please request Special Report #172. I Page 6
April 1988 Volume 88, No. 2133
Africa. National Security Strategy of the United States (Reagan) 1 Arms Control America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988 (Shultz) 43 Conference on Disarmament Reconvenes in Vienna (Reagan) 51 Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Shultz) 38 1 Nuclear Testing Talks Open Round Two (White House statement) 50 Secretary's Interview on “This Week With David Brinkley” (excerpts) 48 Soviet Experts Visit U.S. Nuclear Test Site (joint statement) 51 U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue Held in Washington (Shultz, Yeo, joint statement) 52 China. U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies (White House statement, White House fact sheet) 65 Congress America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988 (Shultz) 43 1 69 81 69 Department & Foreign Service. America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988 (Shultz) 43 East Asia National Security Strategy of the United States (Reagan)1 U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue Held in Washington (Shultz, Yeo, joint statement) ..... 52 Economics Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Shultz) 1 81 66 U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue Held in Washington (Shultz, Yeo, joint statement) 52 Egypt Arab Republic of Egypt Visit of Egyptian President (Mubarak, Reagan) 72
Europe 1 66 Fisheries. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Meeting on Fisheries Issues (joint statement) Hong Kong. U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies (White House statement, White House fact sheet) 65 Human Rights Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Shultz) 38 70 The Struggle Against Terrorism (Shultz).. 35 66 Japan U.S.-Japanese Relations 64 U.S.-Japanese Relations in Focus (Clark) 58 61 Korea. U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies (White House statement, White House fact sheet) 65 Lebanon. Passport Restriction for Lebanon (Department statement) 79 Middle East National Security Strategy of the United States (Reagan)1 Secretary's Interview on "This Week With David Brinkley” (excerpts) 48 85 America's Foreign Policy Agenda in (Shultz) 43 Central American Peace Process (White House statement) 86 32 Secretary's Interview on "This Week With David Brinkley" (excerpts). 48 National Security Strategy of the United States (Reagan) ... 1 Pakistan (White House statement) .... 80 1 80 Panama. Panama (Department statement) 85 Passports. Passport Restriction for Lebanon (Department statement) 79
Presidential Documents Conference on Disarmament Reconvenes in Vienna 51 1 72 61 Publications CSCE Semiannual Report Released 90 Department of State Foreign Relations Volume Released 90 Singapore. U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies (White House statement, White House fact sheet) 65 1 Terrorism America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988 (Shultz) 43 The Struggle Against Terrorism (Shultz) 35 Trade America's Foreign Policy Agenda in 1988 (Shultz) 43 1 U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies (White House statement, White House fact sheet) 65 87 U.S.S.R. Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship (Shultz) 38 Nuclear Testing Talks Open Round Two (White House statement) Soviet Experts Visit U.S. Nuclear Test Site (joint statement) 51 66 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Meeting on Fisheries Issues (joint statement) 68 81 Western Hemisphere Central American Peace Process (White House statement) 86 1
Clark, William, Jr Mubarak, Hosni Mohammed Reagan, President Schifter, Richard Shultz, Secretary Takeshita, Noboru Whitehead, John C Williamson, Richard S Yeo Cheow Tong Page 7
(White House photo by Pete Souza)
8. Security in Europe involves not just military but also political, economic, and, above all, humanitarian factors. We look forward to a Europe undivided, in which people of all states can freely receive ideas and information, enjoy their fundamental human rights, and determine their own future. Allied forces are stationed outside their national territory to protect these values and to uphold the solidarity of our free alliance. They cannot, therefore, be equated with Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe. A just and lasting peaceful order in Europe requires that all states enjoy relations of confidence with their own citizens, trust them to make political or economic choices of their own, and allow them to receive information from and exchange ideas with citizens of other states. 9. Conventional arms control talks should be guided by a coherent political vision which reflects these values. It was their adherence to this vision which enabled the allies to secure a successful outcome to the Stockholm fee conference. It is these same considerations that have led the allies to decide that both the negotiations which they have now proposed, on conventional stability, as well as those on confidence President Reagan and NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. and security-building measures, will be undertaken within the framework of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process. C. The Allies' Objectives manpower alone is an imprecise guide 10. Those on confidence- and 13. In accordance with the principles of to offensive capability. 15. Our aim will be to establish a security-building will involve all 35 our approach to conventional arms conCSCE signatory states and will have as situation in Europe in which force postrol, as set out in the Brussels declaratheir objective to build upon and ex tures, as well as the numbers and detion, our objectives in the forthcoming pand the results of the Stockholm con ployments of weapons systems, no conventional stability negotiations will ference; the agreement reached there longer make surprise attack and largebe: marked a significant step toward reduc scale offensive action a feasible option. • The establishment of a secure and ing the risk of war in Europe. Fully We shall pursue this aim on the basis of implemented over time, it would create stable balance of conventional forces at the following criteria. lower levels; more transparency and contribute to • We need to enhance stability in greater confidence and predictability of • The elimination of disparities the whole of Europe from the Atlantic military activities in the whole of Eu prejudicial to stability and security; and to the Urals and to do so in a way rope. The momentum generated by • As a matter of high priority, the which, while safeguarding the security Stockholm must be maintained. elimination of the capability for launch- of all allies, takes account of the con11. At the same time, we are con ing a surprise attack and for initiating centrations of Warsaw Pact forces and scious of the specific responsibility of large-scale offensive action. the particular problems affecting the the 23 members of the two military al- 14. This latter capability is the central, southern, and northern liances in Europe whose forces bear regions. most worrying in relation to the seizure most directly on the essential security . In seeking to eliminate the ability of territory by an aggressor. Its essenrelationship in Europe. Hence our deci to conduct large-scale offensive action, tial ingredient is the forward deploysion that distinct and autonomous nego- ment of conventional forces capable of we shall focus on the key weapons tiations on conventional stability should systems. rapid mobility and high firepower. take place between the 23 states. Tanks and artillery are among the most • We shall propose provisions deal12. The adoption of mandates for ing with stationed forces, taking acdecisive components, though other eleboth of the negotiations must be part of ments of combat capability could prove count of the weight of forward-deployed a balanced outcome to the Vienna to be similarly significant. Manpower is Soviet conventional forces. We shall CSCE followup meeting, which necessi also take into consideration capabilities also important. But not all items of tates substantial progress in all areas of equipment are appropriate for limita for force generation and reinforcement. the Helsinki Final Act. tion, if only for technical reasons, and Page 8
this joint endeavour in a spirit of solidarity, reaffirming our willingness to share fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities as well as the benefits of our common efforts. 7. We seek a just and stab con tion of peace in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states are respected and the rights of all individuals, including their right of political choice, are protected We want gradually to overcome the unnatural division of the European continent, which affects most directly the German people. We will continue to uphold the freedom and viability of Berlin and to support efforts to improve the situation there. The search for improved and more stable relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe is among our principal concerns. We call upon these countries to work with us for a further relaxation of tensions, greater security at lower levels of arms, more extensive human contacts and increased access to information. We will continue the effort to expand co-operation with the East wherever and whenever this is of mutual benefit.
The Purposes and Principles of Our Alliance 2. Our Alliance is a voluntary association of free and democratic equals, united by common interests and values. It is unprecedented in its scope and success. Our security is indivisible. Our Alliance is dedicated to preserving peace in freedom and to collective self-defence, as recognized by the United Nations Charter. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. 3. Our concept of a balanced security policy as set out in the Harmel Report has successfully stood the test of time. It remains valid in its two complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches: political solidarity and adequate military strength, and, on that basis, the search for constructive dialogue and co-operation, including arms control. The ultimate political purpose of our Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. 4. The security in freedom and the prosperity of the European and North American Allies are inextricably linked. The longstanding commitment of the North American democracies to the preservation of peace and security in Europe is vital. The presence in Europe of the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States provides the essential linkage with the United States strategic deterrent, and, together with the forces of Canada, is a tangible expression of that commitment. This presence must and will be maintained. Likewise, a free, independent and increasingly united Europe is vital to North America's security. The credibility of Allied defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution. We therefore welcome recent efforts to reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance, intended to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and Alliance security as a whole. The Atlantic Alliance cannot be strong if Europe is weak. 5. Our aim will continue to be to prevent any kind of war or intimidation. By maintaining credible deterrence the Alliance has secured peace in Europe for nearly forty years. Conventional defences alone cannot ensure this; therefore, for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary. 6. While seeking security and stability at lower levels of armaments, we are determined to sustain the requisite efforts to ensure the continued viability, credibility and effectiveness of our conventional and nuclear forces, including the nuclear forces in Europe, which together provide the guarantee of our common security. Taking into account the structure of the Alliance, each of us undertakes to play his part in
East-West Relations: The Way Ahead 8. We have noted encouraging signs of change in the policies of the Soviet Union and some of its allies. This creates the prospect for greater openness in their relations with their own people and with other nations. We welcome such progress as has been already achieved in certain areas. But we look beyond pronouncements for tangible and lasting policy changes addressing directly the issue dividing East and West. 9. However, we have to date witnessed no relaxation of the military effort pursued for years by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union persists in deploying far greater military forces than are required for its defence. This massive force, which the Soviet Union has not refrained from using outside its borders, as is still the case in Afghanistan, constitutes a fundamental source of tension between East and West. The steady growth of Soviet military capabilities, as it affects every region of the Alliance, requires our constant attention. 10. We will continue to be steadfast in the pursuit of our security policies, maintaining the effective defences and credible deterrence that form the necessary basis for constructive dialogue with the East including on arms control and disarmament matters. To meet our security needs in the years to come will require ever greater efficiencies in the application of our scarce resources. We are therefore determined to expand our practical co-operation in the field of armaments procurement and elsewhere. In this context we recognise the challenges to our industrially less advanced Allies and the need to address them through mutual assistance and cooperation.
11. Arms control is an integral part of our security policy. We seek negotiations not for their own sake but to reach agreements which can significantly reduce the risk of conflict and make a genuine contribution to stability and peace. We shall work together vigorously and on the basis of the closest consultation to this end. 12. Our representatives to the North Atlantic Council continue actively the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament as directed in the Statement of our Ministers at Reykjavik in June 1987. 13. The recently concluded INF agreement between the US and the Soviet Union is a milestone in our efforts to achieve a more secure peace and lower levels of arms. It is the impressive result of the political courage, the realism and the unity of the members of the Alliance. The treaty's provisions on stringent verification and asymmetrical reductions provide useful precedents for future agreements. We look forward to its early entry into force. 14. Consistent with their security requirements, the fifteen Allies concerned will make use of all possibilities for effectively verifiable arms control agreements which lead to a stable and secure balance of forces at a lower level. For them, the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament includes: • A 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the US and the Soviet Union to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations; • The global elimination of chemical weapons; • The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe; • In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings. 15. Recognizing the urgency and central importance of addressing the conventional force imbalances in Europe, we have adopted a separate statement on conventional arms control. 16. The resolution of East-West differences will require progress in many fields. Genuine peace in Europe cannot be established solely by arms control. It must be firmly based on full respect for fundamental human rights. As we continue our efforts to reduce armaments, we shall press for implementation on the part of the governments of the Soviet Union and of other Eastern countries of all of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and of the Madrid Concluding Document. We support the continuation and strengthening of the CSCE process. It represents an important means of promoting stable and constructive relations on a long
President's Visit to Mexico
President Reagan visited Mexico on February 13, 1988, for a meeting with President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. Following are arrival remarks made by the two Presidents, a luncheon toast made by President Reagan, and the text of a White House statement. 1
ARRIVAL CEREMONY, MAZATLAN, FEB. 13, 1988
term basis between countries of East and West, and, moreover, enhances closer and more fruitful contacts between peoples and individuals throughout Europe. We call upon all participating states to make every effort for an early conclusion to the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna with a substantial and balanced final document. 17. We agree that the speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the effective restoration of that country's sovereignty would be of major significance. It is against these criteria that we shall assess General Secretary Gorbachev's recent statements. 18. We hope that at their forthcoming summit in Moscow President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be able to build upon the progress achieved at their Washington meeting last December. We strongly support the efforts of the United States. These fully accord with our consistent policy to seek, through highlevel dialogue, early and substantial progress with the Soviet Union on a full range of issues, including greater respect for human rights, arms control, a lessening of regional tensions and improved opportunities for bilateral contacts and cooperation. 19. Reflecting upon almost four decades of common endeavour and sacrifice and upon the results achieved, we are confident that the principles and purposes of our Alliance remain valid today and for the future. We are united in our efforts to ensure a world of more secure peace and greater freedom. We will meet the opportunities and challenges ahead with imagination and hope, as well as with firmness and vigilance. We owe no less to our peoples. Greece recalled its position on nuclear matters.
President De la Madrid 2 On behalf of the people and the Government of Mexico, I am very pleased to extend a most cordial welcome to the President of the United States of America and to the distinguished members of
President Reagan President De la Madrid, distinguished guests, people of Mexico: This is a momentous occasion for me. Over 5 years ago, President De la Madrid and I first met near the border in Tijuana. We dedicated ourselves to building on the strength, friendship, and cooperation that are traditional bonds between our two countries. We resolved to address the daily concerns of our citizens with mutual respect and understanding. We set out to make progress on difficult issues and to discuss areas of disagreement with the candor of good friends. The personal rapport we developed has served the interests of both our peoples. Today Mexico and the United States stand together as we strive to meet the perplexing challenges that face our nations. We can be proud of what has been accomplished in so short a period. We have created dynamic commercial ties that lay the foundation for a stronger and expanding trade relationship and more competitive economies. We have worked together to find positive and creative solutions to a threatening international debt problem. We have established strong new mechanisms to deal with border matters. We have strengthened law enforcement cooperation, reducing the ability of criminals to take advantage of different jurisdictions. Today we will meet again in the spirit of good will and cooperation that has been the hallmark of our relations. Today we help pave the way for a new generation of political leaders in both our countries who will soon follow us and build on the foundation we've laid. That foundation is cemented by our shared values and common goals: a better quality of life for our peoples, opportunities for our children, and the dignity of living peacefully in free and democratic societies. Much still needs to be done to achieve these goals, but we can be proud of the legacy we leave. Next year we will commemorate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission. The commission has been a success, a model for
This is the sixth time that we two Presidents have met, and, on balance, this type of top-level communication between the governments of our countries has shown itself to be both effective and useful. On the basis of personal friendship and direct, frank communication, we two Presidents have periodically had the opportunity to review issues of interest to us and to improve the manner in which our relations are conducted. I must gratefully acknowledge President Reagan's interest in maintaining our relations within an atmosphere of mutual cordiality, dignity, and respect. We have dealt successfully with delicate issues and broadened the basis for cooperation, which, as neighbors, our two countries require. Today we can affirm that our relations are conducted on a very positive level. There is fluid and wide-ranging communication between the two governments, and we have institutional mechanisms, not only to solve but also to prevent problems. I am certain that on this occasion, perhaps the last time we meet as Presidents, we will strengthen the basis for good and productive relations and discuss as frankly as we always have the problems on our agenda. President Reagan, I cordially welcome you and also the members of your party.
Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 7, 1988.
others throughout the world. It is concrete and living proof that two nations can live as neighbors, deal with the reality of a 3,000-kilometer border, and respect each other's sovereign independence and identity. There will be no greater monument to this upcoming anniversary, which marks a century of Mexican-American cooperation, than the current high plane of relations between the leaders of our countries and the bonds of family, commerce, and friendship between our peoples. This is the spirit in which I come today.
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 13, 1988
(White House photo by Susan Biddle)
President Reagan and President De la Madrid.
President Reagan and President De la Madrid met privately for approximately 45 minutes with only notetakers present. President Reagan congratulated President De la Madrid on his 5 years of leadership and for the modernization that he had brought to Mexico. The President stressed that during the tenure of the two Presidents significant successes had been achieved in trade, investment relations, drug enforcement, commercial ventures, and general economic improvements. The President stressed the importance of the drug problem for our two countries. He raised the issue of certification to Congress by March 1 and urged the Mexican President to work even harder on drug eradication. President De la Madrid emphasized his deep concern and intensive efforts to deal with the drug problem. He said he condemns narcotics and would have more to say on the matter publicly later. President De la Madrid quoted a number of statistics concerning their drug enforcement activities. President Reagan recognized that Mexico has been very cooperative in fighting drugs, but also pointed out that "this is the year we have to show results.” The two leaders also discussed Central American policy. The President repeated his commitment to the peace process and to his support for the resistance. President De la Madrid said his country has been supportive of the Esquipulas plan (Guatemala accords). They also discussed East-West relations, and the President commented on his recent summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.
Geography Area: 1.978 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); about three times the size of Texas. Cities: Capital—Mexico City (pop. 18 million, est. 1985). Other cities—Guadalajara (3 million), Monterrey (2.7 million), Ciudad Juarez (1.12 million), Puebla de Zaragoza (1.1 million), Leon (1 million). Terrain: Varies from coastal lowlands to high mountains. Climate: Varies from tropical to desert.
People Nationality: Noun and adjective-Mexican(s). Population (July 1987): 81.9 million. Annual growth rate (1987 est.): 2.09%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish (mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religion: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%. Language: Spanish. Education: Years compulsory-10. Literacy—88%. Health: Infant mortality rate (1984)—51.0/1,000. Life expectancy (1984)—65.4 yrs. Work force (26,320,000, 1985): Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing-26%. Manufacturing12.8%. Commerce-13.9%. Services, 31.4%. Mining and quarrying-1.3%. Construction—9.5%. Electricity—0.3%. Transportation and communication4.8%.
GDP (1987 est.): $126 billion. Per capita GDP (1987 est.): $1,537. Annual real GDP growth (1987 est.): 1.5%. Avg. inflation rate (1987 prelim.): 158.8%. Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Products—corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. Industry: Types—manufacturing, services, commerce, transportation and communications, petroleum and mining. Trade (1987 est.): Exports-$20.6 billion: manufacturing 48%, petroleum and derivatives 42%, agriculture 7%, mining 3%. Imports--$12.1 billion: intermediate goods 73%, capital goods 21%, consumer goods 6%. Major trading partners—US, EC, Japan. Official exchange rate: (mid-Jan. 1988): 2,207 pesos = US$1 (controlled rate); 2,223 pesos = US$1 (free market rate).
Taken from the Background Notes of February 1988, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita Adams.
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LUNCHEON TOAST, FEB. 13, 19883
This is the sixth time President De la Madrid and I have met, as he told us, since 1982. I am extremely pleased with our discussions and with the remarkable record of accomplishment since we last met in Washington. Our commercial relations are perhaps the most dramatic example of this progress. The signing of our new framework understanding last November marked the beginning of a special trade and investment relationship between our countries. Today we have rededicated ourselves to work together through the framework process and in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to seize every opportunity to expand commerce between us. One day I hope these steps will be seen as part of the historic evolution toward the free and unimpeded trade and investment on this continent and in the Western Hemisphere. There are, of course, obstacles to overcome, not the least of which is a persistent debt problem. There is, however, reason for optimism on this account. Innovative, market-based ideas on how to manage the international debt problem are emerging. Mexico's plan to exchange debt for long-term bonds is but one example. And cooperation on the debt is but one of the many areas where progress is being made. Agreements that have been reached or are near in several areas such as textiles, telecommunications, and civil aviation-are positive steps forward. We can also point to the successful management of difficult environmental problems along our common border. Under the agreement we signed in 1983, we're meeting our responsibilities. This is exemplified by the recently signed contingency plan on hazardous substances. Population movement and employment needs will continue to be crucial factors in our relationship. And I'm gratified by the new dialogue we've undertaken on these subjects and by the establishment of U.S. and Mexican commissions to study these questions jointly.
In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed, and I signed into law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act, intended to reestablish control of our borders. It offers protections for well over 1 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, many of whom are from Mexico, by providing a means for them to find legal employment and to participate openly and freely in our society. The mutual legal assistance treaty signed in December has already been ratified by the Mexican legislature. A few days ago I transmitted this treaty to the U.S. Senate for prompt ratification so that cooperation against criminals can be intensified. And as for the fight against criminals, Mr. President, perhaps our most serious undertaking has been the battle against the scourge of international drug trafficking and the use of these drugs in our societies. The people of the United States are now turning away from drugs. Drug use is no longer fashionable, and in most circles it's no longer tolerated. My wife, as you're aware, has taken the lead in an energetic program to combat drug abuse. Our success, measured by the number of people rejecting drugs, should curb the demand that fuels the trafficking. This menace threatens the fabric of both our societies. The heartache and corruption brought on by these traffickers are pervasive. President De la Madrid, if the decent people of our two societies are to win, it requires cooperation and a mutually reinforcing effort. And, Mr. President, I'm certain we are both committed to victory in this war against drugs and the evil it has wrought on our peoples. Our first responsibility to our citizens is to assure them an environment where they can raise their families in peace and freedom and prosperity. And that is why our commitment to democracy in our hemisphere must be unshakable. Totalitarian societies—such as those in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and now Nicaragua—have demonstrated for all to see that tyranny doesn't work. Mexico and the United States have a common interest in stable, free, and democratic governments in this hemisphere. I would hope this common interest will manifest itself in a common stand against the expansion of totalitarianism.
A year from now, new presidents will be in office in both our countries. They will be challenged, as have you and I, Mr. President, to achieve real, measurable progress on matters that concern us both because they affect the daily lives of our people. In the past 5 years, we have demonstrated that we can cooperate to achieve creative, mutually beneficial solutions, and this is a valuable legacy that we leave to our successors. Mr. President, I want to say publicly before we part that I truly believe history will honor you for the wise and politically courageous way you're guiding Mexico on the difficult but ultimately rewarding path to economic recovery and national development. This is an effort worthy of our admiration, our respect, and our support. And I know that with continued perseverance it will be crowned with success. I also believe, Mr. President, that you and I together have turned the relationship between the United States and Mexico in a new, more constructive direction that our successors can build upon. When I arrived today, I spoke of the foundation for Mexican-American relations that we've laid these last 5 years. Well, you know, one of my first jobs as a young man was digging foundations at a construction site. I worked there with strong, decent men whose hard work was a necessary part of the building process. President De la Madrid, it's been an honor for me to work with you and your colleagues, to labor beside you, and to have your friendship. Our peoples will live better lives for what we've done together. I can think of no goal better than that. So, I propose a toast to you and to relations between the United States and Mexico. And may they always be as sunny as the skies here today over Mazatlan.
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 22, 1988. 2President De la Madrid spoke in Spanish, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter. 3Made in response to a toast proposed by President De la Madrid at the Camino Real Hotel.
News Conference of February 24 (Excerpts)
President Reagan held a news conference on February 24, 1988.1 Secretary of State George Shultz today reported to me on his recent trip to Moscow, and it was encouraging. Progress continues to be made on our fourpart agenda, and the commitment remains to do all that we can to advance the cause of peace and to settle regional conflicts. In the Middle East, it's time for all parties to rid themselves of old ideas and stances that cannot work and to begin a serious process of negotiation and reconciliation. Any process that is undertaken must meet Israel's security needs and satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Secretary Shultz leaves tonight for the Middle East to see if practical and real progress can be made that provides a pathway to a comprehensive settlement, and he carries with him my full support. There's another regional conflict that has serious implications for our country's security interests: Nicaragua. Our policy consistently has been to bring peace and freedom to all of Central America. Today four of the five Central American countries choose their governments in free and open democratic elections. Independent courts protect their human rights, and their people can hope for a better life for themselves and their children. One country, Nicaragua, with its communist regime, remains a threat to this democratic tide in the region. So our message to the people of Nicaragua tonight is the same as it has been for the past 7 years: freedom based on true democratic principles. In the past several months, there've been some limited steps taken by the communist regime in Nicaragua toward reform. Now is not the time to reverse that process. There's no argument that all of us seek peace and democracy in Nicaragua, and the difference is how to achieve that goal. On February 3d, Congress voted on continued support for the decmocratic resistance in Nicaragua, and to my disappointment, the majority in the House of Representatives voted to remove the pressure of
the democratic resistance on the Sandinista regime. However, the Senate agreed with me that we cannot leave those fighting for freedom in Nicaragua at the mercy of the communist regime and expect the process toward democracy to move ahead. We've already seen what happens when pressure is removed. In just 2 short weeks, the Sandinistas threatened the only free press in that country and rejected a cease-fire proposal made by the mediator, Cardinal Obando, which incorporated the essential elements laid out and agreed to last August. And in the first 2 months of 1988, Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua has almost doubled, compared to the same period in 1987. These do not represent signs of peace; these remain troubling indications of a regime determined to crush its opposition and threaten its neighbors. There is a choice. We must act to ensure that freedom is not smothered in Nicaragua and to guarantee that these latest promises will be kept in a timely way. Q. Through the years you've been very eloquent on the subject of human rights in the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. The question really is: Why have you never condemned the treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied areas—shooting unarmed protesters, beating people to death, children, trying to bury some alive? And I'd like to follow up. A. We have spoken to the government there, and we've also spoken to the Palestinian leadership, because there is every evidence that these riots are not just spontaneous and homegrown. But we have spoken, and that's part of the reason why the Secretary of State is going back over there. We don't support that sort of thing, and we are trying to persuade all the participants to try to arrive at resenting justice for all. Q. If you want that and you say you believe in security for Israel and legitimate rights of the Palestinians, why don't you go on the public record now and say that there should be an exchange of removal of the occupation and of peace?
A. I don't think it's up to us to dictate the settlement in the Middle East. Q. We certainly are great supporters of Israel, so we certainly have some influence. A. Yes, and we have used that a number of times and are using it now. But we think that—and the thing that is taking the Secretary of State therewe think that the necessity is for all who are represented in that situation, on both sides, should come together, when you stop to think that legally a state of war still exists there in the Middle East, between the Arab nations and Israel, and that it's time for us to arrive at a true peace and recognize the rights of all. Q. Shi'ite militiamen are scouring southern Lebanon for Colonel Higgins, the American kidnapped last week, and you've expressed a determination to get him out. Can you say that the same intense efforts, the same kind of dragnet, will be used to find the other American hostages, one of whom, Terry Anderson, is about to mark the end of his third year in captivity? A. We have never given up on that. As you can realize, it's very frustrating to try and establish a location, knowing, of course, that you are governed by the fact that unwise action on our part could bring about harm to the hostages. But we've never let up, and we never will, in trying to obtain the freedom of all the hostages. Q. Pat Robertson said today that his Christian Broadcasting Network once knew the location of American hostages in the Middle East, and that the United States, in effect, missed an opportunity to rescue them. I understand he's clarified that remark, but I wonder if you have any thoughts about the tone that he's setting in this campaign. A. I don't want to comment on the campaign, but I can only say this: that it would be very strange if he actually did have information as to the location of those hostages. Isn't it strange that no one in our Administration was ever apprised of that? We have tried our best, and through every kind of channel, to establish their whereabouts, because that's the beginning of efforts to try and get them free. But if he thought that he knew, he kept it to himself. Page 9
Q. As of now, is there any change in our policy of not talking with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), in light of the fact that there are reports out of Geneva that Mr. (Yasir] Arafat (PLO leader] is now ready to accept UN Resolution 338 and 242? A. I know that this is one thing we're pursuing. If he really is, and if he is willing to acknowledge the right of Israel to exist as a nation—this has been one of the blocking points, that how do you sit down and try to get into a talk about peace when someone says they have no right to even exist? And I'm sure that the Secretary of State is apprised of that fact and will see what we can do there. Q. And given the 40-year hostility in the area which has been built up, how can you as the "great communicator" try to alleviate some of the antagonism between the Israelis and the Palestinians before you leave office? A. We are trying to and will continue to try to. That's a goal that I would think would be one of the greatest achievements of this Administration—if before I leave, we could bring about a peace in the Middle East. Q. Whom precisely are you criticizing when you say that the riots are not homegrown and not spontaneous? A. We have had—it's a little difficult for me, because there are some things that I shouldn't be saying. But we have had intimations that there have been certain people suspected of being terrorists, outsiders coming in, not only with weapons but stirring up and encouraging the trouble in those areas. Now, that isn't something you can go out and say we absolutely know, but certainly the violence is both ways. Q. But it would seem that that's still a generalization if you say some people from the outside. Can't you be specific and say just who is? A. No, because I get into areas there that would be violating security rules, and I don't think I should. Q. The PLO, Russians? A. No, no.
Q. It's my understanding that in 1985 your national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, briefed you on the Iraqi pipeline project and gained your approval for it. In light of the difficulties that your Attorney General, Mr. Meese, is encountering now, could you explain your position on the pipeline and tell me if you think it was a good idea at that time? A. I have no recall of knowing anything about this pipeline plan until fairly recently, and then found out with regard to the transmittal of the letters that have now been turned over to the special investigator. And this was about the first information that I recall having Now, I can't say to you that I was given information earlier, because I just have to tell you if I was I have totally forgotten that I have no knowledge of anything of that kind. Q. Does it trouble you at all that your dear friend Mr. Meese has become entangled in this project, and it has yet been another case which has brought him, some would say, embarrassment? A. Let me say one thing. I have every confidence in his integrity. I've known him for more than 20 years, but I cannot comment in any way on his case that is now before a special investigator Q. The white minority government of South Africa has now effectively banned activities by dissenting organizations, even when those activities are peaceful. What is your view on that, and what can you do, if anything, to reverse it? A. The State Department has already contacted them about that, and we are making our own feelings clear that they should be working toward a multiracial democracy and not oppressing political organizations there. And we've made our feelings clear about that. Q. May I follow up? Have you considered sending aid to the freedom fighters—the ANC [African National Congress) or any other organization-against this oppression just as you send aid to other freedom fighters around the world? A. No, we have not involved ourselves in that, other than things such as the sanctions and so forth. We have tried our best to be persuasive in this very difficult problem and to find-or to encourage a better solution.
Q. What are you doing to make things easier for corporations to trade with the Soviet Union in nonstrategic items, such as food processing, pharmaceuticals, automotive, and hotels, for instance? And do you believe the Soviet Union should join GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade? And will you discuss these and other trade items with Mr. Gorbachev in your forthcoming summit? A. I can't relate to you discussions about those particular things with him. But I do know that there has been consideration of them involving themselves in the GATT procedure; and that, of course, is being reviewed among those of us who are participants now. But I don't know whether that answers your question or not, but our trade with the Soviet Union is restricted mainly on the basis of where we might be giving them technology and information that could be used one day against us. Q. I know you have to remain neutral in the Republican race, but you could clear up a major issue right now by telling us whether George Bush, in fact, did have reservations about the sale of arms to Iran; whether he had reservations about Israel's role in that policy; and whether, in fact, he's telling the truth when he tells us that he did have those reservations? A. Yes, in the general discussion, and that's not unusual here. I've ordered our people on Cabinet matters or anything else, and I want to hear what they really feel. I don't want to be surrounded by yes-men. And, yes, there were reservations, but I'm not going to go into—just as he wouldn't go into the private discussions that we may have had.
But I think it's time for me to point out what the opposition was based on of anyone who did oppose. Particularly, it's been revealed that Secretary Weinberger and George Shultz both objected. They did not object, the idea that we were trading arms for hostages. Their objection—they knew what we were trying to do. This had been a request that came to us from some people not in the Government of Iran but who wanted to privately meet with us on how there could be a better relationship if and when the day came that there was a new government in Iran. And if you'll remember, back in those days, almost every other day there was speculation that the health of the Khomeini was failing to where there might be this contest of a new government. Their objection was—what we had done, we'd gotten this request; and in dealing with it, in this conversation with these private individuals, we pointed out our feelings about terrorism and so forth. They agreed with us. And the thing was that they, the Hizballah (radical Shi'ite group operating in Lebanon), as we know, is philosophically attuned to Iran. The idea was that they could perhaps influence the Hizballah to give up some of our hostages. And indeed, as the talks went on, they did. We got two of them free. But their objection was that if and when this became known, as it would be, it would be made to appear that we were trading arms for hostages. Now, we were giving these arms to these individuals, because we felt that maybe they could influence the Hizballah. We weren't dealing with the kidnappers at all. And this was what the whole situation was. But turned out that George and Cap and those who had doubts were right in that when it did become known, by way of a henchman of the Ayatollah, then everyone just automatically said that—and to this day are saying—it was arms for hostages.
A. I am committed at the 600-ship navy. And I want you to know, that from the very beginning, since I've been here, the Congress has cut my request for defense every time. And sometimes, they have tried to pretend that that is in an effort to reduce the deficit spending and so forth. But in a 5-year period, the Congress cut my defense budgets a total of $125 billion at the same time that they increased my request for domestic programs by $250 billion. And this budget which is now being attributed to me—no, this isn't as low as they originally wanted to cut it, but it was as high as we could get it in the negotiations for the present budget. And it has been harmful. But let me tell you that in 1980, when we came here, the navy had 479 vessels, and by 1987, we had 568. And by next year, it will be 580. And so, what has happened is that there will be a little delay in the achieving of the 600-ship navy. But I can't help but remind-or tell all of you, when I was campaigning in 1980 and knew the state of our defenses, I was faced with the question. And some of you will recall I did a lot of campaigning on questionand-answer basis. At almost every gathering, there would be a question: Well, if I came to a choice between deficit spending and buildup of our defense structure, which would I choose? And every time, I said, in responsibility, I would have to choose the buildup of our defenses. And every time, every audience in America that I said that to gave me an applause that was almost an ovation for saying that. Q. The second part of the question was: Is it a threat to the national security that the navy is not going to have 600 ships on the schedule that you had in mind? A. I don't think right at the moment—and with the way we're progressing in various treaties and so forth—I don't believe that the threat is that immediate, and because very shortly we will achieve our 600. We want 15 carriers and their squadrons, and we've just launched the 15th carrier, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines, and 4 battleships, and we're achieving that.
Q. You must certify by March 1st whether Panama has been cracking down on drug trafficking through that country or whether aid to Panama should continue to be suspended. What are you going to do? A. I can't give you the answer yet, because we're still working on that and still collecting the facts as to what their effort has been at trying to intercept the drugs and join us in that campaign. But as you said, March 1st we will be giving the answer. Q. Some officials in your Administration have suggested that if Noriega (Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces) would step down and go into exile, that you would stop the prosecution of him on drug charges. Would you consider that kind of deal? A. No, and I'm not going to comment on something of this kind. This man has been indicted by a Federal grand jury, and so I'm not going to make any comment of that kind, nor have we made any advances or suggestions of that kind to the Government of Panama. What we would like to see is a return to democracy and a civilian government in Panama, and not this domination by—literally—a military dictator.
Q. Back to the contra aid question. In your opening statement, you seemed to suggest that the Sandinistas are taking advantage of Congress not coming through with contra aid to withdraw some of the concessions they had made. With Congress about to consider new humanitarian aid—both a Democratic and a Republican planis it worth it to pass humanitarian aid without military aid? A. I think the only comment that I can make there is that anything that will keep the freedom fighters as a pressure on the Sandinistas is worth doing. Just as when we tried to pass our own bill and narrowly failed, you could see that the military aid was down the road aways—it was not necessary right now. The other aid-humanitarian aid—is more imminent. And so, if we can get that, that's fine, and then we'll take our chances on the other in trying to get it. But they do still have some military store for a limited period of time.
Q. The resignation of Secretary of the Navy Webb has ignited a controversy about your buildup of the U.S. Navy. And the question is: Are you satisfied that the budget cuts in the military have not damaged our national security, and are you still committed to a 600-ship navy at a time when the Soviets are not cutting their navy?
Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals
Secretary Shultz's prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on March 10, 1988.1
Q. In the two plans that are being considered, the Democrats want the Defense Department to deliver whatever stores and supplies are authorized. The Republican plan would give that responsibility to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency). Do you favor either course? A. I certainly would favor the CIA. I think that involving our military when there is no need to is very rash and foolish, because you would be putting our military into a combat situation, and this is what we've been trying to avoid in Central America all the way. Q. In that regard, I'd like to ask you about the latest hostage situation. Do you think it was responsible for your Administration to allow a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, William Higgins, to operate in southern Lebanon at a time when eight Americans were already being held in that country and when your own State Department was recommending against travel there and considering the ramifications of the abduction of William Buckley earlier? A. I don't think that you can use that as a measure of where officers can be assigned to duty. They're in a dangerous business to begin with. And we are a part of the United Nations, and we have obligations to the United Nations with regard to the UNIFIL force (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) that has been there for a number of years now. And this particular officer happened to volunteer when there was a vacancy at that spot-volunteered for that. And I think that we have the confidence—and I do have the confidence in men like him—that someone would have a hard time getting secrets that could harm this country from a person of that kind.
I am pleased to come before the subcommittee to discuss the foreign operations component of our FY 1989 budget request. The funding we are requesting complies with both the letter and the spirit of the budget summit compromise. It is the bare minimum we will need to support our fundamental foreign policy objectives and interests. We would have preferred more. We can't do the job with less. From the outset, President Reagan has been guided by the conviction that the United States must remain a fully engaged force around the globe for peace, prosperity, democracy, and humanitarian values. We have been making impressive strides in fulfilling these goals. At the core of our diplomacy are our efforts to ensure the strength and unity of our alliance relations, the effective management of East-West issues, the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, and the advancement of our broader security and economic interests. With our tangible support and encouragement, democratic and free market values are gaining strength among the peoples of Latin America, in the Philippines, in Korea, and in Africa. That's good news for everybody. Countries with free people, free elections, and free markets aren't the countries that threaten our security. Democratic countries respect the rule of law both at home and abroad; they are more stable internally from both an economic and a political standpoint; and they are more capable of resisting aggression through their own efforts. Our achievement of the historic INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty offers convincing proof that success in advancing our peaceful objectives depends not only on cohesion and clarity of purpose but also on the political will to provide the means necessary to meet our objectives. The treaty would not have been possible had we or our allies balked at the economic or political costs of countering the Soviet SS-20 menace.
Working for peace means building up and sustaining our military strength and that of our friends while concurrently engaging in hard-nosed diplomacy. The daily effort to defend our security, to establish more stable and workable relations with our adversaries, to ensure continued economic growth, and to achieve negotiated settlements in strife-ridden areas is a costly exercise. But, instability and war are even costlier and not just in monetary terms. It is, indeed, ironic that just when the need for effective U.S. leadership in the world is increasing and we are scoring remarkable successes, we find that we lack adequate means and enough flexiblity either to advance our interests or to meet our commitments to friends and allies. The realities of our time dictate that the United States cannot achieve our interests and objectives alone, nor can we do so with insufficient resources. Other countries around the world cannot adequately protect their security, ensure their domestic welfare, or protect their democratic institutions absent the active support of the United States. And, especially now, when the dangers of terrorism and the broad range of threats to many societies posed by international narcotics trafficking are becoming so stark, we must marshal the means necessary to counter these assaults on human dignity and civilized society. I have committed the State Department—and you have my personal commitment—to use every opportunity and every resource at our disposal to combat these twin scourges.
Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 29, 1988.
East-West Relations The United States and our allies have set in motion a number of efforts that could, with Soviet cooperation, bring major strides toward a safer, more secure, and more humane world. Will we have that Soviet cooperation? Yes, we will, if we shape the right conditions. And how do we shape these conditions? By being fully and actively engaged and by committing the necessary resources. The critical importance of worldwide U.S. engagement came through loud and clear to the President during his recent meetings with his NATO counterparts. In Brussels, we and our
NATO partners agreed that if we expect to advance our agenda with the East, we must demonstrate the same resolve and be prepared to commit similarly vital resources as we did in our pursuit of the INF Treaty. That agenda includes greater openness and full respect for human rights in the East and on arms control: three priority tasks—50% reductions in offensive strategic arms, a global and truly verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and correction of the imbalance in conventional forces. Realism, strength, and dialogue will remain America's watchwords as we continue the high-level exchanges begun in 1985 with the Soviet leadership. Through this ongoing process, our relationship with the Soviet Union is now developing on a more stable and constructive basis. I will be meeting regularly with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the period leading up to the next summit in Moscow. We will pursue the full range of issues that concern us, including human rights, arms control, bilateral matters, and settlement of regional conflicts. We will continue vigorously to challenge the Soviet Government to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in the U.S.S.R. as well as the sovereign rights of its neighbors. We will pursue progress toward a START (strategic arms reduction talks] treaty—the President has made clear to all of us that he wants no letup in our effort to achieve a good treaty.
The Middle East. In the Middle East, this is a time of decisions. The situation on the ground does not serve anyone's interests, and rapid change through negotiations must occur. My discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt focused on the need for realism in our approach to negotiations. The approach we are pursuing is ambitious and compelling. It calls for an early start of interlocked negotiations on transitional arrangements and final status. These will be launched and supported by a properly structured international conference. This process can and should begin as early as mid-April. The mechanics of our approach meet everyone's fundamental concerns and provide for serious negotiations. But the mechanical aspects of this are secondary to what can be accomplished. Our objective is a comprehensive peace. • Israeli security can be enhanced. Israel can enjoy the recognition and respect which flow from negotiations. Israelis can be free from the increasing human and moral burdens of occupation—free to devote their considerable talents and energies to improving their quality of life. Most important, Israel can achieve peace with its neighbors. • Palestinians can achieve rapid control over political and economic decisions which directly affect their lives. Palestinians can participate actively in negotiations to determine their political future. Palestinians can achieve their legitimate rights and live lives of dignity and self-respect. • The Arab world can turn a corner, resolve this festering conflict, and get on with the business of meeting human needs. The refugee problem can be solved. A stable new environment can be created in which the human and economic resources of the Middle East can flourish. This is a moment of testing for the leaders of the Middle East. All must face up to the challenge of peace and beat back the forces of radicalism. Violence and threats achieve nothing. They stand in sharp, empty contrast to what negotiations can accomplish. No resolution of this conflict can fulfill all dreams. Compromise is required. The plan we have put forward is compelling. It is an integral whole. We have asked for decisions soon, so that we can proceed rapidly toward a comprehensive peace.
Central America. In Central America, we must be equally realistic and determined in our efforts. The cause of peace, stability, and democracy in Central America—already severely challenged by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and its Cuban and Soviet allies-received another blow recently when General Noriega refused to accept his suspension as head of the Panama Defense Forces. The United States has rejected Noriega's attempted dismissal of President Delvalle—a dismissal which is, in essence, a coup d'etat without a visible military presence. What we face in Panama is a threat to democracy; a threat to our ability to stop the international drug traffickers; a threat to the safety and stability of this hemisphere. We will not shirk our responsibility to defend ourselves against this triple threat-to stop the drug dealers, the tyrants, and the terrorists. Our policy in Panama is straightforward and consistent: we support fully and unequivocally the government of President Delvalle. And so do many others. Just this week, President Delvalle received enormous support from a broad spectrum of the Panamanian opposition. They made a commitment to unity for democracy. We applaud that effort. The struggle for democracy in Panama also has received widespread support from the other democracies in this hemisphere. Perhaps El Salvador's President Duarte put it best when he said: “El Salvador, as a democratic nation, will never agree to a solution based on abuse of power and imposition of Noriega's dictatorship on the Panamanian people." We and the democratic world will do what is necessary to help democratic government survive and bloom in Panama. We will continue actively to cooperate with President Delvalle and his government in their efforts to reassert legitimate civilian authority. The deteriorating situation in Nicaragua further illustrates my point that failure of the United States to materially reinforce democratic government and efforts to gain a peaceful settlement to conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador can only harm our own security interests. Unless we back up our policies with adequate resources, our friends and foes alike around the world will conclude that America's words lack substance; our commitments, credibility; and our plans, effective execution.
Regional Issues Afghanistan. After 8 long years, the courage and tenacity of the Afghan resistance and people may be about to pay off in the resumed negotiations at Geneva. We are proud to stand with them and with Pakistan. The United States will continue its support for Pakistan and for the Afghan people and will continue to press Moscow to withdraw its troops expeditiously and cease military assistance to the Kabul regime. The United States remains fully and firmly committed to a rapid departure of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan to an independent and nonaligned status, genuine self-determination for the Afghan people, and return of the refugees in safety and honor.
Since Congress ended U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, the Sandinistas have once again reverted to their true totalitarian goals. Their repression and intransigence have increased. Two weeks ago, the Sandinistas rejected proposals by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, the mediator they themselves selected, to further the plan. Those proposals had been immediately accepted by the representatives of the resistance. Then, the Sandinistas informed Cardinal Obando that his services as mediator are no longer required. Just recently, the communists balked again and postponed a meeting with the resistance. Sandinista mob violence against Nicaraguan citizens has increased dramatically in recent weeks. It is time for the Congress to sit up and take notice: the Sandinistas are brutalizing their own people. Those who may have believed that cutting off aid to the freedom fighters would help achieve peace and freedom have made a grave mistake. They must undo the error before it is too late. As Violetta de Chamorro, the head of Nicaragua's leading opposition newspaper, recently wrote President Arias: "The Sandinista regime, taking advantage of the suspension of military actions by which it had been besieged, has entered into a phase of total indifference” to the terms of the Guatemala agreement. Persian Gulf. Elsewhere in the world, an engaged U.S. presence and our sustained support remain essential to international stability and well-being. In the strategic area of the Persian Gulf, our reflagging policy is protecting basic U.S. interests, and allied governments are following our lead. We will continue to stand by the security commitments we have made to our friends in the region. We are at the forefront of international efforts to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war via UN Security Council Resolution 598. We are working within the Security Council to adopt an enforcement resolution imposing sanctions against Iran as long as it refuses to comply with 598. And we are continuing our own active efforts to staunch the flow of arms to Iran. East Asia. In East Asia, the remarkable worldwide trend toward democratic government has had two notable successes in the Philippines and South Korea.
We are supportive of the major steps the Republic of Korea has taken toward full democracy over the past year. We are cooperating fully with South Korea as it strives to host the 1988 Olympics in a secure and peaceful atmosphere. And we are assisting President Aquino in leading her nation in building democracy and accelerating economic growth as the Philippines contends with a virulent communist insurgency. The struggle against communist aggression is evident in Cambodia. We are supporting ASEAN (Association for South East Asian Nations) and the Cambodian noncommunist resistance in their efforts to bring about a political solution to the Cambodian conflict encompassing a complete Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people. Southern Africa. Apartheid is at the heart of South Africa's problems and is a principal source of instability in the southern African region. Our goal remains its rapid and peaceful demise. To that end, we are working to foster negotiations among all elements of South Africa's population that will lead to the creation of a democratic society with equal rights for all. At a time when the misguided actions of the South African Government are stifling the interplay of ideas so essential for the evolution of a free society, and isolating South Africa from the free world, we must do all we can to keep dialogue alive and new ideas coming in. Despite the recent serious escalation of repression in South Africa, we remain firm in our belief that this can best be accomplished through a mix of diplomatic and political pressures on the one hand and a series of positive initiatives on the other. It is critically important that we maintain strong support for U.S. programs designed to assist victims of apartheid and to empower black South Africans to achieve their own peaceful liberation through higher education and growing economic leverage. We are working with our democratic allies to exchange data on assistance programs and to explore ways of assuring a free flow of information to South Africa in the face of rising censorship and repression. Elsewhere in the region, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement involving withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Angola and Namibia and the achievement of Namibian independence.
We now look to the Angolans to make concrete their professions of support for a phased complete withdrawal of Cuban forces and to South Africa to honor its commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 435. To promote economic independence and stability throughout the region, we also strongly support the work of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In addition to bilateral aid, we are providing SADCC with $50 million in assistance for FY 1988. International Economics. In the field of international economics, we are entering a new era. The world economy is changing profoundly as new technologies are developed and the capability to apply them is spreading to all regions of the globe. National boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant as production, finance, technology, and knowledge become increasingly globalized. In order to make the most of the changes now underway, America must first ensure that our economic and social institutions are prepared and willing to compete in this new global economy. We must promote policies that enable market forces to direct international patterns of trade and financial flows. And, along with our allies in the industrial world, we must keep our sights on sustainable, noninflationary economic growth as the principal objective of economic policy.
The Specifics of Our Funding Request This brief review of the foreign policy challenges that face us is enough to show how busy this Administration will be in the coming year. If this Administration—any administration—is to realize America's fundamental foreign policy objectives, it must have both adequate funding and sufficient flexibility to use financial resources to best advantage. But, today, in a time when our active engagement is more important than ever, a steady erosion of our resources and severe constraints on our ability to apply them threaten our leadership position and our vital security, economic, and humanitarian interests in the world. For foreign affairs, or Function 150 in toto, we seek $18.1 billion in discretionary spending authority for FY 1989. The foreign operations component of our budget request includes most forms of foreign assistance (excluding only PL 480 food aid) and is the largest single Page 10
I would note that we will shortly undertake with the Philippine Government the 5-year bilateral review of our bases agreement. We look forward to its successful completion, which would set the stage for an extension or renegotiation of the bases agreement, the fixed term of which ends in 1991. Central America is of vital importance to the United States because of its geographic proximity and strategic position. We have long recognized that the best way to protect our interests in the region is to pursue a multifaceted policy aimed at promoting regional security, democratization, and social and economic development. We are requesting approximately $900 million in FY 1989 to serve these ends. With respect to Nicaragua, in particular, the Administration continues to seek funding from Congress for the contras. At the same time, we will continue our varied forms of assistance to our friends in the region. In the event the current efforts to secure peace and substantially ease the repression in Nicaragua fail, our provision of security assistance to the other countries in the region will serve as a bulwark against spreading instability.
Promoting Prosperity and Development Ensuring our domestic prosperity in to- day's increasingly integrated world economy requires us to do more than keep our own economic house in order. It means assisting other countries to develop their own economies. In this way, we develop in the global economy a growing demand for U.S. goods and services. American growth and pros- perity are, more than ever, influenced by conditions abroad. I am not just speaking of conditions in Western Europe and Japan, important though they may be, but of those in the devel- oping countries as well. These countries take over a third of our exports. The production of 1 out of every 20 workers in our manufacturing plants and 1 out of every 5 acres of our farmland is sold in Third World markets. By promoting economic development abroad we make a direct contribution to our own economic well-being. Current economic stagnation in a large number of developing countries, especially those with heavy debt burdens, illustrates the point vividly and painfully. For example, between 1981 and
1986, the countries of Latin America velopment Association (IDA). IDA is ports to that region dropped by over tivities in low-income developing coun- $11 billion. For the same reason, in Af- tries and, sometimes in conjunction rica, our exports dropped by $2.8 bil- with the International Monetary Fund lion. In contrast, our significant role in (IMF), supports essential economic pol- the development of Pakistan has paid us icy reform in these countries. Because dividends. In 1960, Pakistan's per capita of the budget summit ceiling, none of income was barely $100. By 1985, these funds will be used to pay U.S. Pakistan had more than doubled its in- arrears (currently about $400 million) come and had become a major pur- to any of the multilateral development chaser of U.S. products. Since 1979, banks. MBD arrears raise serious ques- U.S. exports to Pakistan have risen by tions about our credibility, and we will more than half. have to address the arrears problem in • Funding for Peace Corps prolateral economic assistance programs grams—$150 million; and (including ESF). That constitutes al • Voluntary contributions to such most 60% of our total discretionary for- international organizations as the UN eign operations request. It includes Development Program ($110 million) development assistance, voluntary con- and UNICEF (UN Children's Fund) tributions to international organiza- $31 million. tions, assistance provided through multilateral development institutions, Our domestic prosperity is also fur thered by helping U.S. exporters comthe Peace Corps and other bilateral as pete with financing arrangements sistance programs, as well as $3.3 billion for ESF. ESF serves economic offered by foreign governments. For stability and development as well as se this purpose, we are requesting $705 curity objectives. million for the Export-Import Bank's (Eximbank) direct credit programs. Again, we seek only a modest in These programs provide U.S. exporters crease of $80 million, or 2.5%, in ESF, but we enjoin Congress to refrain from the financial support they need to the massive earmarking which required match foreign officially supported exus in FY 1988 to eliminate funding for port credits. Eximbank financing is also numerous countries, particularly in critical in markets in which commercial financing is limited or unavailable beSouth America and the Caribbean. Our allocation of the ESF request would al cause the risk is too great for commer cial banks. low resumption of important programs in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and throughout the region. Promoting Democratic and Human In addition to ESF, economic as- itarian Values sistance takes many forms: The American people fully support our • Development assistance ($1.6 bil- efforts to strengthen democracy around lion, including the new Development the globe. The United States has a viFund for Africa) to fund projects ad- tal stake in promoting democratic valministered by the Agency for Interna- ues around the world and supporting tional Development (AID) in such areas new and growing democracies. Demoas agriculture, education and human re- cratic institution-building is a slow and sources development, health, nutrition, difficult process. Fragile new democand private sector development; racies face daunting political, economic, • Funding for the multilateral de- and military challenges that we must velopment banks (MDB)-$1.3 billion: help them meet with more than mere $70 million will go to the World Bank as words of encouragement. the first installment of our contribution In Central America and the Caribto the new General Capital Increase bean, our support for democratic forces which, together with the contributions has shown good results. Democratic inof others, will support $75 billion in stitutions are taking root in countries new Bank project lending and support where just a few years ago many deof growth-oriented structural adjust- spaired of that ever happening. These ment and policy reform. The largest new democracies desperately need our component, $958 million, will be used help. The President's Caribbean Basin for a U.S. contribution to the eighth and Central America Initiatives, based replenishment of the International De on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central Page 11
inviting the Soviets to add to the I know you have heard about some conventional and chemical threat by differences within the U.S. intelligence deploying their recently tested community over the estimated numbers intermediate-range cruise missile. of Soviet systems. I would be surprised Moreover, the United States has if there were not differences of opinion; been unable to develop—and the Soviet they reflect independent analysis which Union has not put forth—a regime to helps keep us all alert. The Soviet numeffectively verify the differences be- bers for deployed and nondeployed tween nuclear and conventionally forces are near the estimates of our inarmed ground-launched cruise missiles. telligence community, allowing for the Thus, we would have to assume that range of our uncertainties. any Soviet ground-launched cruise mis- There are some differences in sile was capable of carrying nuclear agency views on the number of nonweapons. deployed SS-20s. Estimates for nonThis situation is different from the deployed systems are, of course, one in START, where the United States inherently less certain. They vary by must and will protect its substantial agency, reflecting the independent analforce of nuclear and conventional sea- ysis I have mentioned. launched cruise missiles, as well as The treaty is designed to deal with prospects for a conventional air possibilities such as the Soviets having launched cruise missile. more nondeployed SS-20s than we think they do. Our national technical means Do we need a more intrusive verification regime? can verify Soviet compliance with the treaty's ban on INF flight testing, as I There is no such thing as absolute, have already noted, as well as with the 100% verification. The INF verification treaty's ban on INF infrastructure. regime is the most stringent and intru- Both testing and infrastructure are essive in history. You have heard consid- sential to a militarily effective force. erable detail about it, which I will not Thus, even if the Soviets did have some repeat. It is our judgment that the concealed SS-20s, their effectiveness treaty, through its successive layers of would steadily atrophy. And covert procedures, contains the measures systems are of no use for political needed for effective verification of intimidation. compliance. The zero outcome really pays divi What will we do if the Soviets dends for verification. Once the elim don't comply with this treaty? ination period is over, the existence of The Soviet record of compliance any intermediate or shorter range mis- with treaties is far from perfect. We sile would be a violation. Flight testing have incorporated into the INF Treaty is not permitted. Such testing can be some lessons we learned the hard way. detected by national technical means. For one thing, its terms are more deWithout testing, weapons systems lose tailed and precise than those of any of their reliability over time and become its predecessors. Its verification proviobsolete. sions, by increasing the likelihood of Aren't there uncertainties over getting caught, clearly decrease the atthe basic data? tractiveness of cheating. And the struc ture of the reductions will give us a We designed this treaty so that we basis to assess Soviet compliance would not have to take Soviet data on early on. trust. But we also ensured that we Thus, the Soviet Union will have to would have more basic data for the INF destroy all its shorter range missiles Treaty than for any other arms control within 18 months. This "front-end loadtreaty in history. We have all the initial ing” means that we will be able to see, Soviet data and will get a complete up- from the outset, whether or not they date 30 days after the treaty enters are complying with treaty obligations of into force. This gives us an excellent real military significance. We will be basis on which to assess the data we destroying our shorter range systems have developed ourselves, as well as the in the same timeframe, but for us this means we have used to develop it. will involve missiles in storage, not de ployed systems.
The reductions in intermediaterange missiles will be asymmetrical. We will keep a substantial force of Pershing IIs until well into the final months of reductions. This should provide an additional incentive for the Soviet Union to comply with the timetable it agreed to. But no treaty in and of itself can fully guarantee compliance with its terms. We must and will react vigorously to any questionable Soviet activities. If we detect an action that seems to be a violation, we will press the Soviets on it. Besides regular diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, we will have a new compliance forum. Article XIII of the treaty establishes the Special Verification Commission, or SVC. At the SVC, we will describe our concerns and press for a response. The Soviets may be able to demonstrate that the action in question was not a violation. If they do not, this Administration has shown its determination to take the actions necessary to safeguard our security. Faced with continuing Soviet refusal to live by the rules of SALT II, the President took an appropriate and proportional response. The role of the Congress in this will remain essential. As I said to you 7 weeks ago, “If the Soviets cheat on this treaty, the President must be able to count on Congress to help him take the measures necessary to preserve our security and that of our allies."
Conclusion The last question is the fundamental one, which I posed at the outset: is this treaty in the security interests of the United States? I submit to you that the answer is yes. The more closely you have studied this treaty, the more I am sure you will have joined me in con- cluding that it deserves your full support.
Press release 43 of Mar. 15, 1988. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Page 12
the ballistic missile in this critical strategic role, they will have no incentive to acquire greater numbers. Rather, they will be led to reduce their reliance on that weapon and alter their doctrine. Denying Soviet ballistic missiles a free ride to their targets can throw a monkey wrench into the best-laid plans of the Soviet General Staff. And it is in our interest to see to it that no Soviet planner could contemplate a first strike under any circumstances with any confidence. This is what enhancing strategic deterrence is all about. SDI contributes to this goal. Our experience since 1983 has shown that SDI has reinforced and continues to reinforce the American position at the negotiating table, especially in START. SDI played a key role in getting the Soviets back to the negotiating table in 1985 and has helped keep them there since. The record has shown that the Soviets take arms control seriously only when it is clear that the United States is prepared to do what is required to preserve the military balance. The INF (IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty is an excellent example of what can be achieved in arms control when the United States and its allies are ready to meet their security needs by their own action. In the strategic arms field, continued modernization of U.S. strategic offensive forces, coupled with a vigorous strategic defense program, gets the message to the Soviets that their drive for strategic superiority will not be tolerated by the United States. SDI promotes Soviet seriousness at the bargaining table. Moreover, deployed strategic defenses would actually strengthen a START regime. While they would not decrease the importance of cheating, effective defenses could reduce its impact by providing a margin of safety as a hedge against a clandestinely deployed offensive force.
The U.S. approach to strategic sta- plant space, capital, and manpower bility and enhancing deterrence is di- than does SDI. The Soviets are investirectly reflected in our arms control gating weapons technologies for kinetic positions at the nuclear and space energy, particle beam, radio-frequency, talks. We are working toward a stabiliz and laser weapons. ing and verifiable 50% reduction in Soviet investment in their laser strategic offensive arms, while advanc- weapon program is especially interesting in the defense and space talks a ing and instructive, since the Soviets so treaty that would help provide for pre- often denigrate the prospects for these dictability in the strategic relationship advanced technology weapons. The Soand for the possibility of moving coop- viet military laser program involves eratively toward a more stable, in- some 10,000 of their top scientists and creasingly defense-reliant deterrent engineers and would cost us $1 billion a regime. year to duplicate. It is centered at Sary The Soviet Union, however, has not Shagan, where the Soviets also conduct adopted a similarly progressive ap other ABM activities. The Sary Shagan proach. The Soviets would like to pre- facility features several air defense serve their offensive force advantages lasers and two lasers probably capable "Semantic Infiltration" those already agreed by the sides in the ABM (Antiballistic Missile] Treaty. Opposing SDI then-existing strategic offensive nuclear the Soviets have shown themselves un- arsenals.willing to engage in open discussion of The Soviets don't impose linkage key issues, such as the nature of stratebecause they object to strategic defense gic stability, the possible contributions in principle. They have their own stra- of defenses to stability, measures for tegic defense program, estimated to ensuring predictability in the strategic cost about $20 billion annually, the exis- relationship, and the offense-defense tence of which they categorically denied relationship. until General Secretary Gorbachev's off- No state is so strong a proponent hand admission of it to Tom Brokaw. of strategic defense in practice as the The Soviet strategic defense effort, Soviet Union, yet none is more strongly in fact, is comprehensive and long- opposed to SDI in public. Standing Sostanding. It consists of the permitted viet rhetoric side-by-side with their 100-interceptor system deployed around strategic defense efforts, one is led to Moscow, which the Soviets are now up- conclude that the Soviets are far more grading; a comprehensive passive de- interested in stigmatizing the U.S. defense program for the protection of the fense effort than in engaging in a reaSoviet leadership and key industry; sonable and constructive dialogue on massive strategic air defenses (over the future of the strategic relationship 12,000 SAM (surface-to-air missile] and the role of strategic defenses in it. launchers); and programs investigating The Soviets have recently adopted many of the same advanced strategic the theme that the issue in the defense defense technologies under investiga- and space talks is not SDI but the tion in SDI. ABM Treaty. They have downplayed This advanced technology program their polemical attacks on SDI in favor is, moreover, no “response" to SDI. Its of arguing for "stability," which they various elements have been in place say means an unconditional commitsince the 1960s, and it represents, as a ment to the ABM Treaty. But changes whole, a much greater investment of in Soviet public statements, in my judgement, reflect more of a shift in the style than in the substance of their position.
A Cooperative much easier. This is another reason we pursue a START treaty—and why we reject the Soviet effort to kill or cripple the Strategic Defense Initiative as the price of that deal. Page 13
At the Washington summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also agreed on the importance of greater openness and confidence-building measures. The United States is prepared to work constructively with other members of the Conference on Disarmament to resolve outstanding issues. In addition to treaty discussions, we are working with allies and other friendly countries as well as with the Soviets on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. Primarily in response to the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States and 18 other Western industrialized countries have been consulting since 1985 to harmonize export controls on commodities related to chemical weapon production and to develop other mechanisms to curb the illegal use of such weapons and their dangerous spread to other countries. Also, in bilateral discussions with the Soviets on chemical weapon nonproliferation, we have reviewed export controls and political steps to limit the spread and use of chemical weapons.
On August 30, 1987, the United States--under the terms of the Stockholm document-successfully completed the first-ever onsite inspection of a Soviet military exercise. In September, the United Kingdom inspected an exercise involving Soviet and East German forces in the German Democratic Republic; in October 1987, the Soviets conducted similar inspections of NATO exercises in Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) involving U.S. forces; in November 1987, the German Democratic Republic inspected a F.R.G. military activity; and in February 1988, the United States inspected an exercise in Hungary which involved Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet forces. The United States considers the successful conclusion of these inspections an important step in the process of improving openness and building confidence and security in Europe.
for a time-limited, first-phase withdrawal from Central Europe of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a 3-year, no-increase commitment by all parties with forces in this zone. During this time, residual force levels would be verified through national technical means, agreed entry/exit points, data exchange, and 30 annual onsite inspections. Thus far, the Soviets have not responded constructively to the Western initiative.
NATO High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control This task force presented a report on the direction of NATO's conventional arms control policy to the North Atlantic Council on December 11, 1986. At that meeting, NATO ministers issued the “Brussels declaration,” which states NATO's readiness to enter into new negotiations with the Warsaw Pact aimed at establishing a “verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels" in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Further Negotiations on Confidenceand Security-Building Measures At the Vienna CSCE Followup Conference in July 1987, NATO proposed that the 35 CSCE participating countries resume negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in order to build on and expand the work begun in Stockholm. Warsaw Pact and neutral and nonaligned states also support resumption of these negotiations. However, final agreement to resume such negotiations can only come as part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Followup Conference, including significant progress in Eastern-bloc human rights performance.
Conference on Confidenceand Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe In September 1986, after almost 3 years of negotiations, the 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe adopted a set of concrete measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. These measures, which are built around NATO proposals, provide for prior notification of certain military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of certain military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops, and annual forecasts of upcoming notifiable military activities. The accord also contains provisions for onsite air and ground inspections for verification. Although modest in scope, these provisions are the first time the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection on its own territory for verification of an international security accord. The United States is encouraged by the record of implementation to date which generally reflects both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm document.
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions On December 5, 1985, NATO presented at the MBFR negotiations a major initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal deferred the Western demand for data agreement on current forces prior to treaty signature. The Soviets had claimed that this Western demand was the primary roadblock to agreement. The proposal also called
Conventional Stability Talks NATO began discussions with the Warsaw Pact in February 1987 to develop a mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. In July, representatives of NATO presented a draft mandate for negotiations that would directly involve the 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would cover their conventional forces on land from the Atlantic to the Urals. These negotiations would take place within the framework of the CSCE process, but would be autonomous regarding subject matter, participation, and procedures. On December 14, 1987, the negotiators reached preliminary agreement on certain aspects of the mandate. Discussion continues on the remaining issues. We hope to conclude these mandate discussions in 1988 so we can get the new negotiations underway. As with the negotiations on confidenceand security-building measures, our ability to proceed with new conventional stability negotiations depends on the achievement of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Followup Conference, including progress in Easternbloc human rights performance.
Current Reflections on U.S.-Japan Relations
Address before the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies-Japan Forum on March 16, 1988. Mr. Sigur is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Japan, our relations go beyond the traditional bilateral levels to shared responsibility for close coordination on broader political and security matters and for the maintenance and improvement of the global economic system and institutions. I would like to highlight the main elements of those relations between Japan and the United States.
I am always pleased to be able to come to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and to share my observations and comments on our policies with so many colleagues and friends. It is a special pleasure to be here tonight since this event coincides with a joint research project on U.S.-Japan relations between students of Johns Hopkins SAIS and the International University of Japan. The joint conference reports of the last few years were well received, and I look forward to this year's assessment. In many ways, this year is a time of transitions. After a successful January visit here with the President, Prime Minister Takeshita resumed the work of his new administration in Tokyo. Here in the United States, our own presidential election campaign is underway. The transition of administrations is a good time to reflect on the major issues in U.S.-Japan relationsissues, I might quickly add, that transcend administrations or political parties. The Reagan Administration has devoted and continues to devote considerable time and attention to relations with Japan. I think the President summed it up the best when he said of the relationship, “Great care has been taken over four decades by political leaders on both sides of the Pacific to mold and create this gem of friendship which is of such immense value.” The President went on to say that even the closest of friends have differences and that our challenge is to keep trade and commerce flowing equitably between our peoples. It is in this context that we must always bear in mind that the relationship between the United States and Japan is not a single relationship but a web of connections-political, defense, commercial, financial, personal. With
The Defense Relationship The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is the foundation upon which our bilateral relationship rests. The interests of both the United States and Japan-and, indeed, the interests of the West, of which Japan is a part—are well served by it. Our security arrangements with Japan, including the presence of our troops and facilities there, are essential for the peace and security not only of Japan but of the entire Pacific region, including, of course, the United States. So, as the term “mutual security” implies, we share the benefits, as most will agree. There is, however, growing controversy over sharing the cost of that sec ty. The buzzword around Washington these days is "burdensharing.” And in this time of budget austerity, an important focus of administration as well as congressional concern is—and must be—defense burdensharing. Japan, in particular, has been criticized for taking a “free ride” on defense costs. Is that true? What is Japan contributing to our mutual defense burden? Japanese defense spending has grown in real terms at a rate of some 5.2% over the past 10 years, significantly higher than that of our NATO allies. Japan's defense budget in 1988, estimated at some $30 billion, will likely be the fifth largest in the world and the second largest of non-nuclear powers, following West Germany. That's an expensive free ride. Moreover, Japan will contribute $2.5 billion in 1988 for the support and maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan. That comes to about $45,000 per U.S. serviceman stationed there. It is worth noting that in some countries where we have mutual security obligations, we pay the host government for the base arrangements. By contrast, in material terms Japan provides the most generous host-nation support program for U.S. forces we enjoy anywhere. And
we have just signed an agreement under which Japan, by 1991, will increase its contribution to combined U.S. forces-Japan labor costs by some $300 million a year. So is Japan taking its defense burdensharing responsibilities seriously? Of course it is. Can Japan do more? Yes, we believe Japan should and will. We think, for example, Japan can move more quickly to acquire the capabilities to fulfill defensive missions it has set for itself, including protection of its sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles. This brings us to an ironic turn of events. Japan, in order to acquire the defense capabilities we wholeheartedly agree with, has decided to buy the American guided-missile destroyer weapons system known as “Aegis." Aegis, by the way—at over a halfbillion dollars per system—is certainly no free ride. Yet some of the same Members of Congress who criticize Japan for not spending enough on defense oppose selling Aegis to Japan, citing the sensitive defense technology involved or arguing that we can somehow force Japan to buy not only the Aegis system but also the hull to put it in. We have been sharing sensitive defense technology with Japan for 30 years to our mutual benefit, and the Japanese have an excellent record of protecting that technology. And while the Aegis sale may not directly benefit our shipyards, the sale of each system will provide over 5,000 man-years of U.S. labor in other areas. This issue is illustrative of the misunderstanding surrounding our defense relationship with Japan. The argument over sensitive technology relates back to the illegal sale of advanced milling machines by the Toshiba Machine Company, which gave the Soviet Union substantially increased production capability for quiet submarine propellers and caused significant harm to our mutual security. The Government of Japan, of course, shares our outrage over that industry diversion to the Soviets. Tokyo has taken several steps, including revision of its export laws, to improve its controls on strategic technology and prevent a repetition of illegal trading activity by Japanese firms. Japan is also working closely with us to strengthen COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls), the multilateral forum responsible for controlling strategic technology flows to the Soviet bloc.
Another area where Japan can and should do more is in its contribution to the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan. As I said earlier, Japan's hostnation support program already is the most generous we have, and we appreciate it. But the fact is that the strong yen has had a dramatic impact on our base expenses. Base worker salaries, fuel for our trucks and aircraft, the electricity bills at our bases, just to mention a few areas, are paid in yen, not dollars—and Japan could assume a larger share of that burden.
found Japan's views to be valuable and geared to Western goals; we have seen our cooperation become increasingly intimate and fruitful. Much of the consultation to which I refer has occurred for many years between senior officials of the two governments. What is noteworthy about the last several years is that consultations at all political and economic levels have become more numerous, more detailed, and more useful. Frequent summit meetings between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, semiannual subcabinet economic sessions, and numerous other exchange visits are just a few examples. Obviously, a good part of the conversations between government officials of our two countries concerns bilateral relations, and particularly economic relations. But the leaders have taken up a variety of international topics as well, and the discussions have taken on the character of routine coordination and cooperation. We believe this pattern will continue.
Development Aid and Foreign Policy Cooperation But burdensharing is not limited purely to defense expenditures, just as our cooperation with Japan is not limited only to the defense relationship. One of the areas in which we cooperate very closely is overseas development aid. Japan now has the second largest foreign aid program in the world, and if current trends continue, Japan will overtake the United States in 1991 as the world's largest aid donor. Increasingly, Japan provides foreign aid to countries of strategic importance to the West. Japan has substantial development assistance programs in countries like the Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Turkey, and Jamaica, which are of special importance to us. Still, we believe Japan could do more in this regard. Japan also has stepped up its efforts to increase financing to developing countries. In 1986–87, the Japanese Government committed itself to recycle $30 billion over 4 years to LDCs (less developed countries. This ambitious program, which includes some concessional bilateral lending and cofinancing with multilateral development banks as well as nonconcessional loans, should provide substantial help to middleincome LDCs with heavy debt burdens. In addition, the Japanese Government has stated the recycling will be completely untied, which could benefit U.S. exports to LDCs. Obviously, defense and foreign aid are not the only areas in which we consult and cooperate closely with Japan. In fact, there is hardly any aspect of foreign policy on which we do not coordinate closely, including issues involving Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and arms control. And I can say that, across the board, we have
The Economic Relationship It is precisely because our defense relationship with Japan is crucial, and because our cooperation with Japan on international matters is so important and cordial, that the economic friction between the two countries is so vexing. The resolution of the trade problems between our two countries is necessary and central to the maintenance of a sound overall relationship. Let me summarize my analysis of the challenge we face in our economic relations with Japan. With determination and with goals shared by business, government, and citizens, Japan has built an economic structure capable of developing and producing attractive, high-quality products at very competitive prices. In the past, Japan often resorted to "infant industry” protection. That sort of protection, questionable in any event, is no longer defensible. The large Japanese manufacturers have the engineers, the expanding research and development, and ample finance to compete vigorously and successfully at home and abroad in the absence of government protection. There is no more visible evidence of this than the volume of Japan's exports to the United States and to the world. Inefficient industries in Japan, which certainly exist, should restructure or retrench in an environment of open markets. I believe Japan already is on that path and should be encouraged to adhere to it.
U.S. Trade Policy Toward Japan One sometimes hears the allegation in Washington that the Administration has no trade policy. That simply is not so. With regard to Japan, we have a policy which addresses both individual trade problems and the structural issues that lie behind our deficit, and it is working. Before I go into the specifics of just what we are doing, I think we have to put the trade imbalance into perspective so that we know just what the problems before us are and so we can avoid doing damage to our own selfinterests through shortsighted solutions. The U.S. economy and the economies of our large trading partners are very much interdependent. We do not, and cannot, exist in isolation. Our economy is particularly closely intertwined with that of Japan. Our two-way trade with Japan in 1987 of $116 billion was our second-largest trading relationship The United States and Japan together account for some 60% of total OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) production. Not just trade but investment flows tie our two economies. The direct investment position in each other's economies stands at $38 billion and is expanding rapidly. Japanese direct investment in the United States has meant employment for U.S. workers. There are Japanese-owned manufacturing facilities in 40 U.S. states, employing well over 100,000 Americans. These investments have increased U.S. productivity, making U.S. products more competitive at home and abroad. We continue to be Japan's largest export market. Although the common wisdom these days is that Japan will not buy U.S. products, the facts do not bear this out. Japan imported $28-billion worth of U.S. products in 1987, far more than any other nation except Canada. To put that number into perspective, it is more than we exported to West Germany, France, and Italy combined. Within this broad economic relationship, the trade imbalance continues as a major problem. Our trade deficit with Japan in 1987 was about $60 billion out of our total global deficit of $172 billion. There is no doubt that the U.S.Japan imbalance must be reduced, and soon. During the past several years, we have developed a firm and consistent set of policies to increase exports to Japan and deal with the trade imbalance. These include:
• Working for the removal of trade barriers affecting individual U.S. products; • Working with Japan and other countries to obtain exchange rates that reflect economic fundamentals; • Encouraging structural adjustment in the Japanese economy to greatly reduce its reliance on exports for growth and to move toward significantly more domestic-led growth; • Taking action under our trade laws, when necessary, to remove restrictive trade practices; and • Cooperating with Japan internationally to strengthen the world trade system and promote the success of the new trade round. We have succeeded in opening the Japanese market in many areas, but too many import barriers remain. Much work remains to be done, although Japan now has the lowest average import tariffs of any major industrial nation. Because of our efforts, various barriers to imports of U.S. fish and fish products, tobacco, legal services, and forest products have been removed. Japan is one of the few countries now removing barriers to trade. Apart from anything else, doing so will result in the higher standard of living that the Japanese people have earned. We should not underestimate the significance of the changing nature of Japan's economy. In the past few years, Japanese policymakers have adopted policies to reorient production and investment toward domestic sectors, to increase imports, and to maintain structural reforms in order to sustain noninflationary growth. These policies are succeeding as the Japanese economy has emerged with vigorous growth, close to 4% in 1987, on the strength of domestic demand. The same economic results are projected for this year as well. The continued strength of the Japanese economy has also made a significant contribution to sustaining global economic expansion.
especially in seeking greater market access for U.S. firms in the areas of telecommunications, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, electronics, forest products, and financial services. Through the talks, Japanese agencies and U.S. agencies have established durable working relationships. The negotiations have been educational for both sides, and the cooperation they have engendered will continue to be essential, given the growing integration of the U.S. and Japanese economies. In our attempt to deal with the effects of trade on our own industries and with political pressures in the United States, we often forget that other democratic governments must deal with much the same political realities and problems. This is by no means an argument for inaction. Rather, we should keep a sense of proportion in our relations with Japan and our other trading partners when dealing with trade problems. The goal we must strive for, through international trade and investment, is increased prosperity for ourselves and the global economy. Protectionism, therefore, is not the answer to our trade difficulties. In the present international economy, goods and funds flow easily across borders. Businessmen have many options. If interest rates are high in one country, companies can borrow in another. If the yen appreciates, Japanese businesses are likely to invest in the United States or serve this market from third countries. If we bar imports from one country, we are likely to see shipments from others. To survive in this kind of world, we must look to the
fundamentals. We must save and invest, research and innovate. The government must create an environment conducive to these things. But only private individuals and companies can accomplish them. I think that both Japan and the United States are headed in the right directions. As a result of the yen's appreciation, in volume terms, Japanese exports to the United States are declining, and Japanese imports from the United States are growing. The United States is taking steps to correct counterproductive economic policies of its own. At the same time, the Japanese Government has resolved to alter its economic structure. The United States and Japan are supporting the economic policy coordination process adopted at the Tokyo and Venice economic summits, and market access negotiations on specific products will continue. In conclusion, I would like to leave with you the message that our current problems, including those in the trade area, should be viewed in the perspective of the fundamentally strong ties between the United States and Japan and of other problems we have addressed and solved over the years. I am confident that, through perseverance and cooperation, the United States and Japan will solve their economic problems in a way that will contribute to increased prosperity in each country and to an ever more solid and productive relationship across the board. This is all the more essential as our relationship continues to expand beyond the bounds of the bilateral and becomes truly global in scope.
Pacific Development and the New Internationalism
Observations Let me add some of my own personal observations on the conduct of our economic relations with Japan. In the course of the series of intense trade negotiations during my time as assistant secretary, the U.S. and Japanese Governments have worked together to solve problems. Some of the negotiations have been strained at times, but they have been successful,
Address before the Pacific Future Conference in Los Angeles on March 15, 1988. Mr. Solomon is Director of the Policy Planning Staff. We live in a time when for many people the words "Pacific" and "future” are nearly synonymous. The nations of the Pacific rim have grasped the technological and economic trends that are transforming our world. They are the
pace-setters of a new internationalism that is reshaping our lives and the world order of the 21st century-now little more than a • The economic dynamism of the Pacific rim is now a crucial source of growth for the global economy. Japan, of course, has led the way and is now an economic superpower with major global responsibilities, as well as our anchor in East Asia. • The new centers of economic power and political influence in the Pacific are steadily moving the world
away from the bipolar era of the postWorld War II years. • The struggle for democracy in the Philippines and South Korea reflects a worldwide surge toward more open politics. • And—of particular concern to those of us involved in foreign policy planning-important changes, now underway among the region's major communist powers, may hold the prospect for a more secure Pacific. As the 14th Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staffwhose founding fathers were George Kennan and Paul Nitze-I am keenly aware that for nearly three decades our internationalism remained firmly centered on Europe. It was with Europethrough the Bretton Woods agreements, the Marshall Plan, and NATOthat the structure of the postwar international system was created; a system that, four constructive decades later, has brought us to the edge of a new world. When the Policy Planning Staff was first established, in the spring of 1947, the Pacific was anything but "pacific." When Americans faced Asia in those days, they saw the newly victorious communist regime in China, the SinoSoviet alliance, the Korean war, and then-in the 1960s and early 1970s—the war in Vietnam. Yet, in the past decade, our perspective on the Pacific has changed dramatically: from the challenges of warfare to those of economic competition; from hostile political rivalry to normal relations with former adversaries; from distant countries with esoteric cultures to new partners in a global process of change. We have had to broaden our international outlook to include a dynamic region that increasingly rivals Europe for influence in world affairs. Our challenge as Americans is to grasp the essence of the trends that are transforming the Pacific and to balance our relations with the region with our continuing commitments to Europe. America is an island continent that links the two great oceans, and we cannot pursue our Pacific interests at the expense of those across the Atlantic, or vice versa. Nothing illustrates this truth better than the recent arms control treaty on eliminating medium and shorter range nuclear missiles. We made it clear in the course of negotiations with the Soviets that ve would not sign an
agreement which merely shifted the SS-20s from west of the Urals to the east. We could not tell our allies and friends in the Pacific that the price of greater security for Europe must be greater insecurity for Asia. We could not, and we did not. And we will not do so as we now pursue a much broader arms control agenda, including restraints on strategic and conventional arms, chemical weapons, and the growing global market for high-techology weaponry. New security challenges, of course, are but one dimension of the new internationalism. I want to take this opportunity to explore with you the other critical challenges we face in the Pacific: First, structural adjustments in a global economy that is being transformed, in part, by new technologies and the challenge of trade imbalances that reflect this transformation; Second, the surge of democracy in the Pacific and the tasks we face in helping the Philippines and South Korea to consolidate their more open political systems; Third, the unique, outward-looking regionalism of the Pacific and problems of linking the region to the global system; and Finally, the security challenges that remain, especially the issue of how to deal with the communist countries as they struggle to keep pace with the market-oriented economies of the AsiaPacific region.
Take China, for example. Stimulated by Deng Xiaoping's reform program, the most populous nation in the world has increased its agricultural output by 50% over the last 6 years. Such developments make ever more costly and futile the agricultural subsidies that are the focus of the current GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) round. Then consider the relationship between new technologies and basic commodities. Science is changing the marketplace for raw materials by reducing the demand for such basic commodities as copper and steel. Every month seems to bring a new advance in the field of superconductivity, which in time could revolutionize the world's energy markets. The lesson here is that a country's natural resources matter less than its human resources—the scientific skills and entrepreneurial talent of its people. Another trend transforming the world economy is the globalization of production processes. In recent years, multinational sourcing, manufacturing, and marketing have become the rule more than the exception. About 40% of U.S. trade, for instance, involves one branch of a firm selling to another branch located in a different country. Today's successful firms source globally, use the newest technologies from around the world, and employ fewer but more skilled workers. This means a higher level of international economic integration and a market that is global in scope. Communications and information advances are erasing the old distinctions between international and domestic affairs—blurring the boundaries of the nation-state and giving rise to what some call the "information age." Domestic issues now rapidly become matters of international interest, and vice versa. Information and knowledge are now readily available to a global scientific community, and a society's openness—or glasnost, as the Soviets are discovering—is fundamental to the most advanced levels of economic development. Business itself has been greatly changed by the emergence of global financial markets. Deregulation and the sheer force of technological change have fused the world's financial centers into a global network of tremendous speed and scope. Markets are no longer places but electronic networks. Vast flows of money-estimated at $1 trillion a day—can move rapidly in response to
Our Economic Future Let me begin with the Pacific's astounding economic progress. It is not just the production of wealth in the region that has impressed the world. The ability of many “developing” nations to leap-frog from basic industry into the computer age in just one generation has seized our imagination. Now, as we approach the end of this century, another series of economic transformations is at hand. Let's start with agricultural production. Malthus is being stood on his head. The capacity to produce food is not a limiting factor for world population growth. Biotechnology is creating new varieties of pest-, frost-, and drought-resistant crops which are bringing rich harvests to countries heretofore dependent on agricultural imports. And when new agricultural technologies are combined with market-oriented reforms, production increases dramatically. Page 14
political and economic news, as we saw on “black” Monday, when the New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong stock markets reacted to each other in real time. Finally, service industries—particularly finance, data processing, software development, engineering, and management consulting-have become the fastest growing sector for employment. More goods are becoming knowledge-intensive as they embody these high-technology services. Clearly, a more educated and skilled work force has become a prerequisite for economic competitiveness. These technologically driven trends are contributing to a dramatic dispersion of economic power. Over the past decade, a number of Pacific rim nations have graduated from the ranks of the "developing countries” to become world-class performers in one or another technological area. China, for example, is now commercializing its space-launch capacity. Computer chips are now a major source of foreign exchange for Malaysia. And South Korea has rapidly become a major global player in the manufacture of automotive components and in ship construction. The high-growth nations of the Pacific have benefited more than most from the scientific and technical trends that are changing our world and from the openness of the international trading system. But their future prosperity-our prosperity-depends on two critical and interrelated factors. First, maintaining—indeed, expanding—the openness of the global trading system; and Second, dealing with the serious trade imbalances which now threaten that system. A “globalized” American economy means that we can no longer successfully pursue our national commercial interests without considering global conditions and trends. Economic logic and our own well-being argue that the principle of economic openness must be the cornerstone of our international economic policy. Yet some Americans are showing signs of doubt. Just as our economy is poised for strong export growth and adjustment in our trade deficit, we must not jeopardize our future with short-sighted, protectionist legislation under the guise of "fair trade.”
Instead, we must pursue the course illustrated most clearly by the recently concluded U.S.-Canada free trade agreement. This pioneering accord will eliminate trade barriers between ourselves and our neighbor to the north—both of us Pacific rim countries—and create important new opportunities for growth. The liberalization of trade to promote global economic expansion is also our goal in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations now underway in the GATT. The Uruguay Round is designed to open markets, strengthen existing trading rules, and extend those rules to new areas such as agriculture, services, intellectual property, and investment. A transition to new relationships among the major players in the global economy is clearly underway. Among the Pacific Basin countries, Japan and the “four tigers” of East Asia now bear a much greater responsibility for the health of the world economy. Their productivity, their income, and their share of world output and trade admit of no other conclusion. It follows that these countries must now share a commensurate responsibility for maintaining and expanding the openness of the world economy. This means setting realistic exchange rates, restructuring economies to seek growth from domestic markets as well as exports, and lowering outdated barriers to imports. So that is our first challenge: to retain the open trading system while we work to distribute new responsibilities according to new capabilities and to reduce the imbalances that now threaten us all with destructive protectionism.
After all, what are the ingredients of economic success? A high level of education, an openness to the world, a rational distribution of decisionmaking power, an emphasis on individual initiative, and greater freedom of information and association—these are the building blocks of democracy, as well, and today the idea of democracy is among the most powerful political forces of our time. The transition to democracy, however, is a difficult and fragile process. The open society has its enemies—from the far left and the far right. It is a process that can be reversed or sabotaged-by political extremism, militarism, first-family corruption, and economic stagnation. To be specific, in the Philippines, financial and security assistance will be essential if the Aquino government is to defeat a persistent communist insurgency, restructure its economy, and set the country on a course toward sustainable and equitable economic growth. Manila will have to do its part by allowing a free market to work and creating the right domestic environment so that the assistance it receives is used effectively. But the free world must be there to support the effort. In South Korea, democracy faces a different challenge. The government and the opposition must learn the giveand-take of a working democratic system. We want the Korean Government to feel confident of our security commitment as it addresses contentious domestic issues in the face of a vicious communist adversary in the north. The South Koreans have a great asset in their strong, dynamic economy, but they will be challenged to continue the process of opening their economy-despite popular resistance—to ensure long-term economic growth.
Strengthening Democracy Our second challenge in the Pacific goes to the very essence of America-our democracy. It used to be said that democracy was a political system appropriate only to the industrialized nations of the West. Yet we see in the Philippines and in South Korea a democratic surge that is the Asian counterpart of the trend that began in Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s and then spread throughout most of Latin America. The Pacific nations are also giving us a more profound understanding of the relationship between political openness and economic development. Free markets and democracy go together.
Regional Cooperation The economic and political transformation of the Pacific countries has led to a unique, outward-looking regionalism. This is the third dimension of change in the Pacific. Asians are coming to understand that attempts to isolate their economies-or their political systemsfrom international influences carry an unacceptably high price. More and more, countries are discovering that there is a premium to be gained from cooperation rather than unilateral action.
Regional and functional groupings are gaining in stature, and international organizations such as the GATT, OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the World Bank, and the specialized and technical UN agencies are playing ever greater roles. And regional associations now provide vehicles for a number of countries to exercise broadened influence in global affairs. ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the South Pacific Forum are examples of this trend. • ASEAN efforts on the Cambodia problem, for example, have allowed its members to marshal international support for an end to the Vietnamese occupation. • In the economic arena, ASEAN as a group has been more effective in such organizations as the GATT than its individual member states would have been otherwise. • And the South Pacific Forum was instrumental in obtaining a major fisheries treaty with the United States. These organizations also have a frequently overlooked security dimension. They serve to minimize conflict among members and provide a mechanism for resolving differences. The Philippines and Malaysia have seen it in their interest to submerge territorial disputes in the interest of ASEAN unity. And all the ASEAN states have played a role in providing refuge and support for the displaced people of Indochina. In the final analysis, these efforts reflect both a high level of regional integration and perhaps an even higher degree of participation in arrangements that transcend the region. Notably, attempts to organize the Pacific Basin along the lines of a NATO or the European Community have failed to take hold. The geographical expanse and political diversity of the region partly account for this fact. But it may also reflect an understanding in the region that the future is being cast in global terms.
an era of diffusion of power among many nations. No one can forecast with certainty where this trend will lead. But the Chinese decision in the early 1970s to normalize relations with the United States has been of profound benefit to both China's security and to regional stability. The result is that China today is also catching the wave of the future. Under Deng Xiaoping's adaptive leadership, China has worked to open its economy to the world and unbind the energies of the Chinese people from bureaucratic and political restraints. The so-called socialist model of development—whether Stalinist or Maoistis clearly bankrupt, discredited by domestic experience and the powerful example of development in the noncommunist world. Now it is Moscow's turn to wrestle with the burden of its Soviet past. Mr. Gorbachev and his reformist comrades clearly see the global trends that are impelling the market-economy states into a new era of growth. And whatever perestroyka may finally come to mean, it is clear that a closed, militarized society can only spell economic disaster. Central to Gorbachev's foreign policy reforms has been a new approach to the Pacific. Speaking in Vladivostok in the summer of 1986, the General Secretary argued for rapprochement with China, a less militant Soviet approach to regional problems, and-above allSoviet participation in the economic growth of the Pacific Basin. Yet, nearly 2 years later, the promise of Vladivostok remains unfulfilled. This major Soviet port on the Pacific remains a closed military bastion, and Asians still see the Soviet Union as a threat to their security. • Despite Gorbachev's call at Vladivostok for a reduction in the Soviet military presence in the region, there have been no significant reductions. With the exception of a showcase troop withdrawal from Mongolia, the Soviet military presence along the SinoSoviet border and the occupation of Japan's northern islands remain virtually unchanged. • In Cambodia, Moscow continues to underwrite the Vietnamese military occupation to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Despite expressions of support for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, we see no signs that Moscow is willing to put at risk its military access to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam by pressuring Hanoi to come to the bargaining table.
And then there are the two communist recalcitrants in Asia, Vietnam and North Korea-military threats to their neighbors, even as they remain mired in economic stagnation. • Vietnam's military occupation of Cambodia, its refusal to negotiate with Prince Sihanouk, and its strong presence in Laos indicate that Hanoi has not yet abandoned its hopes of creating an Indochina federation. • And North Korea's threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula is undiminished. Pyongyang continues to engage in such vicious acts of statesponsored terrorism as the bombing of South Korea's leadership in Burma in 1983 and the more recent destruction of a South Korean civilian airliner on a flight from the Middle East. Still, there are interesting, if ambiguous, signs of change: in Afghanistan, we are encouraged by Moscow's publicly stated willingness to end its military occupation. But we have to make sure that, in withdrawing, the Soviets do not continue to provide arms to their client regime and thus prolong the violence or achieve politically what they have failed to gain militarily in 8 years of brutal warfare. In present circumstances, our task is to respond to changes in the communist states with caution and prudence, while firmly supporting our front-line friends, including Pakistan, South Korea, and Thailand. Beyond these security issues, the Pacific has begun to experience a particularly troublesome dilemma of our times. Although advanced technology holds tremendous opportunities for economic progress, it also poses great risks to international security. As we see in the Iran Iraq war, sophisticated weaponry is widely available in the international arms markets. Asia's emergence as a center of high-technology industries will require its nations to act aggressively to monitor and limit the availability of advanced weaponry. The spread of such arms to regional adversaries or to terrorist networks would be particularly harmful to the international system. Moreover, because many advanced technologies have military, as well as commercial, applications, we will have to work together to control the spread of dual-use items and prevent their use by states bent on damaging the international order.
New Security Challenges This brings us to a fourth dimension of the new internationalism, the security challenges. Nowhere has the transformation been more profound than in Asia. The emergence of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1960s began the transition from a Pacific divided by the communist-capitalist confrontation into
Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 24, 1988. Ambassador Brown is U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.1
So that is the new internationalism, the opportunities and the challengesas we deal with change in the Pacific and the broader transformation of the international system: An ever-more integrated, hightechnology global economy, where rapid growth and the need for restructuring Is threatens to produce a protectionist backlash against an open trading system; • Popular pressures for more open **** politics and the dangers to fragile demets ocratic institutions from the totalitarian 13 left and the authoritarian right; • The erosion of national bound- aries through instantaneous electronic Y communications and through economic forces that are integrating national economies into new regional and global patterns; and • The struggle of the communist states to become competitive in a world in which market-oriented economies, the trend toward democracy, and international associations of free nations are leading the way into the 21st century. No one should underestimate the de potential for disruption as we go through these changes. Yet, we have till good reason for confidence about the future. After all, our challenges are those of social progress; of cultural innovation; of growing prosperity and greater security for the United States, its allies, and its friends. The challenges play to our strengths. As Secretary Shultz likes to put it, if we face up to our responsibilities as well as our opportunities, it is clear that the democracies of the Pacific rim hold the winning hand.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss with you the issue of Indochinese refugees and its impact on our important bilateral relationship with Thailand. I realize that the impetus for this hearing is the rapidly evolving situation with regard to Vietnamese boat arrivals on the east coast of Thailand. Nonetheless, one cannot effectively address this specific situation without looking at the broader context of the Indochina refugee issue which affects most of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations] states as well as our bilateral relationship with Thailand.
Thai refugee camps in 1987, nearly triple the total of 3,886 boat arrivals in 1986. The Thai Government also acted in 1987 to begin to regularize the status of more than 9,600 Hmong who were illegally residing in Ban Vinai Camp, many of whom had entered Thailand in the last year. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that there arose voices in Thailand questioning whether a continuation of the kingdom's generous first asylum policy was in the national interest. The Thai press and public opinion is virtually unanimous in dismissing the new wave of arrivals as "economic migrants” or “opportunists." Some even see in this new flow a deliberate Vietnamese attempt to undermine Thai security, while others worry about the corruption associated with widespread smuggling activities, of which “people smuggling" is only one element. Whatever the character of this new wave of arrivals, one fact remains clear—the policies of the Government of Vietnam remain the root cause of the continued Indochinese refugee outflow. The sophisticated smuggling operation that moves large numbers of Vietnamese citizens through Cambodia to Thailand could only take place with official tolerance, if not official approval. Nonetheless, Thailand continued to accept large numbers of refugees in 1987. In addition, the Royal Thai Government took a number of commendable steps, some of them unprecedented, directly responsive to U.S. humanitarian concerns. These included: • Granting the United States full access to interview and resettle border Khmer with close family members in the United States under the special border humanitarian parole/immigrant visa program; • Giving the United States access to process the nearly 7,000 "ration card holders" at Khao-i-Dang; • Opening up access for the Hmong to the refugee screening process by admitting to screening 9,600 Hmong illegally in Thai refugee camps; • Allowing international access and assistance to the more than 1,500 Nam Pun Hmong, including authorizing their processing for third-country resettlement; and
The Refugee Situation in Thailand The partnership between the international community and Thailand in providing asylum and subsequent resettlement to Indochinese asylum seekers has, in general, been one of the great humanitarian success stories of the past decade. Thailand has provided refuge to nearly 1 million persons who fled Indochina. In turn, the international community has resettled over 575,000 of these refugees in the West. The United States has played the leading role in this effort, resettling over 400,000 refugees out of Thailand. Yet, despite this resettlement effort, the Thais find themselves still providing refuge to over 400,000 Indochinese refugees and "displaced persons." There is no immediate prospect for the safe return of the 288,000 "displaced Khmer" on the ThaiCambodian border to their home country. In addition, of the 112,000 asylum seekers in UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)-supported camps, nearly 69,000 have been in Thailand more than 3 years. Furthermore, the Thai see a sudden upsurge of Vietnamese boat arrivals after several years when it appeared that the flow might be under control: 11,245 Vietnamese boat people entered
• Improving protection at the Khmer border displaced persons camps, particularly through the establishment of a legal market at Site Two, the planned replacement of the Thai rangers by a new unit to provide protection to Khmer displaced persons, and authorization for expanded education.
The Current Problem: Vietnamese Influx Into Thailand While the Thais took these significant steps, no solution was found to the difficult problem of the continued influx of Vietnamese boat refugees into Thailand. My Embassy reported to Washington as early as October 1987 that creative new approaches were required to address the Thais' legitimate concerns over the Vietnamese boat inflow in a manner consistent with our own humanitarian concerns. The problem finally came to a head in January 1988. January marked the third straight month in which boat Vietnamese arrivals were at record highs, not seen in Thailand since 1981. There were almost 6,000 new boat arrivals in the period November 1987January 1988. Equally important, the vast majority of these new arrivals came via the east coast of Thailand, mostly through the Province of Trat. The passage was not that of the traditional “boat people” who braved long and dangerous trips across the seas from Vietnam to reach the shores of the free countries of Southeast Asia. Instead, these new arrivals came via a sophisticated smuggling network through Cambodia by land and then on a short boat trip to the coast of Trat. Many, indeed most, Thais questioned whether this new group was as deserving of first asylum as the “traditional” boat people. Faced with these growing pressures, the corruption and the threat to national security posed by smuggling generally between Thailand and Cambodia, the Ministry of Interior acted vigorously to tighten up on admitting refugees to the east coast of Thailand. A meeting chaired by the Interior Ministry in Trat on January 27 resulted in a dramatically new Thai approach designed to deter future east coast boat arrivals. A naval and marine police blockade was set up to turn back boats carrying Vietnamese asylum seekers trying to enter Thai waters from Cambodia. Those Vietnamese who did manage to reach shore were to be pushed off in boats back to Cambodia. Vietnamese already ashore, but not yet in a
refugee camp, who were determined to have come to Thailand via a short trip from Cambodia would be heretofore treated as “land Vietnamese" and sent to the Site Two displaced persons camp, as part of an overall tough deterrence policy. The implementation of this new policy had some tragic consequences. Between 500 and 550 Vietnamese asylum seekers were pushed off Thai shores betwen January 27 and February 11, according to our information and the public statements of local Trat officials. On the basis of second- and thirdhand reports, we estimate more than 100 persons have died, primarily from drownings after boats were pushed off but, in one case, from a reported ramming by a Thai fishing vessel of a boat carrying Vietnamese refugees. Over 500 Vietnamese were stranded on islands off the coast of Trat, with no regular source of food, water, or medical care. Thai policy has been modified in recent days to address some of these problems. The [Thai] National Security Council decided on February 19 to give UNHCR access to the islands off Trat; provide food, water, and medical care under the auspices of local Thai officials; and evacuate medical emergency cases to mainland hospitals. We have reports from Trat that these decisions are being implemented, with refugees being consolidated at several locations to facilitate their care and assistance. Furthermore, there appears to have been a decision made to stop boat pushoffs. The boat interdiction program and policy of sending new arrivals to Site Two remains in effect. Throughout this situation, the U.S. Embassy has taken action simultaneously on three fronts. First, we moved to deal with the immediate threat to life. Second, we have worked together with the Thai Government and the UNHCR toward a compromise on Vietnamese boat refugee policy consistent with both legitimate Thai national security concerns and our own humanitarian interests. Third, we have proposed ideas that would address the underlying causes of the ever-increasing number of refugee crises that threaten our bilateral relationships with Thailand. Our first concern was the most basic—the protection of human life. We had advance warning on January 20 of a possible change in Thai boat refugee
policy. On the basis of this warning, we sought Washington authorization to approach the Thais with our concerns. Through Mr. Victor Tomseth, Country Director for Thailand and Burma who was visiting Bangkok, we raised this issue on January 25 with Suwit Suthanakul, the Secretary General of the National Security Council—the body charged with formulating Thai refugee policy. The same day, we briefed the Foreign Ministry on our concerns in preparation for the January 27 interagency meeting in Trat which we knew would discuss this issue. We stressed the importance of preserving first asylum and avoiding boat pushoffs. When the first boat pushoff from the mainland become known on January 27, my Embassy stepped up its efforts to persuade the Thai Government to maintain a humanitarian policy and avoid actions that could and did lead to loss of life. I personally discussed the matter in separate calls on the highest government officials including, inter alia, Foreign Minister Siddhi, Interior Minister Prachuab, and the Secretary General in the Prime Minister's Office, Prasong. My Deputy Chief of Mission was equally active, calling on senior officials at the Interior and Foreign Ministries, National Security Council, and Supreme Command. My refugee staff maintained its own intensive contacts with their Thai counterparts. We also worked closely with UNHCR, as the lead international agency in refugee protection in Thailand. UNHCR was in constant touch with us as it pursued its own intensive dialogue with senior Thai officials. We did not, however, restrict our efforts to Bangkok. We worked initially through UNHCR which had a permanent staff in Trat and had been assisting for many months the refugees who sought first asylum on the east coast. When we learned on February 3 that UNHCR had been denied access to new Vietnamese arrivals, we decided that a more direct Embassy role was appropriate. Our first Embassy/Joint Voluntary Agency team visited the east coast on February 5 for 2 days. By February 9, we had established a 24-hour Embassy presence on the east coast to monitor the situation. That presence has remained continuously to this date. Our officers on the spot quickly alerted to us an urgent life-threatening situation—the presence of over 400 Vietnamese off the coast of Trat, many without adequate food and water. By February 11, our Embassy team was
Defense: 17.6% of budget. Flag: Two red stripes at top and bottom, two white inner strips, and wider blue band in middle. The blue represents royalty; the white, Buddhism; and the red, “Thailand," which means "land of the free."
Geography Area: 513,115 sq. km. (198,114 sq. mi.): about the size of Texas. Cities: CapitalBangkok (pop. 6 million). Other citiesChiang Mai (155,471), Hat Yai (123,389), Nakon Ratchasima (200,051). Terrain: Four general regions—a densely populated central plain watered by the Chao Phraya River system; an eastern plateau bordered on the east by the Mekong River; a mountain range spanning the country in the west and separating the plain and plateau in east-central Thailand; and the southern isthmus joining the land mass with Malaysia. Climate: Tropical monsoon.
| out on a boat visiting the islands and & providing assistance to those refugees we located. We continued to go out on boats, providing food and/or cash to buy food where we went. We also provided our information to the appropri ate international agencies and voluntary : groups who could provide assistance, including medical care, on a more sysi tematic basis. Our field work played an important role in advancing a joint effort by private and governmental international agencies to provide food and medical assistance to the refugees on the islands. The Thai Government has now agreed to a UNHCR-supported relief effort to the islands with UNHCR and local government participation. The Embassy team remains in Trat on a 24hour basis, but our role is now primarily monitoring and reporting on the UNHCR-supported relief effort. I personally visited Trat on February 21 prior to departing Thailand to attend these hearings. Accompanied by my Refugee Counselor, Embassy doctor, and Thai- and Vietnamese-speaking officers, I visited over 1,200 Vietnamese refugees in three shelters in Trat. I also overflew by helicopter the islands, observing no groups of refugees not already identified and receiving assistance from the UNHCR-supported relief effort. The shelters we visited were crowded, but the Vietnamese were in good condition, and they said they were satisfied with their treatment by the Thai. Several of the persons I spoke with had reeducation camp experience, with one man having been imprisoned for 12 years. In my talk with the governor of Trat, I stressed our mutual interest in humanitarian treatment of the Vietnamese asylum seekers and expressed our willingness to work with the Thai Government in dealing with this issue. Immediate action to deal with the threat to life was, however, only part of the challenge we faced. Working with Thai officials and UNHCR, we sought to promote a policy that would accommodate Thai concerns about reducing the refugee flow while preserving first asylum and humanitarian treatment. We worked closely in support of UNHCR's proposal to create a holding center for new Vietnamese boat arrivals, which would deny the refugees immediate access to resettlement processing as a means of “humane deterrence" of new arrivals without pushoffs or loss of life. We also pledged to intensify our resettlement processing activity at the existing Vietnamese boat
Nationality: Noun and adjective, Thai(s). Population (1987): 54 million. Annual growth rate (1987): Less than 1.6%. Ethnic groups: Thai 84%, Chinese 12%, other 4%. Religions: Buddhist 95%, Muslim 3%, other 2%. Languages: Thai, ethnic, and regional dialects. Education: Years compulsory—6. Attendance-96%. Literacy—89%. Health: Infant mortality rate-45/1,000. Life expectancy--64.2 yrs. Work force (21.4 million): Agriculture58.9%. Industry, commerce, and services26.3%. Government—8.18%.
Economy GNP (1986): $40 billion. Annual growth rate: 3.4%. Per capita income: $771. Avg. inflation rate: 4.3%. Natural resources: Tin, rubber, natural gas, timber, fisheries products, tungsten, lignite, zinc. Agriculture (16.7% of GNP): Products-rice, corn, sugarcane, manioc. Land—24% agricultural. Industry (20.6% of GNP): Types—textiles, agricultural processing, wood products, tin and tungsten mining. Trade: Exports—$8.802 million: textiles, rice, fish products, rubber, tin, tapioca, shrimp, corn, sugar, precious stones/ jewelry. Major markets–Japan, EC, US, Singapore, Hong Kong. Imports-$9,186 million: petroleum, machinery, food, capital equipment, fertilizer, chemicals. Major sources-Japan, EC, US, ASEAN. Official exchange rate: 26.27 baht = US$1.
Page 15
the joint statement issued by the President and the General Secretary in their Romania Renounces Washington meeting, as developed further during Secretary Shultz's visit to MEN Renewal Moscow in February 1988. Both sides have worked hard, and some progress has been realized in a number of areas, but much more needs to be done. DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, Jackson-Vanik amendment, Section 402 FEB. 26, 19881 of the 1974 Trade Act. By mutual desire, the meetings be We will be consulting with Romatween the Secretary and the Foreign The Romanian Government has in nian officials regarding the legal and Minister began with a frank and busi- formed us it has decided to renounce policy implications for our bilateral nesslike exchange of human rights and renewal of most-favored-nation (MFN) humanitarian questions. The discussion commercial agreement of Romania's resubject to the terms of the Jackson quest. We welcome and reciprocate the of these issues will continue at the ex- Vanik agreement. Therefore, the Ad Romanian Government's expressed depert level. ministration this year will not exercise sire to continue to work for better relaThe Secretary and the Foreign the waiver authority under that amend tions, to maintain a broad range of Minister and their senior experts held ment. The U.S. Government remains extensive discussions on arms control. contacts and consultations, and to work firmly committed to the Jackson-Vanik They reaffirmed the strong com to promote trade and economic amendment as the law of the land. mitment made in the Washington sum relations. Under the Jackson-Vanik amend The Government of Romania has mit joint statement to make an ment, without another annual waiver, authoritatively stated to us it will conintensive effort to complete a treaty on Romania's MFN status will expire on tinue to allow emigration for family rethe reduction and limitation of strategic July 3, 1988. Therefore, all Romanian offensive arms and all integral docu unification purposes without relation to products arriving in U.S. ports after economic ties with the United States. ments at the earliest possible date, July 2, 1988, will be subject to the We welcome this. It is particularly preferably in time for signature of the higher non-MFN duties. In addition, important because of the continuing intreaty during the next meeting of the effective July 3, Romania will no longer tense concern shared by the Admintwo leaders. The ministers reviewed be eligible for any U.S. Governmentthe joint draft texts of a protocol on istration, the Congress, and the supported export credits through such American people with human rights in inspection; a protocol on conversion or programs as the Commodity Credit Romania. This concern will continue to elimination of strategic offensive arms; Corporation (CCC) or the Export-Imand a memorandum of understanding, be a central part of the U.S.-Romanian port Bank. dialogue. developed in accordance with their di Since 1975 Romania has had MFN rective at the February ministerial in tariff status under a bilateral commer Read to news correspondents by DeMoscow. Reemphasizing their commit- cial agreement, contingent on annual partment deputy spokesman Phyllis ment to effective verification measures, renewal of a waiver provided for by the Oakley. I they agreed that the negotiators in Geneva will seek to resolve the remaining differences in these documents and report on progress at the next text of a separate agreement building JVE, to be finalized through the conministerial. on the language of the December 10, duct and analysis of the JVE; and acThe ministers continued their re 1987, joint statement issued by Presi- celerate work on verification issues for view of the key remaining substantive dent Reagan and General Secretary the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty issues associated with the treaty, as Gorbachev, allowing consideration of (PNET). well as a wide range of treaty topics of any unresolved issues at the next meet- The two sides reviewed the situainterest to each side, including prob- ing of the Secretary and the Foreign tion on conventional arms control, with lems associated with: verification and Minister in Moscow. special reference to the mandate negocounting of nuclear-armed long-range Taking note of further progress in tiations in Vienna, and expressed the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs); U.S.-Soviet full-scale step-by-step ne- hope for their completion in the context limitation and verification of nuclear gotiations on issues of nuclear testing of a successful outcome of the Vienna armed long-range sea-launched cruise and confirming the commitment by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Comissiles (SLCMs); and mobile intercon sides to the implementation of the operation in Europe) meeting. tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). agreed mandate of these negotiations, The ministers discussed the onThey also reviewed issues related to the ministers instructed their delega- going multilateral and bilateral negotiasublimits on warheads within the 6,000 tions in Geneva in particular to design tions toward a comprehensive, level. and conduct as soon as possible the effectively verifiable, and truly global The Secretary and the Foreign joint verification experiment (JVE) in ban on chemical weapons and inMinister also reviewed the progress at full conformity with the December 9, structed their delegations in Geneva to the nuclear and space talks (NST) on 1987, ministerial statement; complete a continue working constructively in this the negotiations regarding the ABM detailed plan and schedule for the JVE direction. (Antiballistic Missile] Treaty as dis- by the April ministerial; prepare a joint cussed at the Washington summit. They draft of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty directed their negotiators in Geneva to (TTBT) protocol by the time of the expedite preparation of a joint draft Page 16
These are challenging times. From our cordial and candid conversation, I know that we share similar goals and many of the same concerns. Portugal's role as a key and trusted ally is much appreciated here. We applaud Portugal's desire to modernize its armed forces and to play a more active role in NATO's collective defense efforts. Our commitment to assist Portugal in these efforts remains firm, even within the context of the harsh budget realities that we all face. The task of leadership is to rise to that challenge. I believe from our meeting today, our two governments will accelerate the pace of our extensive cooperation and develop even further the close and mutually beneficial relationship, which has traditionally existed between our two countries.
(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)
Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco High also on our list of topics was Silva of the Republic of Portugal made the agenda for the NATO summit, an official working visit to Washington, where we will meet again next week. I D.C., February 23-25, 1988, to meet listened intently to the Prime Minister's with President Reagan and other gov- views on East-West issues. I brought ernment officials. him up-to-date on recent developments Following are remarks made by in U.S.-Soviet relations and our plans President Reagan and Prime Minister for the Moscow summit. Secretary Cavaco Silva after their meeting on Shultz discussed his meeting with SoFebruary 24.1 viet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva briefed us President Reagan on Portugal's assessment of the recent European Community summit in It has been a pleasure and an honor for Brussels and the current political and me to meet today with Prime Minister economic situation in Portugal. Cavaco Silva on his first official visit to As our meeting today underWashington. Portugal is a founding scored—while trying to improve relamember of the North Atlantic Treaty tions with adversaries—America still Organization, a valuable friend, and an remains strong and unflinching in its ally. commitments to our friends. The core We salute Portugal's impressive of our foreign policy is our permanent transition to democracy and its continu- partnership with our fellow democing commitment to the collective de- racies in the Atlantic alliance, on which fense of the West. Beyond the shared the global balance of power and the values and common interests that link cause of freedom so crucially depend. our two countries, the Portuguese Be assured we will never sacrifice the American community has made a last- interests of our allies and friends in any ing contribution to American society agreement with the Soviet Union. that we can all appreciate. The people of the United States Mr. Prime Minister, you and I have and the people of Portugal are united just concluded a most useful discussion with all other free peoples in the cause covering a broad range of international, of freedom and the responsibility of as well as bilateral, issues of impor- maintaining the peace. The United tance. Southern Africa, the Middle States and Portugal are doing their East, and Afghanistan were among the part in this historic adventure. We are topics we covered today, and I am honored to have such friends. grateful for your advice and counsel.
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva2 I reiterated to President Reagan of NATO. I am sure that, at the next NATO summit meeting which will be held in a few days, we will have the opportunity to restate our common de- termination to strengthen the Atlantic alliance as a requisite for the preserva- tion of peace and our common values. I informed President Reagan of the con- clusions of the last European Council and the prospects for building a united Europe and for Portugal's development and modernization. In the context of Portugal-U.S.A. relations, I reasserted our desire to maintain a preferential relationship since Portugal, being the U.S. maritime frontier with Europe, is a strategically important ally and wishes to remain a close and reliable ally. A few differences have emerged regarding the agreement signed between our two countries in 1983, in the context of the defense agreement, which Page 17
about $1.1 billion and a budget deficit equal to 9% of GDP, compared to the corresponding 1985 figure of 12%. Inflation, which reached 29.3% in 1984, was reduced to 11.7% in 1986. The Portuguese Government hopes to achieve investment-led growth in 1987, while lowering inflation to 8%-9%. Its policies aim to reduce consumption and credit growth to avoid an inflationary surge and deterioration in Portugal's internal and external balances. Portugal is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and COCOM. It joined the European Community (EC) in January 1986. Transition periods to bring most Portuguese agricultural prices and import charges in line with those of other EC countries and liberalize capital movements generally end in the early 1990s. The sizable amount of EC structural adjustment assistance already received and expected in the future will help the Portuguese Government carry out its plans to modernize industry and agriculture. Portugal's economic system has changed profoundly since the 1974 revolution. Financial and commercial relations with former colonies have declined in importance. The large industrialfinancial groups that once controlled much of the economy have been dismantled. Most or all Portuguese-owned firms in the following sectors were nationalized in 1974 and 1975: banks, insurance, airlines, railways, electricity, oil, gas, petrochemicals, cement, breweries, tobacco, woodpulp, steel, shipping, urban transit, and shipyards. Many other companies, although not nationalized, are under government control. Some eventually may be returned to their owners. Foreign-owned firms were exempted by statute from nationalization. Since 1979, Portuguese governments have sought to expand the scope for private enterprise and foreign investment in the economy. Constitutional revision in 1982 resulted in modification of many of the socialist features of the 1976 constitution and set the stage for legislation that opened up several sectors, including banking, which had previously been off limits to private enterprise. Since 1984, six foreign banks (including three from the United States) and four Portuguese private banks have begun operations. Portugal's foreign investment legislation was liberalized considerably in 1986. The liberalization's major effect was to stream
line the process of seeking government In recent years, Portugal also has approval of foreign investment proposals sought to broaden diplomatic contacts in Portugal. Investment proposals from with moderate Arab states in order to EC countries and, in practice, those lay the basis for expanded economic from other countries, are generally and commercial relations. At the same approved on a pro forma basis by the time, the Portuguese Government has Portuguese Government's foreign in- maintained relations with Israel at the vestment institute. ambassadorial level. Labor unions—before the revolu Following the 1974 revolution, tion mainly instruments of government Portugal opened relations with the policy-have become active, indepen- Soviet Union and East European comdent agents. Two major labor con- munist regimes. Trade and cultural exfederations have emerged. The oldest, changes, however, remain at a low level. the General Confederation of Por As a NATO and EC member, Portugal tuguese Workers (CGTP-Intersindical), approaches East-West issues in the is communist controlled. In January framework of its own strong political, 1979, the General Union of Workers economic, and military ties to Western (UGT) was formed. This confederation Europe. of unions is viewed as the democratic Portugal continues to administer alternative to, and has grown to about the small overseas territory of Macau, the same size as, the CGTP. The UGT near Hong Kong. Portugal and China has become a major force in the Por- concluded an agreement on April 13, tuguese labor movement and has gained 1987, to return the territory to Chinese international respect. rule in 1999. The interim period is intended to permit a smooth transition. A dispute with Indonesia over FOREIGN RELATIONS the status of Portuguese East Timor resulted in a diplomatic break on DePortugal's foreign policy reflects its cember 7, 1975, and Indonesia annexed geographic, cultural, and historic roots East Timor in July 1976. Portugal does in the Western community and the de- not recognize the annexation as repretermination of its post-1974 elected gov- senting an act of self-determination by ernments to reinforce those bonds and the East Timorese and has contested the democratic values they help sus- the Indonesian action in international tain. Portugal took a major step in that fora. In 1982, the UN General Assemdirection by formally entering the bly asked the UN Secretary General to European Community in January 1986. consult with both governments in an The government continues to give high effort to resolve the issue. Portugal and priority to integrating Portugal suc- Indonesia subsequently have conducted cessfully into the Community, and discussions under the auspices of the Portugal holds a broad range of new Secretary General. opportunities and responsibilities as Well over 2 million Portuguese an EC member. A charter member of reside in Europe, Africa, and the NATO, Portugal is seeking to modern Western Hemisphere as permanent ize and convert its armed forces from emigrants or—particularly in the case their colonial-era configuration in order of Western Europe—as temporary that they may play an increased role in workers. Through cultural and educaalliance defense. tional programs as well as diplomatic Five centuries of exploration and efforts, Portugal seeks to maintain ties colonizing activity have bequeathed to these emigrant communities and to Portugal a significant legacy of ties to support efforts by emigrant workers to the Third World, particularly in Africa. secure adequate social benefits from Since granting independence to the for- their host countries. mer overseas territories of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, GuineaBissau, and Sao Tome and Principe, the Portuguese Government has made major efforts to maintain and strengthen diplomatic, economic, and aid linkages with the governments of these nations. Page 18
prefer to establish such a bilateral program with us for these prisoners, we are ready to discuss the modalities of such a program without further delay. Finally, fifth, you asked that we: "provide to the Vietnamese community, in writing, clear guidelines on what family members can accompany.” We appreciate that clear guidelines on accompanying family members are of great importance to all of you. Our office has already provided your president with a written explanation of the current guidelines. If additional information or clarification is required, we will be more than happy to provide that as well, and we are always available to answer any of your questions.
Resumption of the Orderly Departure Program I am pleased to be able this evening to give you some good news about the Or- derly Departure Program itself. It is working again, and we are encouraged by the way things seem to be going. After 18 months of persistent U.S. dip- lomatic activity, we succeeded in July in reaching an agreement with the Vietnamese Government for the re- sumption of interviews for the ODP. In September, a parallel agreement was reached on a bilateral program with the Vietnamese Government for the Amer- asian children. Two interview trips to Vietnam by teams of U.S. consular and INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service) officers from the American Embassy in Bangkok have now been successfully completed. Each resulted in the interview and approval of over 1,000 persons. We now expect to be making further interview trips on a reasonably regular basis, and we hope for similarly positive results. I am sure that all of you are aware months, during which we urged that interviewing be allowed to resume and during which we made proposals on how the interviewing process could be improved and accelerated once it was resumed. In July of this year in Hanoi, the Vietnamese Government accepted our proposals and agreed to a resumption of
interviewing in Ho Chi Minh City. The good news is that they have, in tion on a request may be better than Commissioner for Refugees) personnel. U.S. Commitment to Refugee Resettlement your relatives and to obtain Vietnamese proposed procedures, U.S. consular and agreement for their resettlement in the immigration officers are going directly United States. Therefore, we must be to Ho Chi Minh City to conduct the discreet and careful in what we say in interviews in person. This means that, public. We leave the polemics to others. hopefully, most cases can be adjudi- When we meet with the Vietnamese aucated on the spot, subject to satisfac- thorities on this unresolved humantory medical examination results, with itarian issue we must be sober, sincere, final approval normally occurring and serious—and we are. within only a few weeks after the inter- There is, we believe-based on the views take place. Since there is no recent positive developments concernlonger a long backlog of people waiting ing the Orderly Departure Programfor flights, we hope that the first of some reason to be hopeful that there those approved in September will be may be better news ahead about the able to join their relatives in the United "reeducation" camp prisoners and their States before the end of the year. prospects for being allowed to leave There still remain some unresolved Vietnam for resettlement here. processing problems. As you know, the In June, in an address to the forODP office at the embassy in Bangkok eign ministers of the Southeast Asian issues letters of introduction on behalf countries meeting in Singapore, Secreof applicants whose files are sufficiently tary of State George Shultz declared complete and who have either an ap that the United States would support proved Form I-130 petition which is the countries of first asylum for the "current,” or nearly so, or who have long haul, including the continuation of been tentatively approved for travel. a substantial American refugee resetThe United States has provided to the tlement program. In September, this Vietnamese authorities the names of pledge was made concrete in President everyone to whom we have issued an Reagan's formal proposal to the ConLOI. In August of this year, after the gress and subsequent determination to Vietnamese Government agreed to the set the first-asylum admissions ceiling resumption of interviewing, the Ameri- for FY 1988 at 29,500 and the ODP can Embassy sent them a new consoli- ceiling at 8,500, for a total of 38,000 dated list of everyone to whom an LOI persons. had been issued who was still in Viet Commitment is, indeed, the watchnam. That list contained about 95,000 word of U.S. refugee policies and pronames. We hope that the Vietnamese grams. We are committed to humaniauthorities will increasingly draw from tarian ideals as a nation. We are comthese U.S. lists of persons who have mitted to helping refugees who are already been issued LOIs. the victims of oppression in this world. For most of the time that inter- We are committed to generous refugee viewing was suspended, the Viet admissions programs in order to offer namese Government did not issue any hope and new lives to the thousands exit permits or issued only a very few. and thousands who have lost their Page 19
U.S. Condemns North Korean Terrorism
How the Bombing Was Carried Out
Statements by Ambassador out this act of terrorism. The Korean Clayton C. McManaway, Deputy to the white paper details the confession of Ambassador at Large for Counter- Ms. Kim Hyon-hui. Highly trained, Terrorism, and William Clark, Jr., Korean-speaking U.S. officials have met Deputy Assistant Secretary for East with her and believe she is telling the Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the truth. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Af- We offer the following additional fairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com- facts, which we believe confirm her mittee on February 4, 1988.1 story. • North Korean agents have used AMBASSADOR McMANAWAY suicide capsules when captured in the past. More importantly, technical analyI am a deputy in the State Depart sis shows the cyanide capsule (taken ment's Office of the Ambassador at from Ms. Kim) to be chemically identiLarge for Counter-Terrorism, which is cal to those found on North Korean responsible for interagency policy for agents captured in earlier incidents. mation and coordination on matters • According to a public Japanese concerning international terrorism. I statement, the documents needed to will address our government's view of produce the forged Japanese passport the evidence linking North Korea to the used by Mr. Kim were obtained by an destruction of KAL (Korean Air Lines] individual wanted in Japan as a North Flight 858 and the steps we are taking Korean agent. in response. I will outline why we are • U.S. experts have concluded that convinced that North Korea was re the forged passports are of such high sponsible for this terrorist attack; what quality that they were almost certainly actions the United States has taken so prepared by a government intelligence far to register our outrage and concern; service. No terrorist group is known to and some of the actions we are con have the capability to produce forgeries templating—in consultation with the of this quality. Republic of Korea (R.O.K.)—to encour • We know from non-Korean age the international community to con sources that Ms. Kim and her compandemn this mass murder of 115 innocent ion traveled with coded phone numbers air passengers. Our aim is to deter of North Korean missions in Vienna and North Korea from future terrorism. Belgrade. Countering state-supported ter • As part of her cover, Ms. Kim rorism is fundamental to our counter initially spoke Japanese and denied she terrorism policy. We, therefore, take was a Korean. However, in her subseaction to condemn and punish, when quent public and private appearances, ever possible, any state which supports she spoke fluent Korean with a North attacks on civil aviation or other acts of Korean accent. terrorism. Given North Korea's record Finally, U.S. officials showed Ms. of egregious violence against South Kim a large selection of photographs of Korea, however, we think it especially individuals and asked her to identify important that all civilized countries any who had played roles in the KAL make it clear to North Korea that its 858 bombing. She identified two men murderous behavior must never be re- known to the United States as North peated. Should the world prove indif Korean agents. One of them, Han Songferent, we fear that North Korea will sam, was a North Korean official staconclude that terrorism is cost free and tioned in Budapest. Ms. Kim said she conduct further atrocities against inno- and Mr. Kim stayed with Han while in cent South Korean citizens. Such ac Budapest. The description she provided tions could make the Korean Peninsula of his house matched that of U.S. Govdangerously unstable. ernment officials who have seen it. The other was Yi Yong-hyok, the man she The Evidence said gave her the order to bomb the airliner. I believe you have seen the white paper We have no doubt that North issued by the Republic of Korea on the Korea is responsible for this act of mass destruction of KAL 858. After careful murder. review, we have concluded that it contains compelling evidence that North Korea planned, organized, and carried
This terrorist act was not launched overnight. It took careful planning, intensive training and indoctrination for the two operatives, and coordination and support from North Korean diplomatic missions abroad. Ms. Kim has detailed her training as a covert agent, beginning in 1980. She has said that she and her accomplice, Kim Sung-il, began to train in 1984 for missions against the 1988 Seoul Olympics. After receiving the order to bomb KAL 858 in October 1987, she and her partner received specialized training in the use of explosives. Ms. Kim and the other operative began their trip last November 12 when they left Pyongyang for Moscow accompanied by two North Korean intelligence officers. They then traveled to Budapest, Vienna, and Belgrade. In Belgrade, they were given the bomb by a North Korean official. It was concealed in a portable radio with additional liquid explosive concealed in a wine bottle. From Belgrade, the pair flew to Baghdad aboard an Iraqi Air flight. In Baghdad, they transferred to KAL Flight 858. The agents left the bomb aboard the plane when they got off in Abu Dhabi. When the plane disappeared while approaching Bangkok, an urgent search was begun for the passengers who had deplaned at Abu Dhabi. The two were tracked to Bahrain, where they were apprehended at the airport while awaiting a flight to Rome. It was at that point that Ms. Kim and her companion took cyanide. Her companion died, but Ms. Kim survived with medical treatment. I believe you have received a full briefing in closed sessions on still classified information, so I will move on at this point to what we have done to bring North Korea to account for this despicable act.
As soon as we were satisfied at North Korean culpability, the United States announced the following steps. • The Secretary of State designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act and notified the Secretary of Commerce of this action. Congress was also notified as part of the Commerce Department's report on exports controlled for foreign policy Page 20
U.S. Interests in the United Nations
Statement before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 25, 1988. Ambassador Walters is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
intended to enforce 598. Half measures—such as the proposal for a UN naval force in the gulf—are not workable. They would play into Iran's hands by addressing only one aspect of the conflict and by allowing the land war to continue unabated.
has not rescinded its offer to share some of the Olympic events with the North, and it has not called for violent retaliation. The people and Government i of South Korea have responded to this international outrage with outrage, but also with restraint and dignity. We api plaud their prudence, objectivity, courage, and determination. Second, we—the entire world community-must let the North know that no one can or will tolerate acts of state terrorism like the destruction of KAL 858; the North Korean leaders must understand that they have no alternative but to abandon their confrontational ! and murderous approach to international affairs. Finally, a word about the upcoming Olympics: the North cannot be allowed to disrupt them, whatever constraints are required. While the primary security responsibility for the games lies with the R.O.K. authorities, we are working closely with them to ensure that the games are safe. We are convinced that the Seoul Olympiad will be one of the most successful Olympics since their modern resurrection in 1896, a true celebration of the international community, in which we still hope the North will find it possible to participate constructively. Pyongyang need only abandon its bloody and unproductive campaign of terror.
"The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
I am delighted to have this opportunity Middle East to appear before members of the House Throughout most of 1987, deceptive Foreign Affairs Committee to address calm prevailed at the United Nations issues of importance to the United with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. States. The United Nations is engaged The Security Council was focusing its in a major way on key foreign policy attention primarily on Iran-Iraq. All of issues where there is a strong consen this changed with the sudden outbreak sus in the United States: getting the of widespread violence in the occupied Soviets out of Afghanistan and the territories in late November. Vietnamese out of Cambodia, bringing Between December 18 and Februpeace to the Persian Gulf and a settle ary 1, the Security Council was in alment in Cyprus, and promoting respect most constant session on the occupied for human rights and fundamental free territories. Four separate resolutions doms. These are issues that will remain were put to the vote. The United high on our list of foreign policy pri States supported one, abstained on orities for the rest of this Administra two, and voted against the last resolution and beyond. tion. Though our votes were different, our goals were the same: reduction of Iran Iraq War tension in the occupied territories, Is raeli compliance with the fourth Geneva The United States has supported the convention, and movement toward an UN Secretary General's intiative to overall peace settlement in the region. form a coalition at the United Nations We voted for the resolution which determined to bring an end to the war seemed to further this policy, abstained between Iran and Iraq. A major step on those whose impact appeared ambigwas taken last year: Security Council uous, and voted against a resolution Resolution 598adopted with the sup which would not have advanced those port of all Council members—not only principles. orders the parties to end the war The Administration is working at but defines the shared commitment of present with the parties in an effort to the international community to a agree on the substantive principles settlement. which should govern direct negotiations Following the adoption of Resolu- as well as on the procedural aspects of tion 598, the Secretary General con- such negotiations. We are addressing ducted intensive discussions, including short-term problems in the occupied two rounds of talks with Iran and Iraq, territories as well as an overall peace to seek agreement on ways and means settlement. We need to remember two to implement the resolution. While things: Iraq agreed to comply, Iran, despite deceptive signals to the contrary, has • The UN Security Council has maintained its commitment to the path played an important role on these isof war. In order to persuade Iran to sues by establishing Resolution 242 as comply with the resolution by agreeing the basis of all subsequent diplomatic to an immeditate cease-fire and with effort; and drawal of its forces to the international • At some point, the United Nafrontier, the five permanent members tions, and particularly the Security of the Security Council are now actively Council, may again have an important working on a second resolution which role to play in guaranteeing a just and would impose an arms embargo on durable settlement. Iran. The United States is urgently seeking passage of this resolution Page 21
some source, the fiscal and financial crisis will only worsen. The Delvalle government has, in fact, made a formal request to the U.S. Government to pay canal treaty obligations into an escrow account. We have this request under review.
cal parties and [National) Civic Crusade of Panama favoring a government of national reconciliation. This is a blueprint for progress toward democracy in Panama. We support their goal of restoring democratic government and civilian constitutional order. Once this goal has been achieved, we will work cooperatively with the Government of Panama toward the recovery of Panama's financial and economic health. The United States remains committed to fulfilling its Panama Canal treaty obligations, and we are prepared to resume working with the Panamanian Defense Forces under the treaty once civilian rule and constitutional democracy are established.
President Delvalle, the opposition political parties, and the National Civic Crusade, united in their disapproval of Noriega and to the Solis Palma presidency, called a nationwide general strike on February 29. The strike was successful, both in participation and in duration. It lasted for 4 days and during peak periods drew rates of participation as high as 80%. In the United States, strong bipartisan support has been expressed for moves to restore democratic civilian government to Panama. In the view of the U.S. Government and the American people, President Delvalle is the lawful President of Panama. On March 7, Panama's major opposition parties-- Authentic Panamenista (PPA), Christian Democratic (PDC), and Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIRENA)—issued a communique of support for President Delvalle and offered to join him in the formation of a government of national reconciliation. One member of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) joined in this communique, and more are expected to follow.
Narcotics Involvement Panama's location and dollar-denominated banking system have made it a key transshipment point and money laundering center for drug traffickers. In early February, Gen. Noriega and others were indicted by two Florida grand juries, in Miami and Tampa, on charges of profiting from drug trafficking and protection of traffickers; that was the final straw in a situation that had already been deteriorating dramatically.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS' STATEMENT, MAR. 10, 19883
Today, as you know, Panama faces a political crisis with roots in charges of official corruption, fraud, undemocratic practices, and, most recently, of illegal involvement in narcotics trafficking and related criminal activities. We believe these problems can only be resolved by supporting civilian constitutional rule and the legitimate Delvalle government.
Recent Developments On February 25, President Eric Arturo Delvalle ordered Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega replaced. Noriega's civilian henchmen called the national Legislative Assembly into rump session and in 10 minutes took measures they claimed impeached President Delvalle and Vice President Esquivel. The same rump session of the national Legislative Assembly called upon the cabinet to elect a new president. At 3:30 a.m., Manuel Solis Palma was sworn in as Panama's Minister of the Presidency, the new (figure) head of state. President Delvalle, however, refused to accept his “impeachment” or go quietly into exile. He stayed inside Panama to continue the battle against actions he believes violate the letter of the Panamanian Constitution and the spirit of democracy. On February 26, the White House issued the following statement (for text, see above).
The Financial Situation On March 1, President Delvalle issued a proclamation giving notice to those having dealings with the Government of Panama that all obligations owing the government should be made directly to the Delvalle government and not to the Noriega regime. Juan Sosa, Panama's Ambassador to the United States and one of the officials loyal to President Delvalle, took action under this proclamation to marshal and conserve assets of the Panamanian Government in U.S. federally insured banks. His directions to these institutions not to send funds from U.S.-based Government of Panama accounts to Panama and his initiation of actions in U.S courts to freeze Panamanian Government accounts have caused a severe shortage of cash in the Panamanian economy, which uses the U.S. dollar as its official currency. This has accentuated the political crisis. Most businesses have ceased to accept credit cards or checks for consumer transactions. Pensioners and retirees received government annuity checks on March 4 but were initially unable to cash them due to bank closings. After demonstrations by the pensioners, the government acted to furnish ad hoc check-cashing facilities. More government paydays will materialize as the month progresses. In the absence of new cash infusions from
Panama Defense Force Let me say in no uncertain terms that we bear no ill will toward the Panamanian Defense Force as an institution. In fact, we have a great deal of respect for the notable accomplishments of the PDF. Civilian activists in Panama, and, indeed, observers in the United States must remember the unique services that the Panamanian Defense Forces have provided in Panama's neglected rural areas. The past contributions of the PDF to national security and rural development and their potential for the future make the defense force a vitally important part of the fabric of Panamanian society. Military leaders must, for their part, take immediate steps to remove their institution from politics, deal with the corrupt few, and modernize the PDF to carry out military tasks in defense of the canal. Deep military involvement in politics weakens the civilian and military institutions, just as it detracts from Panama's ability to fulfill its crucial role in defense of the canal. In professional military matters, the Panamanian military can continue to count on the full support of the United States. We believe that strict adherence to the canal treaties by both partners is fundamental to Panama's democratic future.
In Panama today, the issue is civilian government and democracy. Civil unrest, official corruption, denial of media freedom, and drug scandals have undermined the confidence of foreign investors and of users of Panama's heavily
The United States has been, and remains, committed to fulfilling faithfully its obligations under the Panama Canal Treaties. We are also prepared to resume our close working relationships with the Panamanian Defense Forces once civilian government and constitutional democracy are reestablished.
SECRETARY SHULTZ'S NEWS BRIEFING (EXCERPTS), MAR. 11, 19884
service-oriented economy. While the banking sector is suffering most right now, larger interests are at risk. With complete transfer of the Panama Canal less than 12 years away, and with the international transportation sector undergoing significant change, it is critical that Panama maintain the confidence of future users of the canal. It is no exaggeration to say that today's crisis puts Panama's future on the line. Despite the significant U.S. and other foreign interests there, Panama's internal political problems are for Panamanians themselves to resolve. The best guarantor of Panama's continued economic well-being is a sta1 ble civilian constitutional government in and a professional apolitical military service which enjoy the confidence and support of the Panamanian people. The U.S. Government is firmly committed to supporting the forces of democracy in Panama. We are promoting dialogue among Panamanians and the strengthening of Panama's civilian political institutions. Whatever solution emerges from the present crisis must make a place for all fi elements of society. And that includes 3 the Panama Defense Force, whose de velopment as a professional, apolitical * military establishment we support today as in the past. We will continue to seek ways to support democratic civilian rule in Panrama, and we will continue to fulfill our i responsibilities under the Panama Ca nal Treaties. We are firmly committed is to continue to help this important friend and ally in the Caribbean Basin in its search for true democracy.
resumption by the Panamanian Defense Forces of a role consistent with constitutional democracy. In the present circumstance, I believe that Gen. Noriega would best serve his country by complying with the instruction of President Delvalle to relinquish his post. In so doing, Gen. Noriega would contribute very substantially to reducing political tensions and set the stage for a prompt transition to democracy in Panama. Until such a time as democratic government is restored in Panama, the United States cannot proceed on a “business-as-usual” basis. Today, therefore, I have taken a number of steps against the illegitimate Noriega regime that will contribute significantly to the goal of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Panama. I have directed that actions be taken to suspend trade preferences available to Panama under the generalized system of preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Further in keeping with the spirit of our war against drugs, I have ordered that Panama be subject to intensified scrutiny by our immigration and customs services in order to apprehend drug traffickers and money launderers. Moreover because we recognize President Delvalle as the lawful head of government in Panama, have directed that all departments and agencies inventory all sources of funds due or payable to the Republic of Panama from the U.S. Government for purposes of determining those that should be placed in escrow for the Delvalle government on behalf of the Panamanian people. In that light, I have directed that certain payments due to Panama from the Panama Canal Commission be placed in escrow immediately. This step is in complete compliance with our obligations under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaties. I am prepared to take additional steps, if necessary, to deny the transfer of funds to the Noriega regime from other sources in the United States. We have welcomed the recent statements issued by President Delvalle, the political parties, and the National Civic Crusade of Panama calling for a government of national reconciliation. We support their goal of restoring democratic government and constitutional order. Once Panamanians achieve this goal, the United States is fully prepared to work with the Government of Panama to help quickly restore Panama's economic health.
Q. What is the total, cumulative effect of trade actions? In particular, what happens to funds generated by the oil pipeline? A. In the case of the oil pipeline, those funds are flowing into an account on which there is a temporary restraining order. So they are, in effect, frozen. That account is here in the United States. That's an action taken by President Delvalle, in effect, and is in place here in this country as one of the many consequences of the fact that President Delvalle very clearly and properly is recognized by us as the legitimate President of Panama. Trying to add all this up is a little difficult because you've got some things that affect trade in some respects and some things that affect payments. I don't know that I can give an overall number. For example, the amount of trade affected by the withdrawal of GSP and CBI benefits is about $96 million a year. But just how to put a number on the impact of that, I don't know. Q. What effect do you think that this will have? What do you see the effect being, and what is the message to Noriega? Can he withstand this kind of economic pressure? A. In the fourth paragraph of the statement of the President—I'll just read it out. “... I have taken a number of steps against the illegitimate Noriega regime. ..." That's a very strong word. What we think should happen is that he should leave Panama, and we want to see a return to civilian democratic rule. We also would expect to see the Panamanian Defense Forces resume an honorable and proper role in a constitutional system. They have an important and significant job to do.
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MAR. 11, 19882
The United States has had a long and mutually productive relationship with Panama. The people of the United States consider the people of Panama to be near neighbors and friends. The historic Panama Canal Treaties exemplify the close cooperation that has traditionally characterized the friendship between the two countries which created one of the great engineering works of the human race. Out of concern for our friendship, we have been saddened and increasingly worried in the recent years as Panama's political crisis deepened. Our policy with respect to the situation in Panama is clear. We strongly favor a rapid restoration of democracy and the
Then you have the economy more generally, and you can see that we have stayed away from the idea of some sort of broad trade embargo. We're anxious to see Gen. Noriega get out of there. We don't want to punish the Panamanian people. We're for the Panamanian people. For that matter, we're for the Panamanian Defense Force. So we're trying to, very carefully and deliberately but strongly, take actions that are focused in on things that we think will make a difference, and to be very clear about our objective, which we're being. Q. Are the people down there who work for the U.S. Government and our troops, are they getting their pay—they could cash their checksand is it true that the Panamanians who work for the United States who have to go to banks in Panama cannot cash theirs? A. The ability of people in Panama to cash checks is a function of what's happening to their banking system. And it is having its troubles, to put it mildly. Exactly who is able to cash what, I can't say for sure at this point. But it does vary somewhat. Q. Isn't this going to make a mob scene with the people down there, and wouldn't that make our 40,000 Americans down there be in some danger? A. The people of Panama, from every indication we can see, support President Delvalle in his effort to get Gen. Noriega and his association with drug running out of the country. And to that extent, I think that we are on the same side.
There's a lot to work with in Panama, but Gen. Noriega has to get out of the way and the forces for democratic civilian rule take up. It's very encouraging, as the statement here says, that the political parties and the National Civic Crusade of Panama have been calling for a government of national reconciliation and giving general support to President Delvalle. Q. The President's statement says that he'll take further actions if necessary. What are his criteria for de. ciding when to take further steps? A. If there are further steps needed, he will take them. Q. But what would be that circumstance? A. I think it's better to leave a little uncertainty. But it's an evolving situation. There are additional things that no doubt we can do, and the President is saying that he will keep the situation under constant review. Q. What are the additional steps that would be first taken? A. I think we'll just leave that Q. You said he should leave Panama. Do you mean Panama or power? Q. What are the conditions that the United States wants to see achieved other than and beyond Noriega's departure? For example, any commitment to elections, or any procedure like that? A. We would expect that when Gen. Noriega leaves, President Delvalle will be able to assert his legitimate rights and civilian control of the Government of Panama will take up. The Panamanian Defense Forces will be able to resume a significant and honorable role in support of that constitutionally proper regime. Beyond that, what happens? Of course, we are ready—and we are studying it now—we are ready to take up work with such a government, to do everything possible to restore economic health in Panama, the security of Panama, and so on-and getting the drug lords out of there, which is of very considerable importance. So those are things that we're prepared to do, and then they will want to have another election, of course, which is something that will come along. But there is no plan for that. Q. If Gen. Noriega accedes to your demand and leaves the country, what will the U.S. Government do then in terms of pursuing the indict
ments that have been returned against him by two federal grand juries? A. He has been indicted in this country, and I am sure the Justice Department intends to prosecute him if we can. That's our position. Q. So why should he accede to your request then? A. He ought to be thinking a little bit about the good of the people of Panama. That's one reason. Q. Could you comment on the suggestion by some critics that the strategy of the United States contributing by the cash squeeze may turn Panamanians against the United States and may give the general an opportunity to fan anti-American sentiment. A. What seems to be evident is a clear recognition on the part of Panamanians that the source of the trouble is Gen. Noriega, and things that are being done by him illegitimately is what is drying up the funds. I want to point out that President Delvalle is the legitimate president. Noriega is, in effect, trying to pull off a military coup against a civilian government. President Delvalle has recognized and he has taken certain steps to deny the coup effort these funds. By and large, as far as I can see, in the general spirit of things that effort on his part is being supported. Q. Since you've talked about this as a virtual coup, are we putting our troops down there on any special alert? Are there any plans for any military duties down there beyond the normal ones? A. We have normal military dispositions there. It is, of course, the responsibility of the United States to operate and provide for the security of the canal. And to that extent, we have troops down there. We have SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] down there. We conduct exercises from time to time. This is all part of the normal routine, and that normal routine is in place. Q. No new exercises? Q. Can you assess the Panamanian economy and gauge how much of a blow this will be—these sanctions? A. There are two different kinds of things that are involved here. One is the cash squeeze, and that does have some effect on the economy, but it also has an effect, kind of, on the immediate ability to manage things.
Q. How deep do you feel or does the government feel corruption runs in the Panama Defense Forces? And do you feel that the top echelons there need to be flushed out along with Noriega? A. I don't want to try to comment on the Panamanian Defense Forces generally, other than to say that it is a strong and honorable force, it has a significant and proper role to play, and we want to see it play that. As far as our evidence is concerned, we have evidence that's very powerful to indict Gen. Noriega, and that's what we have done and it's been done with great care. From all that I can understand from talking to Attorney General Meese about it, the evidence is really there.
Q. On the subject of the defense forces, though, reports coming out of k. Panama indicate that, to a large ex tent, the defense forces continue to li stand behind Noriega. What evidence 13 can you point to that the pressure brought to bear up to this point is P having any effect where it counts the most within the defense forces. A. I wouldn't say that it counts most. It does count there. But in the end, the feelings that people—us ordiy nary, everyday people throughout our ? country-feel are what counts, and we've seen that in place after place around the world. We'll just have to see the views. What I'm saying here—this isn't just the United States. We happen to be especially involved because we have a responsibility for operation of the canal and because we've had a longtime association with Panama-a friendly one—that will continue. But the views that we have of (f what's happened in Panama are shared is all over the world. For example, when si we were over at the NATO meeting, I to spoke to my friends in the European * Community. They just had a meeting 1 with the Central American groups, and they excluded Panama from the meeting. They wouldn't let them be there. They've been suspended from the Contadora group and so on. And there are innumerable segments about that that I could read off to you that have come from different countries about this. So there is a great concern throughout Latin America and Central America that we identify an effort at a military coup for exactly what it is and that we come out strong and swinging for civilian democratic rule, and that's what we're doing, and it's the right El thing to do.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, We call upon the Nicaraguan GovMAR. 15, 19881 ernment to negotiate in good faith an end to the prolonged bloodshed in NicOver the last 2 weeks, it has become aragua. We urge the U.S. Congress to apparent that the Sandinista army has approve expeditiously a meaningful probeen preparing for a major offensive gram of assistance for the Nicaraguan against the Nicaraguan resistance. freedom fighters. Based on what we now know, this would appear to be the largest offensive we have seen the Sandinistas under- DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, take. Large numbers of troops, MAR. 16, 19881 equipment, and supplies are being concentrated in the Bocay region. This The Sandinista army has introduced is apparently what Daniel Ortega had troops into Honduran territory in conin mind when he announced on March 8 siderable numbers in conjunction with that the resistance "should prepare it- its attack on Nicaraguan resistance self for another heroic drive” by the forces along the Nicaragua-Honduras Sandinista forces. border. In response to this dangerous In terms of details, based on what situation created by the Sandinista atwe now know, there are a total of 12 tack, appropriate U.S. actions are now combat battalions deployed in the area under consideration in consultation of the Bocay Valley. If these battalions with the Honduran Government. The are at full strength, that could amount United States will honor its committo something on the order of 6,000 ments to the Government of Honduras troops. These battalions are supported to assist it in defending its national sovby at least 10 Soviet MI-17 helicopters. ereignty and preserving its territorial The Sandinistas have established a new integrity. The United States also has a base for this operation at Bonanza. This longstanding commitment to the freebase is a command and control logistic dom fighters of Nicaragua. support and intelligence center. The Concerning the details, the SanSandinistas have diverted a significant dinistas' primary objective appears to portion of their scarce gasoline supplies be to destroy resistance supplies, which to fuel the helicopter sorties required are stockpiled in this area. These supto support this force. plies represent a large portion of the Since the February 3 vote to termi- military equipment remaining in the nate aid, resistance units have begun to hands of the resistance, and their loss fall back toward border areas. The re- would be a very severe blow to the resistance position is difficult. Its forces sistance. must defend what is left of their sup The resistance forces engaged in plies, which means that they cannot use this unequal battle are in a desperate normal guerrilla tactics to disperse and situation. Several strategic points, inescape superior Sandinista firepower cluding two airfields, have fallen to and manpower being brought to bear on Sandinista forces. If the Sandinistas them. can maintain their momentum, it is This offensive is being prepared very likely that other key resistance even though the resistance accepted positions in the Bocay Valley will also Sandinista terms for the cease-fire be overrun. The resistance is fighting a talks scheduled to resume March 21 in superior Sandinista force, estimated to Sapoa, Nicaragua. Rather than pursu- be on the order of at least 1,500 inside ing these talks as a way of ending the Honduras and another 4,500 in the fighting in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas Bocay region. In addition, the Sanare preparing an effort to destroy mili- dinistas are bringing to bear much sutarily the weakened Nicaraguan free- perior firepower, including aerial dom fighters. bombardment from Soviet-supplied This effort is supported by Soviet AN-26 aircraft, close support from araid to the Sandinistas which continues tillery and rockets, as well as Soviet unabated. In January and February of MI-25 so-called flying tank attack this year, over 3,000 metric tons of mili- helicopters. tary equipment were delivered, by our estimates.
Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 29, 1988. 2 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 14. 3Statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams before the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal Treaties and the Outer Continental Shelf of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from 1 the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
This action in the Bocay is the most important part of what is, however, an even wider Sandinista effort to destroy the resistance. There is also a multiple battalion operation underway in the vicinity of Bonanza.
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAR. 16, 19882
In addition to its value as a test of the proficiency of our military units, this exercise is a measured response designed to show our staunch support to the democratic Government of Honduras at a time when its territorial integrity is being violated by the Cuban and Soviet-supported Sandinista army. This exercise is also intended as a signal to the governments and peoples of Central America of the seriousness with which the U.S. Government views the current situation in the region. The duration of this exercise has not been decided. The brigade task force will not be deployed to any area of ongoing hostilities.
In light of the significant cross-border incursion by Sandinista armed forces into Honduras from Nicaragua, and at the request of the Government of Honduras, the President has ordered the immediate deployment of an infantry brigade task force consisting of two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, two battalions from the 7th Infantry Division at Ft. Ord, California, plus supporting units, to Palmerola Air Force Base in Honduras for an emergency deployment readiness exercise.
SECRETARY SHULTZ'S STATEMENT, MAR. 17, 19883
Last night the President decided to send two battalions from the 82d Air
Nicaraguan Resistance and Sandinistas Reach Agreement
borne Division and two battalions from the 7th Infantry. The airborne division is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the infantry division at Fort Ord, California. Altogether, this involves about 3,200 men. All of the forces involved are light infantry; that is, there's no artillery. The deployment, we expect, will be essentially complete by midnight on Thursday, all deploying to the Palmerola Air Base. That's about 125 miles away from the area of fighting, and it's near Tegucigalpa. The troops will take part in exercises that are something that's on-going. But they are sent in response to a Nicaraguan troop movement into Honduras and in response to, most particularly, a request from the President of Honduras. So that is what the President did. Let me just now review, sort of chronologically, what took place and then state some of the views of leaders (in the region). Chronologically, what we have observed and seen is that beginning around the 1st of March, and carrying on for about a week and a half, we observed what seemed to be Sandinista preparations for an offensive. They were moving supplies, vehicles, heavy equipment into the Bocay Valley. We were, obviously, aware of this, as were the freedom fighters and the Hondurans. We could see that a command and control center was being established in Bonanza, a town in Nicaragua about 45 miles southeast of the Bocay Valley. On the 8th of March, Mr. Ortega announced “a heroic drive" against the resistance. On the 9th of March, the Sandinistas deployed some 360 troops into the Bocay Valley in 18 helicopter sorties. Scarce petroleum reserves-that is, they don't have a lot of petroleum reserves in Nicaragua-but they released these petroleum reserves for operations. And we could see there were tight communications security laid on. On the 10th of March, there were contacts between the Sandinistas and the freedom fighter patrols inside Nicaragua---as they patrolled, they could feel each other's presence. On the 15th of March, we had reports from the freedom fighters of heavy fighting, some Sandinista troops inside Honduras. We had reports of continuous bombing of Honduran territory by Nicaraguan AN-26 aircraft. Two airfields—resistance airfields—that are located on the border area were
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, MAR. 24, 19881
Yesterday the leadership of the Nicaraguan resistance met on Nicaraguan soil with members of the Sandinista regime and reached an agreement that calls for: • Cessation of all hostilities beginning immediately and extending 60 days after April 1st; • High-level negotiations April 6 in terms of a definitive cease-fire; • Arrangements for phased amnesty; • Respect for freedom of speech in Nicaragua; • Measures for political dialogue and full political rights; and • Measures for verification of this agreement. This agreement is the product of the determination and sacrifice of the freedom fighters through years of struggle, including their heroic resistance last week to a Sandinista offensive designed to destroy them. Their strength and perseverance have created this opportunity for peace and freedom. We consider this agreement to be an important step forward.
There is much work to be done to take full advantage of this opportunity. The agreement provides for continued aid to the freedom fighters, but there is no aid. Congress should provide that aid immediately, before the Easter recess, to sustain the freedom fighters while these negotiations continue. We will be consulting with the freedom fighters and with the four democracies on how the United States can best further the prospects for peace and freedom in Nicaragua. Others must also play a positive role. Just as the cease-fire agreement does not envisage any further U.S. military assistance at present, so is there absolutely no excuse for any further deliveries of arms from the Soviet Union, Cuba, or the Eastern bloc to Nicaragua. Yesterday's agreement provides that negotiations will resume in Managua on April 6. The return to Managua of the leadership of the Nicaraguan resistance will mark a triumph for their cause. The United States will continue our relentless effort for peace with freedom in Central America.
Press release 50, which also includes a question-and-answer session with reports. Page 22
seized. President Azcona was alarmed by this, of course, and he called Presidents Duarte and Cerezo and also Ortega to tell them to withdraw Nicaraguan troops from Honduras or face the consequences. On March 16th, the reports that we had—and all intelligence reports of this kind, they are not precise, we can't swear by a given number, but the range of the estimates seemed to be pretty confident about it—was that we saw a presence inside Honduras of somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,500, or perhaps as high as 2,000, Sandinista troops. And this posed a critical situation for the resistance because they were basically outmanned and, of course, outgunned, as there were not only the AN-26 aircraft but also the heavily armed helicopters being used to support the Sandinista troops. At 11 a.m. on March 16th, the Honduran Foreign Ministry issued a statement about fighting on the border, and President Azcona told our ambassador, Ambassador Briggs, as he had heard people say that there was no such movement into Honduran territory, he said that was absurd. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Ortega made a radio address in Nicaragua and denied that Nicaraguan troops had crossed the Honduran border. I might say that the Speaker [of the House Jim Wright) informed us yesterday that he was called by the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, who told him that the troops were withdrawing. You never know who to believe. At 4:45 (p.m.) the Honduran Super Mysteres conducted a reconnaissance of the Bocay area. At about 5:15 in the afternoon, Ambassador Briggs met with President Azcona, General Regalado, and Foreign Minister Lopez. President Azcona gave to Ambassador Briggs a letter requesting U.S. assistance and instructed Foreign Minister Lopez to send a stiff protest to the Sandinistas. We had, of course, been following this situation closely and had brought Members of the Congress up-to-date in various meetings as best we could. I would have to say that no matter what you describe, people shake their heads and say, “I don't believe you. This isn't so. We have other reports,” and so on. Nevertheless, we tried to describe the situation as accurately as we could as we went along.
We've had meetings with the President. Our so-called policy review group of senior people met at the White House yesterday in the late afternoon. At 6:45 p.m., Ambassador Briggs called in to report the results of his meetings with the President of Honduras and his associates. And we had various other reports from people in the region. And in the light of President Azcona's request and developments in the region, of the clear statements in the Rio pact and the various UN and OAS charters, the President responded to President Azcona's request. And the response was the action, or one of the responses was the action that I outlined to you. These troops are there. They are lightly armed. They will take part in an exercise. They are not near where the fighting is taking place. But they are designed to say to the Government of Honduras that we are your friend, and we stand with you. And if you are invaded, you can count on the United States. And it's alsomit tends to get people's attention to something that's happening in the Central American region that we feel is wrong. Now we're not the only people who feel that it's wrong, and I will not try to go through what everybody has said, but I have two things that I would like to read out to you. One is a communique issued by the Foreign Ministry of Honduras giving their view of the situation and the other is a statement by President Arias of Costa Rica. First, I'll read the Honduran statement. This is a translated text of what they issued: The Honduran Foreign Ministry informs the national and international public about the incidents that have occurred at the border between Honduras and Nicaragua in the Bocay area in the Olancho Department. On 15 March, the Honduran Armed Forces informed the president of the republic about the violation of the national territory by EPS forces [Nicaraguan forces]. Several hundred EPS forces entered Honduran territory, supported by artillery and airplane and helicopter bombing. In an effort to prevent a deterioration of the border situation, the President contacted President Ortega, demanding that he order his troops to refrain from violating Honduran national territory and withdraw the military units that have invaded Honduras. The President also contacted Jose Napoleon Duarte, Vinicio Cerezo, and Oscar Arias Sanchez to ask them to demand that the Nicaraguan Government stop its aggression against Honduras and withdraw its troops from the border region.
On the same day, 15 March, after making these telephone calls in an effort to safeguard the security of Honduras, President Azcona addressed a letter to the U.S. President, informing him of these incidents and asking him for his solidarity to reject the violation of Honduran territory. In view of the fact that the military action in Honduran territory by the EPS is an act of aggression, President Azcona, based on a special relationship of security existing between the United States and Honduras and based on the international mechanisms for collective security, felt compelled to ask the U.S. Government for the effective and immediate assistance needed to preserve the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 16 March, the U.S. Ambassador in Tegucigalpa, carrying out specific instructions from his government, reaffirmed his country's commitment to support Honduras and to supply all the aid that our country may need to defend national sovereignty. The Foreign Ministry presented to the Nicaraguan Government its most vigorous protest over the aggression that was carried out, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the invading troops, and warning the Nicaraguan Government that it would adopt the necessary measures to exercise its right to legitimate defense, established in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Honduras deplores the Nicaraguan Government's insistence on jeopardizing the effort to resolve its social conflict through the use of international violence with the incidents that occurred on the border. Tonight the President of the republic again talked with the Nicaraguan Government, an occasion he used to reiterate the urgency of withdrawing the Sandinista troops from Honduran territory and to inform him about the measures that the Honduran Government has implemented to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is a press release of the Honduran Foreign Ministry. This is a statement made by President Arias last night: This is an arrogant attitude, regardless of whose it is, to try to bring the other party to the negotiating table on their knees, to obtain a greater advantage in negotiations. For me, I am convinced that negotiation and dialogue are the best solution and that at the negotiating table, both sides have to compromise to reach a cease-fire. I can't view favorably the kind of action which is being carried out, which removes us further from the possibility of dialogue. It puts in danger the plans for the meeting of March 21-23, which was already confirmed. It puts (them) in danger because I no longer know what is going to happen, whether it will take place or not.
I just had the opportunity to say this personally to Daniel Ortega. I also had the chance to speak with Cerezo this morning. I told them my concerns. Later I spoke with President Azcona and (Shultz said, “I think this is the thing to focus on.") if it is confirmed that Honduran territory and the sovereignty of the Honduran people have been violated by Sandinista forces, (“And all of our intelligence is that that is so," Shultz interjected.") then Costa Rica must necessarily condemn this act categorically and vigorously. Costa Rica believes that in the respect for international law and national sovereignty lies the security of every nation in the world; therefore, if Honduran territory has really been invaded by Sandinista forces, I condemn it. This is not the moment for a military strike to finish off the enemy. That's the quote from President Arias. So it's a serious situation. And it is not the first time that Nicaragua has sent troops into Honduras. We have always reacted, as has the Government of Honduras reacted, strongly to such troop movements. In this case, it is particularly highlighted by the fact that there is supposed to be a peace process going on. And back in July, all of the parties signed the Esquipulis agreement that had, at least as it's stated objective, the bringing about of democratic patterns of government in all of the countries and called for negotiated cease-fires and movements in the direction of peace. And that was confirmed and elaborated. And the Nicaraguan lack of
compliance was highlighted by the other four presidents in the meeting in San Jose in January. So gradually, we have seen an effort to put together cease-fire talks and they have gone on and off. The Government of Nicaragua has not chosen to do it until recently, although the resistance has been ready for a long time. And so at least there has been an effort to construct an environment, moving toward peace. I think the putting of troops into Honduras by Nicaragua under those circumstances, as you can see, has shocked President Arias, as it has many other people, including us. That's basically the situation, and I think it is a very serious one. Obviously the vote in our House of Representatives to deny further assistance to the freedom fighters has dealt them and, in my opinion, the cause of freedom a very serious blow. Nevertheless, we have to struggle with what we have and not in any way give up on the importance of security and prosperity and the rule of law and democracy in our area and throughout Central America.
seizure of power by the communists in many countries of Europe, led to the flight of a substantial portion of the population. What was singular about the case of Cuba is that the overwhelming majority of those alienated by the new regime chose to flee to the United States. A second singularity of that revolution is that the Castro regime in Cuba, while on the one hand declaring illega departure from Cuba to be a serious crime punishable by sentence to prison, also has used emigration as a safety valve to rid itself of persons who, because of their negative attitude toward communism, did not fit into post-1959 Cuban society. Twenty years into the “new Cuba," there occurred an event called “The Dialogue," when representatives of some of the three-quarters of 1 million Cubans who had fled Cuba for a new life in the United States returned to their homeland. It was agreed that some of those who had fled could go back to visit Cuba. The authorities in Havana agreed to this because of their need for the dollars that the returning expatriates would bring. They did not sufficiently foresee the effect which these persons would have on their relatives and friends who had stayed behind. The visitors were living in freedom and comparative affluence. Their hosts quickly perceived the difference. The effect was to heighten the social tensions which already existed in communist Cuba. In April 1980, a group of Cubans broke through the barriers outside the Peruvian Embassy in Havana and took refuge within. When Fidel Castro, misjudging the situation within the country, pulled off the Embassy guards, the response was overwhelming. Overnight there were 10,000 persons on the Embassy grounds.
Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. 2 Text from White House press release. 3 Made before the Senate Budget Committee. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
The Mariel Boatlift of 1980 While several countries, the United States included, sought to organize a manner in which the 10,000 persons on the Peruvian Embassy grounds might be distributed abroad on a rational basis, Fidel Castro struck back in the form which had been characteristic since 1959. He directed the flow of the dissidents to the shores of his enemy, the United States, declaring the port of Mariel, about 20 miles west of Havana, open to anyone who wished to leave Cuba. Again the response was overwhelming. There were hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions, of Cubans tl who were sufficiently alienated by the 2 system that they wanted to leave Cuba a permanently. In fact, not everyone wanting to leave was permitted to do so. Many a family was divided arbitrarily by deci sion of the Cuban authorities. More to important, however, the Cuban Govern ment invited the occupants of Cuban prisons and mental institutions to join the exodus. Boat captains arriving from the United States at the port of Mariel were not permitted to choose their passengers. They were ordered to take persons whom the Government of Cuba wanted to see come to the United States. Under these circumstances it was no surprise that of the 125,000 persons who arrived in the United States in 1980 from the port of Mariel, more than 10% admitted to having committed some criminal offense in Cuba. The Mariel boatlift put the traditional receptivity of the American people toward those fleeing despotic governments, particularly communist regimes, to a severe test. While the chaotic exodus from Mariel did severe damage to the reputation of the Castro regime after more than two decades in power, it also placed heavy social burdens and expenses on American society, especially in south Florida.
arrivals and their relationship to rising crime rates in their jurisdictions. They sought to return these individuals as quickly as possible to the custody of Federal authorities on the grounds that the Federal Government had been responsible for letting these individuals enter the country and go free into U.S. society. As the number of persons detained for crimes in Cuba diminished, the number detained for crimes in this country increased. The third solution was to return the excludables to Cuba. Putting aside some romantic notions of forcibly returning these individuals to Cuban shores, it was evident from the outset that such a return would have to be with the consent of the Cuban Government, which was firmly opposed to such an outcome: the United States, it said, wanted “scum,” and “scum” was what it would have. The first negotiating effort to return these persons, known as the “Mariel excludables," was begun by the Carter Administration in December 1980. The Cubans consented to negotiate, but they asserted that they would take back persons only on a case-bycase basis and only if these persons were returning voluntarily. They made it clear that they meant to use the case-by-case basis to reject anyone they did not wish to see again in Cuba. Few, if any, would have returned voluntarily. This would not have solved the issue, and the talks failed. It seems likely that the Cuban side, having rid itself of 125,000 persons undesirable by its own peculiar standards, felt that it was in a strong bargaining position. It doubtlessly wished to see if the incoming Reagan Administration would be obliged to accept terms that its predecessor had rejected. The response by the new Administration in Washington was to enforce the sanctions provided by U.S. immigration law against Cuba's refusal to accept back the Mariel excludables. In such circumstances Section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act directs that the United States will suspend issuance of visas in a country refusing to accept back its nationals upon U.S. request. It states: Upon the notification by the Attorney General that any country upon request denies or unduly delays acceptance of the return of any alien who is a national, citizen, subject, or resident thereof, the Secretary of State shall instruct consular officers performing their duties in the territory of such country to discontinue the issuance of
immigrant visas to nationals, citizens, subjects or residents of such country, until such time as the Attorney General shall inform the Secretary of State that such country has accepted such alien. This policy was subjected to criticism on both legal and humanitarian grounds. Some felt that section 243(g) would apply only if the Attorney General formally advised the Secretary of State of what he already knew: that Cuba was refusing to accept the excludables, an action he took only in 1983. Others argued that the Cubans in the United States wishing to bring their relatives here with immigrant visas should not be deprived of the opportunity because the Cuban Government refused to take back the excludables. The larger issue here was how are the borders of the United States to be protected, not merely from a sudden and irregular flow of immigrants from a country less than 100 miles away, but how could Cuba-or perhaps someday another country-be prevented from sending common criminals at any time it might choose. In convincing the Cuban Government to reach a reasonable settlement, we had to develop and use effective bargaining chips. In this case the provisions of U.S. law were helpful, although hardly decisive standing alone.
The "Excludables” which the United States and State and se local authorities had to confront was the question of what to do with the persons who had admitted to commit ting crimes, many of them serious, in 14 Cuba. In essence, there were three choices: keep them indefinitely in de1 tention, release them into American so ciety, or insist that Cuba take them back. There were problems associated with all of those choices. Since it was infeasible, and generally undesirable, though not unlawful, to detain illegal aliens indefinitely, the overwhelming majority of persons who admitted committing crimes in Cuba were released, so that by 1988 only onetenth of 1% of the entire 125,000 were still in confinement for crimes which - they had committed in Cuba. Yet many of those who were released committed new offenses in the United States. State and local jurisdictions began progressively to complain about the new
The negotiating phase in the Reagan Administration began in May 1983 when we handed the Cuban Interests Section in Washington a list of persons whom the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had identified as Cuban nationals excludable from the United States on substantive grounds: that is, they had committed serious crimes in either Cuba or the United States or suffered from serious mental disorders. Had these persons applied for immigrant visas in the normal way, they would have been refused under provisions of U.S. immigration law. The Cubans were told that once they had taken back these persons, there would be other lists. Once all the excludables had been accepted back in Cuba, we would resume normal processing of immigrant visas in Havana. There was no positive Cuban response to this demarche, but diplomatic correspondence followed until the Grenada rescue mission of October 1983 put a temporary halt to it.
curred by State and local authorities, as well as the social costs of the victims of their crimes. This would also serve as a warning that future Mariels would also be costly to the sender, which would have to accept back persons who committed crimes of a serious nature. Hence they would have good cause to respect U.S. immigration laws and procedures in the future. In return, the United States was willing to restore normal migration from Cuba and to see a refugee program established for former political prisoners. Cuba, on the other hand, wanted strongly to get the onus of the Mariel boatlift behind it. The Cubans had paid a heavy price of their own in loss of respect even among the relatively smal percentage of the U.S. population which had been inclined to favor closer U.S. ties to Cuba. In financial terms, 442 years after legal emigration from Cuba was largely cut off, Cuba also needed to reopen the safety valve to get rid of potential dissidents and to transfer elderly Cubans (who made up many of the immigrants) to the care of their relatives in the United States or the social welfare roles of Federal, State, or local authorities in this country.
Early in 1984, the United States proposed talks with the Cubans on the migration issue. The Cubans refused to negotiate but did say that they might be prepared to discuss the issue after the U.S. national elections in November. This attitude was curiously similar to the Cuban position at the close of the Carter Administration, when an agreement was rejected while Havana waited to see what the new U.S. Administration might do. In June 1984, however, the Rev. Jesse Jackson announced that he planned to visit Cuba to meet Fidel Castro. The Department of State offered to brief Jackson or his representative about Cuba. During a discussion with a Jackson representative, who inquired how Jackson might be able to serve U.S. interests in Havana, we referred to the migration issue as one urgently in need of solution, particularly because of humanitarian considerations. We also urged that Jackson bring again to Castro's personal attention the need to release the hundreds of very long-term political prisoners who were still being detained under appalling conditions in Cuban jails. Jackson did raise these issues. He returned with some long-term political prisoners whom Fidel Castro, following his customary practice, had “released” to Jackson. He also returned with a curiously formulated Cuban assent to discuss the migration issue if both major U.S. political parties agreed to the proposition. Apparently, the Cubans imagined that this subject was somehow going to be a campaign issue in the United States. We immediately again formally proposed talks with Cuba in New York City. The Cubans accepted. The talks began in July but did not culminate until December 1984, and not until after the fall presidential elections did the Cubans demonstrate that they were seriously interested in an agreement that would be acceptable to the United States. The negotiating process was detailed, intense, protracted, and conducted in a businesslike manner. The resulting agreement was the product of a firm and carefully prepared U.S. position but also benefited from some very skillful bargaining by the principal U.S. negotiator, Deputy Legal Adviser Michael G. Kozak. The Cubans at the outset were occasionally polemical, but as talks advanced, they became highly realistic and decidedly unemotional. The main elements of the Migration Agreement signed on December 14, 1984, were:
• Cuba would take back, at the rate of up to 100 per month, 2,746 persons on a list of excludables developed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The names had been reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Cubans, who agreed to accept all the persons on the list. It was recognized by both sides that very few, if any, of the 2,746 would return voluntarily to Cuba. • The United States would immediately resume issuance of preference immigrant visas in Havana, and Cuba would henceforth be treated like every other country in so far as immigration was concerned. The Cubans had originally sought to obtain a specific quota but came to recognize that U.S. immigration law did not permit this. • The United States agreed to accept up to 3,000 former political prisoners and their families in fiscal year 1985, with a commitment to continue the program in future years, subject to U.S. law. The Cubans explained that these persons had committed no crimes other than "crimes against the state" and noted that they did not fit into Cuban society. This provision was consistent with the U.S. tradition of humanitarian help toward the victims of oppression. • Cuba agreed to the unilateral enhancement of the staff of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana in light of the increased consular work which would be a result of the agreement. During the negotiations, the foremost U.S. objective was to get immigration relations with Cuba on a regular, sustainable track. The periodic waves and suspensions of migration that characterized U.S.-Cuba relations since 1959 we not in our interest or, for that matter, in that of Cuba. We wanted a regular flow of people who have the highest priority for us—those with relations in the United States and/ or former political prisoners—and not priorities set by Castro's decision as to those whom he wished to be rid of, in this case common criminals. A regular flow is also important so that people can be absorbed into U.S. society without imposing heavy burdens on local communities. One essential specific objective in establishing normal migration was to get Cuba to take back the excludables, who by the time of the negotiations were already costing the Federal Government alone an estimated $40 million per year merely for their incarceration. This obviously did not include costs in
Implementation: Five Months and Six Days The U.S.-Cuba Migration Agreement was a decidedly popular one, judging by the usual test of popular satisfactior with American diplomacy: there was very little criticism. Non-Hispanics in south Florida were concerned at the prospect of a new flood of Cuban immigrants, a concern fanned by newspaper articles exaggerating the likely flow of persons. A few Cuban exiles complained that the United States had negotiated with Cuba rather than having simply acted unilaterally. This overlooked the fact that the return of the excludables to Cuba would have been impossible with out Cuban consent, if for no other reason than the likely attitude of U.S. courts toward the forcible return of the excludables to a country whose authorities refused to accept them. In reality the Migration Agreeme! was that rare accomplishment which appeared to satisfy the interests of both sides. It had no "down side" at i for the United States. Unfortunately, the Cuban Government may have assumed, without any factual basis, that because of the agreement the United States would alter important policies
signed to encourage Cuba to deal with migration within the terms of a recent and mutually acceptable bilateral agreement. Another form of suasion which we used with Cuba in this period was to make clear, as in the pre-1984 period, that Americans of both parties and of various points of view insisted that Cuba deal with the issue of Mariel and the excludables. Many Members of Congress were willing to give that message to the Cubans in one form or another.
2 toward Cuba that were not associated with migration, even though these La areas had not even been touched in the a negotiations. 21 The agreement was implemented only for 5 months and 6 days, during 3 which time a number of immigrants and di a small handful of refugees came north, a and exactly 201 excludables were ree turned to Cuba. The relatively limited 2 outcome was due to the difficulty of establishing new procedures and standvards, moving personnel, arranging for examinations, assembling documents, etc. Implementation was, nevertheless, going well on both sides. There were no serious difficulties experienced. The T: agreement was proving to be the suc cess that had been anticipated in New York. Then, a few hours before the first broadcast of the Radio Marti service of the Voice of America on May 20, 1985, Cuba announced that it had decided to suspend all types of procedures regarding the execution of the 1984 Migration Agreement. Cuba also announced other sanctions, most of them aimed at the exile community in the United States whom Havana identified as being the force behind Radio Marti. The Cubans made it clear that the suspension would last as long as the new program was on the air.
1984 were conducted after the law was passed and while the new program was being prepared, we had no advance warning that Cuba would link the two issues and undo the negotiations of the previous year. Suspension of the Migration Agreement was greeted, as Cuba had no doubt anticipated, with dismay in the exile community in the United States, which had high expectations about the reunification of families and the coming to freedom of former political prisoners still living under difficult conditions in Cuba. Nevertheless, Havana miscalculated if it believed that these persons would become an effective lobby against Radio Marti, because the exiles and, especially, their most assertive spokesmen were also the firmest supporters of the radio. The desire of the U.S. Government to return excludables to Cuba was similarly frustrated, but no responsible U.S. official considered sacrificing the new program in order to restore an agreement with Cuba that had appeared evenly balanced in its own right and in the interest of both parties. In fact, the Cuban Government at no time after May 20, 1985, criticized the Migration Agreement or the negotiations that had brought it about. This was a point which we kept in mind during the following 30 months of hiatus and impasse. In addition to restricting visa issuance in Havana, the United States introduced a new sanction on Cuba in order to induce it to end its suspension of implementation of the Migration Agreement. On October 4, 1985, presidential Proclamation 5377 suspended the entry as nonimmigrants of officials and employees of the Government of Cuba and the Communist Party of Cuba. This action was taken under authority of Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, the U.S. Government having found that the unrestricted entry of such officials or employees would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Since virtually every Cuban, if employed at all, is an employee of the state or the party or both, this proclamation facilitated the Department of State in inhibiting travel sought by the Cuban authorities. Since sanctions seldom cut only one way, there was also some criticism of this measure in the United States, but it seldom was pursued when we explained that it was de
An Unsuccessful Round of Negotiations Thus it was not all too surprising when we received word through an informal channel that the Cubans in mid-1986 were prepared to end their suspension of the Migration Agreement under conditions which seemed negotiable. We understood that they were willing to restore the agreement if they were permitted to broadcast to the United States without causing new interference to U.S. domestic broadcasting on the a.m. mediumwave band. At our suggestion the two sides met in Mexico City in early July of 1986. The talks failed, however, because the Cubans expected the United States to make concessions in radio broadcasting that were well outside the capability of any U.S. administration. They asked for four “clear channels,” which would have put scores of U.S. radio stations out of business. Even before these talks began, however, chances for a successful outcome were compromised by costly press leaks which made it appear that the Cubans were backing down on their demands on Radio Marti. The U.S. negotiators derived the lesson from this event that future efforts to induce Cuba to resume implementation of the Migration Agreement would have to be conducted with even more discretion than heretofore. Following the failure of the Mexico City talks, the United States dealt with Cuba's policy of permitting persons to leave Cuba for third countries, principally Panama, whence they would try to enter the United States, legally or illegally. On August 22, 1986, presidential Proclamation 5517 suspended entry into the United States of Cuban nationals except those who were immediate relatives of U.S. citizens or who could demonstrate that they had departed Cuba prior to that date. The purpose of this action was to deal with the practice of selling Cuban exit per
Das The Impasse Cuba's response to Radio Marti linked La* the issue of migration, which had ap peared to have been resolved in New The issue of radio interference went er back beyond even the outset of the CasOtro regime, the coming to power of which had, however, greatly exacerCo bated what had, heretofore, been non ideological differences. In 1983, the Cuban Government had called off bilateral technical talks on radio inter ference matters after Congress enacted ein September of that year the Radio END Broadcasting to Cuba Act, authorizing for a program on the Voice of America to meet the “need for broadcasts to Cuba cible which provide news, commentary, and neryPother information about events in Cuba accepts and elsewhere to promote the cause of igrani freedom in Cuba.” During the 20 pliso months between the enactment of the the int" law and the first broadcast of Radio der Marti, the Cubans left no doubt that they did not like the idea of the pro gram, but since the entire negotiations facts leading to the Migration Agreement of
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mits and third-country visas to persons living in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law and the Cuba embargo. An additional effect of this action was to make it more difficult for Cuba to use selective emigration as a safety valve, as well as a supplementary income source. On the other hand, U.S. restrictions on immigrant visa issuance led some in the exile community to lobby for domestic legislation which would force the U.S. Government to issue visas in Havana and in third countries to Cuban nationals, no matter what Cuba did about the excludables or the existing Migration Agreement. These efforts took the form of draft legislation in 1987 which would have given the Cubans the objectives for which they negotiated in New York while depriving the United States of the leverage to bring about the exclusion of those Cuban nationals who had committed serious crimes and were placed in Federal, State, and local detention centers pending their possible return to Cuba. The draft legislation would have left us with the excludables and would have encouraged future disorderly immigration by removing the costs for Cuba. Moreover, for extraneous reasons, U.S.-Cuban relations sharply deteriorated in late 1986 and through much of 1987, with hostile demonstrations outside the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, restrictions on the delivery of diplomatic pouches and necessary supplies, and ultimately-responding to the defection to the United States of several important Cuban officials—the Cubans made charges of widespread espionage activities by U.S. personnel in Cuba. We, in turn, were obliged to ask the Cubans to withdraw some of their personnel from Washington.
In July, during a discussion with a senior Cuban official in Washington, I recalled that many a difficult matter had been resolved during the negotiations by having less formal face-to-face talks between the heads of the two delegations. If there could be a very quiet, off-the-record session between the two sides, we might be able to establish whether it would be worthwhile to meet again more formally on the migration/radio impasse. The Cuban official appeared to endorse this idea, but later in the day in Havana, the Cuban Government made new charges against the United States. Nevertheless, brought this new probe to the attention of all agencies in the U.S. Government concerned with the issue. There was one other element that figured in the equation. This was the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, a fact which the Cuban side clearly wished to take into account. In October 1987, there were press stories in the New York Times and the Miami Herald discussing prospects for resumption of implementation of the agreement. We still, however, needed to find a very discreet way of ending the impasse since we were not able to meet the conditions which Cuba had set in May 1985—termination of Radio Marti—or the new conditions of July 1986—broadcasting to the whole territory of the United States on the mediumwave band.
sciously or inadvertently scuttle any agreement by making it appear that one side or the other was about to sell out. Our own approach was exactly the same as it had been at the time of the 1986 talks in Mexico City when we wer: prepared to announce the immediate resumption of implementation of the Migration Agreement of 1984. The decision was not a complicated one in November 1987: it was merely “up or down"-restoration of the 1984 accord exactly as it had been agreed or no agreement. In the actual negotiations on November 19 in Mexico City, we and the Cubans reached agreement on the lines of the previous unofficial understanding: the Migration Agreement of 1984 was to be put again immediately into implementation, and we would go on talking about radio issues. That outcome was a signal success for the United States, one which had the following results. • We would be able to return the excludables to Cuba thereby freeing the United States from the dilemma of continuing to detain them indefinitely or else of releasing them into U.S. society. • We would serve notice that persons who in the future enter the United States illegally and commit serious crimes of a nonpolitical nature will be returned to their country of origin. • By establishing normal migration conditions with Cuba, we could ensure that persons coming to this country would do so consistently with U.S. law and in an orderly way. . Our ability to process intending immigrants or former political prisoners would be enhanced by Cuba's concurrence with an increase in the staff of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to accommodate the increased workload. The agreement to resume implementation of the Migration Agreement of 1984 was announced in both capitals at noon on November 20. In fact, the news had leaked somewhat earlier. Unfortunately, somewhat over 24 hours later, Cuban prisoners took over the minimum security facility in Oakdale, Louisiana. Three days after announcement of reimplementation of the Migration Agreement, Cuban prisoners took over the maximum security facility in Atlanta.
A Common Interest Despite all of the foregoing, we continued to stress the theme that the two countries had a common interest in returning to the implementation of an agreement which had manifestly been satisfactory to each party. During a visit I made in May 1987 to Havana, I reminded the two primary Cuban negotiators of the 1984 agreement that there was no need to wait for the next U.S. administration to make renewed effort to settle concrete issues which seemed possible to resolve, whatever our differences on other matters.
In November, the Cubans accepted our idea of the previous July for an informal session to see if there was a way to end the impasse and get back to the agreement. At the meeting, in a third country with only two persons present on each side, it was proposed on a personal basis to break the impasse by agreeing to the immediate reimplementation of the migration accord and to engage in further discussions on the radio issue, including both broadcasting from one country to the other and the older issue of radio interference. It was recognized that the broadcasting from one country to another was of primary interest to Cuba. The interference question was of considerable interest to the United States, as well as to Cuba. The Cuban negotiators still had to sell this idea to their boss. There was always the chance that they would come to a formal negotiating table with new conditions which we would be hard pressed to meet. If the news got out, there would be those who might con
excludables have suffered or will suffer any discriminatory treatment for having been returned from the United States. Moreover, the Department of Juştice, following the Oakdale and Atlanta insurrections, has established a special review procedure to ensure that no Cuban is returned to his country without good cause.
• Linkage of the Migration Agreement to radio issues introduced new complications that could be overcome only by negotiations even more delicate than those of 1984. If the agreement can survive the vicissitudes of U.S.-Cuban relations and the temptation to link its implementation to some other foreign policy objective, it will go far toward removing migration from the agenda of contentious issues between ourselves and the Cubans and can help in coming years in the resolution of practical problems with important social and humanitarian benefits for hundreds of thousands of persons.
The prison takeovers, coupled with press reporting that this was some new ea agreement secretly negotiated with Fidel Castro, created a good deal of confusion and uncertainty. The fact that e the prisoners did not wish to return to 1 Cuba was played up by some as a justizu fication for not returning them. In ] truth, there has never been any time 1 since 1980 that any sizable number of * Cubans from the Mariel boatlift, Es whether excludables or not, have * wished to go back to Cuba. It was al ways the objective of the U.S. Governoment to return the excludables to Cuba, even though they did not want to go there and even though the Cuban Es Government was—throughout most of the 8-year period we are examining to day—unwilling to see them return. TET A. Human Rights and the Excludables 7. It was argued in some quarters that since we were planning to ask the UN Human Rights Commission to look into S serious and persistent allegations of hu man rights violations in Cuba, we should not return the excludables there. We did, indeed, press forward with respect to human rights, which had been another objective of the United States with respect to Cuba. # The fact that we had taken so many persons who fled the Castro regime after 1959, especially those who spent in long years in the regime's prisons for 1 "crimes against the state,” illustrates our concern for humanitarian issues in the illegal nature of their entry and the fact that many had criminal records in Cuba-abused the hospitality of this ous nonpolitical crimes thereby forfeited the privilege of remaining in this country. During the negotiations in New * York, we discussed the issue of how the excludables would be received in Cuba. $ The Cuban side agreed to impose no form of retaliation or punishment on the returning excludables. Of the 201 is returned in 1985, the Cuban Govern ment has estimated publicly that about in three-quarters have been released and are living and working in Cuban society. The rest are finishing out the sentences imposed by U.S. courts. While there is no way of vouching for these figures, there is no evidence that the
Normal Migration Reestablishment of normal migration between the United States and Cuba serves the cause of family reunification while respecting the framework of U.S. immigration laws. It means that Cubans with relatives in the United States and former political prisoners will come in an orderly and humane manner, without putting sudden pressures on American society. It helps to bring to freedom those whose only crime in Cuba was to stand by their principles and to suffer prison as a consequence. The Migration Agreement, although beneficial to all Americans, is especially so for Cuban-Americans. For this reason it is particularly ironic to see it being criticized by a few persons in that community who have themselves been benefited by the traditional hospitality which we have given to persons living under oppressive conditions abroad, especially Cubans. Such criticism was absent in 1985. The agreement has not been changed in any particular. If it continues to be honored by Cuba, it will bring benefits to all parties concerned.
Arbitration Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. Accession deposited : Cameroon, Feb. 19, 1988.
In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize the following. • Return of the Mariel excludables was the principal objective of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations in dealing with Cuba on migration matters. • Normalization of migration from Cuba, including agreement on return of the excludables, is a positive benefit obtained by very painstaking diplomatic efforts despite the existence of very significant difficulties in other areas between the United States and Cuba. • The key to the 1984 agreement was that the migration objectives of both negotiating parties were carefully balanced into a package acceptable to both sides.
Aviation Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4, 1969. TIAS 6768. Acceptance deposited: Maldives, Sept. 28, 1987. Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the convention of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at Montreal on Feb. 24, 1988. Enters into force on the thirteenth day after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification. Signatures: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Dem. Rep., Fed. Rep. of Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Arab Emirates, U.S., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Feb. 24, 1988.
Red Cross Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1 Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.1 Accession deposited: Guyana, Jan. 18, 1988 Ratification deposited : New Zealand, Feb. 8, 1988.6,7
Defense Memorandum of understanding concerning a NATO anti-air warfare system (NAAWS), with annex. Signed Sept. 11-Oct. 19, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 19. 1987. Parties: Canada, Sept. 22 Fed. Rep. of Germany, Sept. 29; Netherlands, Oct. 2; Spain, Oct. 13; U.K., Oct. 19; U.S., Sept. 11, 1987. Memorandum of understanding concerning a NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s (NFR 90). Signed Oct. 20, 1987, and Jan. 23 and 25, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 25, 1988. Parties: Canada, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, U.S., Oct. 20, 1987; France, Jan. 23, 1988; U.K., Jan. 25, 1988.
Maritime Matters Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. Accession deposited : Antigua and Barbuda, Jan. 29, 1988. International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. Accession deposited: Mauritius, Feb. 1, 1988. Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Done at London Nov. 15, 1979.5 Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London Nov. 17, 1983.5 Acceptances deposited: Switzerland, Jan. 19, 1988.
Satellite Communications Systems Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London, Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Accession deposited: Nigeria, Feb. 23, 1988. Operating agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Signature: Nigeria, Feb. 23, 1988.
Diplomatic Relations Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502 Ratification deposited : Albania, Feb. 8, 1988.
Environmental Modification Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614. Accession deposited: Guatemala, Mar. 21, 1988.
Space Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, Mar. 21, 1988.
Narcotic Drugs Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. Accessions deposited: United Arab Emirates, Feb. 17, 1988. Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725. Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, Feb. 17, 1988.
Judicial Procedure Additional protocol to the Inter-American convention on letters rogatory, with annex. Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered into force June 14, 1980.1 Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Feb. 24, 1988. Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983.1 Territorial application : Canada extended to Northwest Territories, Jan. 26, 1988.2
Pollution Montreal protocol on substances that de- plete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 16, 1987.' [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 14, 1988.
Sugar International sugar agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. Provisional entry into force: Mar. 24, 1988. Notifications of provisional application : Argentina, Dec. 31, 1987; Belize, Dec. 23, 1987; Canada, Mar. 14, 1988; Congo, Feb. 10, 1988; Costa Rica, Mar. 23, 1988; Cuba, Dec. 29, 1987; Dominican Rep., Dec. 30, 1987; Ecuador, Jan. 13, 1988; El Salvador, Feb. 15, 1988; Finland, Feb. 5, 1988; German Dem. Rep., Mar. 23, 1988; Honduras, Feb. 15, 1988; Hungary, Dec. 30, 1987; India, Mar. 15, 1988; Rep. of Korea, Dec. 31, 1987; Malawi, Mar. 22, 1988; Mauritius, Feb. 15, 1988; Nicaragua, Jan. 18, 1988; Pakistan, Mar. 1, 1988; Panama, Papua New Guinea, Dec. 31, 1987; Peru, Jan. 19, 1988; Philippines, Feb. 15, 1988; U.S.S.R., Feb. 5, 1988; U.S., Feb. 23, 1988. Accessions deposited : Australia, Canada, India, Mauritius, Mar. 24, 1988. Approval deposited : Hungary, Mar. 24, 1988. Ratifications deposited: Fiji, Nov. 25, 1987: Guyana, Dec. 15, 1987; Nicaragua, Mar. 24, 1988; South Africa, Dec. 31, 1987; Sweden, Dec. 15, 1987.
Marine Pollution International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, Jan. 8, 1988.
Telecommunications International telecommunications convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Nairobi Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1984; definitively for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. (Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-6. Accession deposited: Bahamas, Feb. 5, 1988. Ratifications deposited: Guinea, Tonga, Jan. 11, 1988.
Transportation-Foodstuffs Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1984. Accession deposited: Ireland, Mar. 22, 1988.
Terrorism Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally pro tected persons, including diplomatic I agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. Accession deposited: Oman, Mar. 22, 1988. International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. Accessions deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 10, 1988, Cameroon, Mar. 9, 1988.
Treaties Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and international organizations or between international organizations, with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986.5 Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 10, 1988. Ratification deposited: Mexico, Mar. 10, 1988.
Canada Memorandum of understanding concerning access of airlines to LaGuardia Airport for transborder services. Signed at Washington Mar. 25, 1985. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1985. Notice of termination : U.S., Mar. 22, 1988, effective Mar. 22, 1989. Agreement amending and supplementing the agreement of Mar. 9, 1959, as amended and supplemented, governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway (TIAS 4192, 5117, 5608, 6236, 7408, 9003, 9883, 10363). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 7 and Dec. 22, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1987. China Agreement concerning trade in textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Beijing Feb. 2, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 2, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988. Costa Rica Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at San Jose Mar. 3, 1988. Enters into force when the importing country notifies the exporting country that all constitutional requirements have been met. El Salvador Project grant agreement for the 1987 balance-of-payments support program. Signed at San Salvador Aug. 28, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1987. Agreement amending the agreement on Aug. 28, 1987, for the balance-of-payments support program. Signed at San Salvador Feb. 1, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1988.
Weapons Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with Protocols I, II, and III. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983. Ratification deposited: France, Mar. 4, 1988.
Timber International tropical timber agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provisionally Apr. 1, 1985; for the U.S. Apr. 26, 1985. Accession deposited: Australia, Feb. 16, 1988.
Wheat Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at London Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 1986; definitively for the U.S. Jan. 27, 1988. (Senate] Treaty Doc. 100–1. Food aid convention, 1986. Done at London Mar. 13, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 1986; definitively for the U.S. Jan. 27, 1986. (Senate] Treaty Doc. 100–1. Ratifications deposited: Fed. Rep. of Germany, Mar. 14, 1988.
Trade Agreement on technical barriers to trade (standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. Agreement on implementation of Art. VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (antidumping code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650. Agreement on import licensing. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788. Acceptances deposited: Mexico, Feb. 9, 1988. Agreement on implementation of Art. VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 10402. Acceptance deposited: Mexico, Feb. 9, 1988.2
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 6, 1982 (TIAS 10521), for the exchange of information concerning a cooperative program in the field of management of radioactive wastes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Brussels May 29, 1987, and Feb. 23, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1988; effective Oct. 6, 1987.
BILATERAL Argentina Scientific and technical cooperation agreement for a global telemetered seismograph network. Signed at Reston and San Juan Dec. 28 and 29, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 29, 1987. Belgium supplementary protocol modifying and supplementing the convention of July 9, 1970 (TIAS 7463), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Dec. 31, 1987. [Senate) Treaty Doc. 100–15. Transmitted to Senate for advice and consent: Feb. 29, 1988.
United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] Accession deposited: Australia, Mar. 17, 1988. Protocol extending the arrangement of Dec. 20, 1973, regarding international trade in textiles (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva July 31, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986; for the U.S. Aug. 5, 1986. Acceptances deposited: Dominican Rep., Feb. 23, 1988; Guatemala, Jan. 19, 1988.
France Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Mar. 15, 1982 (TIAS 10508), on cooperation in agricultural science and technology. Signed at Paris Mar. 3, 1987. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1987. Gambia Agreement concerning the use of Banjul International Airport as a space shuttle emergency landing site. Signed at Banjul Mar. 7, 1988. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1988. Guinea International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Conakry and Washington Dec. 31, 1987, and Feb. 2, 1988. Entered into force Mar. 15, 1988.
Hong Kong Agreement amending agreement of Aug. 4, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Mar. 2 and 7, 1988. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988.
Liberia Agreement modifying the agreement of July 1 and August 11, 1982 (TIAS 10435), for reciprocal relief from double taxation on earnings from operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia Oct. 7 and 23, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 23, 1987.
Panama Agreement concerning enforcement of alimony and child support obligations of Panama Canal Commission employees, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes a: Panama Feb. 22, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 22, 1988.
Vene: Agret Mar. the fi ment. Mar.: 4, 198
Hungary Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Jan. 6 and 20, 1984, as extended, for scientific and technical cooperation in earth sciences. Signed at Reston and Budapest Jan. 26 and Feb. 9, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 9, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988.
Israel Agreement for the establishment and operation of a radio relay station in Israel, with annexes, minutes, exchange of letters, and related letters. Signed at Washington June 18, 1987. Entered into force: Feb. 17, 1988.
Somalia Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Gor ernment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Mogadishu Jan. 25, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1988.
Jamaica Agreement amending agreement of Aug. 27, 1986, as amended, relating to trade in certain textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 17, 1987, and Feb. 1, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 1, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988.
Maldives Agreement amending agreement of Sept. 7 and 19, 1984, as amended, relating to trade in wool sweaters. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo Dec. 18, 1987, and Feb. 17, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 17, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988. Mauritius Agreement amending agreement of June 3 and 4, 1985, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port Louis Dec. 8, 1987, and Jan. 12, 1988. Entered into force on Jan. 12, 1988. Mexico Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 22, 1987 and Feb. 11, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 11, 1988. Agreement concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Signed at Mazatlan Feb. 13, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1988; effective Jan. 1, 1988. Memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in the scientific and regulatory fields of health. Signed at Mexico Feb. 22, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 22, 1988. Niger Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Niamey Feb. 10, 1988. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1988. Norway Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in geological sciences. Signed at Reston and Trondheim Dec. 9, 1987, and Feb. 4, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 4, 1988. Oman Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Dec. 14, 1979, and May 18, 1980, relating to the provision of technical assistance and service to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation of Oman (TIAS 9824). Signed at Muscat Dec. 15, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 15, 1987.
Sudan Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Khartoum Feb. 28, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1988.
Japan Protocol amending the agreement of Jan. 20, 1987, concerning special measures relating to Art. XXIV of the agreement under Art. VI of the treaty of mutual cooperation and security regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States armed forces in Japan (TIAS 4510). Signed at Tokyo Mar. 2, 1988. Enters into force on the date when diplomatic notes are exchanged indicating approval by both governments in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. Kenya Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Nairobi Feb. 26, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1988.
U.S.S.R. Agreement regarding U.S. access to fisheries in the U.S.S.R. economic zone. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow Feb. 21, 1988. Enters into force following written confirmation of the completion of the internal procedures of both governments. United Arab Emirates Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at Abu Dhabi Feb. 6, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1988.
Korea Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8456), as extended, relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul Feb. 5 and 6, 1988. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1988; effective Feb. 7, 1988.
Kuwait Agreement on aviation security. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuwait Nov. 22, 1987, and Jan. 11, 1988. Enters into force on exchange of notes confirming that the constitutional procedures required by Kuwaiti law have been fulfilled.
Department of State Bulletin May 1989 Page 24
Economics World Bank (GIST, Mar. 1988). Agriculture in U.S. Foreign Economic Policy (GIST, Mar. 1988) GATT and Multilateral Trade Negotiations (GIST, Mar. 1988).
Zimbabwe International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Harare and Washington Feb. 15 and Mar. 9, 1988. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1988.
General The Dulles Legacy: Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy, Deputy Secretary Whitehead, John Foster Dulles Memorial Dinner, Prince ton University, Princeton, Feb. 26, 1988 (Cur- rent Policy #1048). Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, Mar. 1988.
INot in force for the U.S. 3Does not accept optional annexes III, ax! IV, and V. 4With reservation. 5Not in force. 6Not extended to Cook Islands, Niue, or Tokelau. ?With declaration on Protocol II.
Shultz: statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mar. 14. Shultz: remarks and question-and-answer session during videoconference with students in Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., Mar. 15. Shultz: statement before the Senate Budget Committee. Shultz: remarks and question-and-answer session before Young Republican Leadership Conference, Mar. 18. Shultz: interview on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press," Mar. 20. Program for the official working visit of President Mar. 24-25. Shultz: new conference. Shultz; statement and question-and-answer Nicaraguan resistance and Sandinistas. Shultz: interview on “McNeil-Lehrer Newshour,” Mar. 24
Human Rights Deputy Secretary Whitehead, International
Middle East salem, Feb. 26, 1988 (Current Policy #1055).
Refugees namese Refugees, Deputy Assistant Secre- Geneva (Dec. 3, 1987) (Current Policy #1037). Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand, Ambassador Brown, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 24, 1988 (Current Policy #1052)
*Not printed in the BULLETIN.
Subject Whitehead: address and question-and-answer session before the National Security and Foreign Relations Commissions, the American Legion, Feb. 29. Shultz: departure statement, Damascus, Feb. 27. Shultz: interview on ABC-TV, Brussels, Mar. 2. Shultz: interview on CNN, Brussels, Mar. 2. Shultz: news briefing, Brussels, Mar. 3. Shultz: interview on CBS News, Brussels, Mar. 3. Shultz: luncheon toast for Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian. Shultz: toast at return dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Wu, Mar. 8. working visit of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Mar. 14–17. Shultz: statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, House Appro- priations Committee, Mar. 10. Leonard H.O. Spearman sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic data). Shultz: news briefing, White House, Mar. 11.
Secretary Shultz on Foreign Operations, House Appropriations Committee, Mar. 10, 1988 (Current Policy #1054). The INF Treaty: Advancing U.S. Security Inter ests, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mar. 11, 1988 (Current Policy # 1057).
United Nations Secretary Williamson, Subcommittee on Hu- rent Policy #1051). U.S. Interests in the United Nations, Ambas sador Walters, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on International Operations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 25, 1988 (Current Policy #1053).
Western Hemisphere The U.S.-Cuba Migration Agreement: Resolving Mariel, Cuban Affairs Coodinator Skoug, Uni-
Attention Foreign Policy Specialists
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May 1988 Volume 88, No. 2134
Laos. Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 Lithuania. Lithuanian Independence Day, 1988 (proclamation) 46 Maritime Affairs. U.S. Signs Treaty on Maritime Security (Department statement) 62 Mexico. President's Visit to Mexico (De la Madrid, Reagan) 6 Middle East Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Middle East Peace Plan (Shultz) 57 President's News Conference of February 24 (excerpts) 9 A Statement for Palestinians (Shultz) 56 Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Bremer) 61 Narcotics Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Nicaragua Nicaraguan Resistance and Sandinistas Reach Agreement (Shultz) ......... 74 President's News Conference of February 24 (excerpts) .... 9 Sandinista Offensive (Shultz, Department and White House statements) 73 Secretary's Interview on “Meet the Press" 21 North Atlantic Treaty Organization President Attends NATO Summit (Reagan, statement, declaration) ... 1 U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 26 Panama Events in Panama (Abrams, Reagan, Shultz, White House statements) 69 Secretary's Interview on “Meet the Press" 21 Poland. Human Rights and Change in Eastern Europe (Whitehead) 54 Portugal Republic of Portugal 48 Visit of Portuguese Prime Minister (Cavaco Silva, Reagan) 47 Presidential Documents Chancellor Kohl Meets With President Reagan (Kohl, Reagan) 44 Events in Panama (Abrams, Reagan, Shultz, White House statements) 69 Lithuanian Independence Day, 1988 proclamation) 46 President Attends NATO Summit (Reagan, statement, declaration) 1 President's News Conference of February 24 (excerpts) 9 President's Visit to Mexico (De la Madrid, Reagan) 6 Visit of Portuguese Prime Minister (Cavaco Silva, Reagan) 47 Publications Background Notes 85 Department of State 85 Refugees Aspects of U.S. Resettlement Programs for Vietnamese Refugees (Funseth) .. 58 Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 Romania Human Rights and Change in Eastern Europe (Whitehead) 54 Romania Renounces MFN Renewal (Department statement).. 43
Africa. Meeting Our Foreign Policy 12 Arms Control The INF Treaty: Advancing U.S. Security Interests (Shultz). 18 Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 President Attends NATO Summit (Reagan, statement, declaration) 1 Secretary Shultz Visits Moscow (joint statement) 42 Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington (joint statement) 42 SDI: Enhancing Security and Stability (Rowny) 24 U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 26 Bulgaria. Human Rights and Change in Eastern Europe (Whitehead) ..., 54 Cambodia. Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) Congress Events in Panama (Abrams, Reagan, Shultz, White House statements) 69 Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 The INF Treaty: Advancing U.S. Security Interests (Shultz) 18 Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Sandinista Offensive (Shultz, Department and White House statements) 73 U.S. Condemns North Korean Terrorism (Clark, McManaway)... 64 U.S. Interests in the United Nations (Walters) 67 Cuba. U.S.-Cuba Migration Agreement: Resolving Mariel (Skoug) 76 Czechoslovakia. Human Rights and Change in Eastern Europe 54 East Asia Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Pacific Development and the New Internationalism (Solomon) 33 Economics Current Reflections on U.S.-Japan Relations (Sigur) 31 Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Europe Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Bremer) 61 Germany. Chancellor Kohl Meets With President Reagan (Kohl, Reagan).... 44 Honduras. Sandinista Offensive (Shultz, Department and White House statements) 73 Human Rights. Human Rights and Change in Eastern Europe (Whitehead) 54 Immigration. U.S.-Cuba Migration Agree ment: Resolving Mariel (Skoug) 76 Israel. Secretary's Interview on “Meet the Press" 21 Japan. Current Reflections on U.S.-Japan Relations (Sigur)
South Africa President's News Conference of February 24 (excerpts) 9 South Africa's Proposal to Ban Foreign Funds (Department statement) .... 23 South Asia. Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 Terrorism Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz). 12 Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Bremer) 61 U.S. Condemns North Korean Terrorism (Clark, McManaway) 64 U.S. Signs Treaty on Maritime Security (Department statement) 62 Thailand. Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) .. 37 Trade Current Reflections on U.S.-Japan Relations (Sigur) 31 Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 Romania Renounces MFN Renewal (Department statement) 43 Treaties Current Actions 81 U.S. Signs Treaty on Maritime Security (Department statement) .... U.S.S.R. The INF Treaty: Advancing U.S. Security Interests (Shultz) 18 President Attends NATO Summit (Reagan, statement, declaration) 1 President's News Conference of February 24 (excerpts) 9 Secretary Shultz Visits Moscow (joint statement) 42 Secretary's Interview on “Meet the Press" 21 Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington (joint statement) 42 SDI: Enhancing Security and Stability (Rowny) 24 U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 26 United Nations Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12 U.S. Interests in the United Nations (Walters) 67 Vietnam Aspects of U.S. Resettlement Programs for Vietnamese Refugees (Funseth) .. 58 Indochinese Refugees and Relations With Thailand (Brown) 37 Western Hemisphere. Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals (Shultz) 12
Abrams, Elliott 69 Bremer, L. Paul, III 61 yn, William A 37 Cavaco Silva, Anibal 47 Clark, William, Jr 64 De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel 6 Funseth, Robert L 58 Kohl, Helmut 44 McManaway, Clayton C 64 Reagan, President 1, 6, 9, 44, 46, 47, 69 Rowny, Edward L 24 Shultz, Secretary 12, 18, 21, 56, 57, 69, 73, 74 Sigur, Gaston J., Jr 31 Skoug, Kenneth N. Jr 76 Solomon, Richard H 33 Walters, Vernon A 67
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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2135
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GEORGE P. SHULTZ Secretary of State
President Reagan with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (White House photo by Pete Souza)
CHARLES REDMAN Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD Director, Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD Chief, Editorial Division
The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.
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South Asia 54 Agreements on Afghanistan (Zain Noorani, Eduard ment, Text of Agreements) 60 Afghanistan Day, 1988 (Proclamation)
Africa 21 Ethiopia (Department Statement)
Middle East Placed Mines in Persian Gulf Council, Message to Iran) 37 An American Vision of Peace in the Middle East (Richard W. Murphy) 39 Visit of Israeli Prime Minister (President Reagan, Yitzhak Shamir) 39 U.S., Israel Formalize and Extend Consultative Groups (White House Statement) 40 FY 1989 Assistance Proposals for the Middle East and Murphy) 43 U.S. Role in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East Peace Process (Richard W. Murphy)
Arms Control 22 SDI Anniversary (President Reagan)
Economics 23 The U.S. and the Pacific Basin: Trade and Adjustment Issues (W. Allen Wallis) 26 Finance Ministers Discuss Trade and Monetary Policies (Statement) 27 Challenges in International Civil Aviation Negotiations (Jeffrey N. Shane)
Western Hemisphere President (Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, President Reagan) 65 The CBI: Important Incentives for Trade and Investment
Military Affairs 46 Regulations Revised on Arms Trafficking
Environment 30 President Signs Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances
Publications 70 Department of State 70 Background Notes
Nuclear Policy 51 Nuclear Cooperation With EURATOM (Letter to the
Europe 31 U.S. Concerns Over Danish Parliamentary Resolution (Department Statement) 31 Greek Independence Day, 1988 (Proclamation) 32 36th Report on Cyprus (Message to the Congress) 32 Northern Ireland (President Reagan)
Science & Technology to Study Climate Change (Richard J. Smith) Science and Technology
General 33 Principled Realism: A Founda tion for U.S. Foreign Policy (John C. Whitehead)
Secretary Meets With Middle East Leaders
Secretary Shultz departed the United States to visit Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Cyprus to meet with Lebanese President Gemayel (for complete itinerary, see box). Following are his statements, interviews, and news briefings made during the trip.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT, TEL-AVIV, APR. 3, 19881
Israel has a special meaning for all of us, most particularly at this time of year, as you noted in your statement. I appreciate your welcome, and I look forward to my discussions with you and with your neighbors over the next 4 days. Five weeks ago, I came to the region to explore the prospects for moving forward toward peace. I sought the views of the leaders of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, and I gave the most careful consideration to what they told me. Nor was that round of consultations a completely new departure. We have been discussing the key issues many months with all the parties. The views we heard in the region were then distilled into the letter, which I presented to each of the leaders last month. The proposal contained in that letter is, therefore, not something invented in Washington without reference to the needs of the parties involved. There is nothing that should be surprising in that letter and the time to act on it is now. The balance in our approach is evident. True, everyone has found something wrong with it. But just to pick at individual parts of our proposal is to take a road labeled "delay and frustration.” The proposal is designed as a package, and it has to be considered as a package. In this case, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts. Each of the parts is essential. More importantly, concentration on single elements of the proposal can wind up diverting us from the real objective of this effort. That objective is
peace and security for all peoples in the region. For Israel in particular, strength is a necessary ingredient for peace and security. But it is not sufficient. In the long run, security can only be found through peace treaties with each of its neighbors. Peace, in turn, can only be worked out through a process of direct negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. Palestinians must be included from the beginning as part of a JordanianPalestinian delegation. Negotiations work. Each of these negotiations must be based on (UN) Resolution 242 which applies on all fronts. There is no place at the negotiating table for those who cannot accept that resolution as the basis for negotiations and no place for those who practice terrorism or who deny Israel's right to exist. An international conference is required to get to direct negotiations, but it must be structured, as you said, so as not to interfere with the negotiations themselves. To round out our proposal, there must first be negotiations on transitional arrangements—to give the people of the West Bank and Gaza, quickly, control over their political and economic situations and to build a better environment, an atmosphere in which to negotiate a final settlement. Peace is possible, and our proposal can show the way. But time must not be lost debating over this or that element. The United States has stood by Israel throughout its history, and it will continue to do so. We will stand with you to ensure security and work with you to secure peace. The Bible tells us in Ecclesiastes that, “To every thing there is a season, and time to every purpose under the heaven: ... A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.” This is the time and the season to move decisively toward peace. Our children and our grandchildren, years from now, must be able to see that this time when opportunity knocked, we opened the door and made the most of it.
Secretary's Itinerary Depart U.S. Mar. 31 Rome Apr. 1-3 Jerusalem Apr. 3-5 Amman Apr. 5 Damascus Apr. 5 Jerusalem Apr. 5-6 Cairo Apr. 6 Amman Apr. 6–7 Qasim Apr. 7 Amman Apr. 7-8 Larnaca Apr. 8 Return U.S. Apr. 8
INTERVIEW ON ISRAELI TELEVISION, JERUSALEM, APR. 3, 19882
Q. During your last visit, you have left your detailed plan for the parties to consider it. Neither Israel nor Jordan did approve or reject your plan. Would you expect a definite yes or no this time, or will you still accept a may be for an answer? A. Obviously, I have to accept what people give me. On the other hand, I think that people should consider an answer. An important letter was delivered, and we'll be looking for a response. Q. An answer—you mean an affirmative answer, yes or no? A. I think it's too bad to miss an opportunity for peace which is what a no would do. So, I think a yes is important. Q. And you expect a yes from both parties, from Prime Minister Shamir and from King Hussein? A. We'll have to see, I don't know what they will say to me, but I know this; that there are great needs for peace. How do you get there? First of all, thinking about it from the standpoint of Israel, but other countries as well. First of all you have to be strong. We know that. There is no substitute. It's necessary. But at the same time we also know that strength by itself is not a sufficient condition to give you peace. Peace and real security come from negotiations with your neighbors, and a peace treaty with your neighbors. That's what you get it from, and so that's what we are trying to achieve.
Q. Prime Minister Shamir indi. cated today that he does not expect any breakthrough during your visit. His associates wondered what brought you back to Jerusalem, knowing very well that Shamir would not retreat from his rejection of most of the components in your plan. A. I come because we have delivered a letter, and I'd like to see a response. Q. During this visit? A. I think it's very important that people understand exactly what it is that we proposed. Let me just go through it with you. First of all, the heart of our proposal is direct negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. In the case of Jordan, and matters concerning the West Bank and Gaza, our approach says that this negotiation should take place between Israel and its JordanianPalestinian delegation. Q. On the principle of trading territories for peace? A. On the principle that Resolution 242 applies on all fronts. Now we think it's also true that anybody who comes to such a negotiation has to accept Resolution 242 and has to renounce terrorism and has to acknowledge the right of Israel to exist. Those are conditions that need to be met. Q. But Resolution 242 also says that Israel has to withdraw from territories both in the West Bank and Gaza. A. It says that and that applies on all fronts. Q. How would you expect A. Let me please continue on and say we think beyond that, these negotiations need to start with the development of transitional arrangements, and we think that can be done fairly promptly. That would be a way of changing quickly the basic conditions of political and economic life for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. I think that's desirable. We believe there is a widely shared view that it's desirable, and also it's not only that conditions would change-you would get into place a set of arrangements that will help create a better environment for negotiations of that final status. So I think that's a good idea, and that's embedded in our plan. Now how do you get to these direct negotiations? We have wracked our brains about that. far as we can see,
the only way you are going to get to direct negotiations is through an international conference, but an international conference that has no authority no ability to tell anybody they have to agree on this or that or to negate any agreement that's reached between the parties. Let's say something you go to and which can start these negotiations off and hear reports about them. Q. And to this international con. ference, Prime Minister Shamir says: "Totally unacceptable." A. I think that many people who have opposed this international conference have described it in a way that's different from what we propose. They describe a conference that has authority and will be the place where people decide that your borders have to be here, there, or elsewhere. We oppose that kind of a conference. In fact, such a conference was proposed in the Security Council a couple of months ago, and we vetoed the resolution. We think that it's the wrong way to go about it. The right way to go about it is by direct negotiations between the parties, and we'll stick to that. Q. Do you still hold to your origi. nal timetable, namely the international opening of peace talks by the end of April or the beginning of May? A. It would be desirable to get going, no doubt about it. Of course, the longer time goes without people signing on to our proposal, the less likely it is to get started, but times are wasting. Q. But you won't hold to a cer. tain date to start these negotiations? A. We won't say that since we didn't make it by this date we will home. But we do think it's important to get things rolling, and that's why we put the dates in there to give a sense of urgency. They are still there, they are still possible, but they get less likely as time goes by. Q. Still possible to have it by the end of this month? A. Yes, it's possible. Q. Prime Minister Shamir-upon returning from Washington-indi. cated that he is waiting for King Hussein's comment on your plan before submitting his own decision. King Hussein is probably expecting Mr. Shamir to be the first. Neither of them would like to be blamed for the failure of your initiative. How will you go about it? Page 26
conference. That would be the under- right, this is the deal,” then we understanding. Presumably, in any letter of take a kind of responsibility to make it invitation that would be sent, the work. So it's much more likely to work ground rules would be stated; and if under those circumstances. after people convened they wanted to Direct negotiations have immense change the ground rules, we would say, benefits in terms of something that can “No, we won't go along with that. We actually be a practical operational way will not be part of something that's dif of getting something done. That's why ferent." I think the United States has we favored that. But the question is, the intelligence and stamina to stand how do you get there? You can't apparup to that. ently just spring into them; you've got As a piece of evidence in that re- to find your way through an internagard, I'll refer again to the fact that a tional conference as we see it. couple of months ago, I guess it was—I don't remember the exact date—such Q. If, after all, Prime Minister an effort was made, and we vetoed it. Shamir's response is “no,” what kind It was put forward in the context of of alternative is there going to be then? great international concern about the A. We haven't had that response, conditions in the territories and the difficulties going on there. It was one that and I think it's apparent that people sort of dared you to veto this resolu don't want to say “no." Why don't they tion, so we vetoed it. want to say “no?” What's the reason? The reason is that everyone sees that Q. Haven't you already explained there are problems. And what do we to Mr. Shamir your idea, your con- want? We want Israel and the other cept, of the conference? Why should countries of the region—but here we he agree now to what he rejected the are in Israel. Let's focus on Israel. We first time? want Israel to have security. If you A. I'll explain it again. Prime Min- don't have security, you don't have ister Shamir is concerned about an in- anything ternational conference in which people We must have security. How do you would gang up on Israel, and they get to be secure? First of all, you have wouldn't be able to force Israel to do strength. And we know that. We live something, but they would force a very by that in the United States too; we unpleasant experience. That's what he's understand that. We support Israeli concerned about. We would be con- security through strength. That's cerned about that too, and we wouldn't fundamental. go along with such a situation. That's I think it is also true that strength why the conference that we proposed is may be a necessary condition for sedifferent. curity, but it is clearly not a sufficient Of course, the real point of our pro- condition. There has to be something posal is not the international confer more. What is the something more? ence; that is the way to what we think The something more is peace with your is the key-namely, direct face-to-face neighbors. I am sure that even after negotiations. That's what you have to you have achieved peace with your get to if you have any chance of settling neighbors, you'll still want to be this. Aside from all of the concerns that strong. Strength is the way you ensure have been expressed about an interna the peace as well as get to peace. But tional conference, I think it's true—and maybe it is not quite so much. So there it is usually true in a negotiation—that must be strength, but there also needs the parties who are directly concerned to be negotiation to find a peaceful reare the ones who have to work it out lationship in the neighborhood. because in the first place, they know the situation best, they know all of the Q. Would you expect Prime Min ister Shamir to give you a “yes” or subtleties that people who aren't di "no" answer to the American prorectly involved just don't have a feel for it. posal? And supposing that he con tinues claiming to be against an Furthermore, I think it's always international conference, would you the case that if you and I have to live with something, and somebody just im still think you may proceed with your initiative and ask the UN Secretary poses it on us, we don't feel the responsibility to make it work. But if you and General to write invitations to the parties to continue with this move of an international conference?
A. We will work, of course, with the key parties, countries, in the region, and we will work with Israel. If Israel says “no," then we will not try to go over Israel's head with an international conference. We are too good a friend and too good an ally. We are going to do things together. It wouldn't work in any case. So Israel is a country that has a decision to make. I think it is an important decision to enhance its security, to enhance its opportunities for peace. We will consult with and, of course, we will work with Israel. Q. Many Israelis consider your meeting with the two Palestinian professors the other day in Washington a deviation from the American commitment to Israel not to negotiate with the PLO. Is it your position? A. Our view is that it's not desirable at all to have discussions or negotiate with the PLO under the present circumstances. There have been some conditions set out for a long time, and we stick to them. The PLO should acknowledge the existence and the right to existence of Israel. The PLO ought to say that they are willing to negotiate and accept Resolution 242; and, at least in my way of thinking, they need to renounce terrorism or, so-called, armed struggle, as the way; acknowledge that negotiations are the way. Then we talk to them but not until then. The two individuals that I met are not members of the PLO. I know that people debate about these different kinds of organizations that have the label “Palestinian” on them. They are—at least as I talked to them in the rather lengthy conversation that I had with them—very intelligent, thoughtful people who are looking for a negotiated way through these problems, who don't have the slightest doubt in their minds Israel is here to stay. We had a conversation in which we didn't agree on a lot of things, but it was a good conversation. I might just say beyond that they are distinguished Americans. They consider themselves part of the Palestinian Diaspora in a sense. Like other ethnic groups in the United States, they regard themselves as U.S. citizens, but they are also interested in the ethnic group of which they have roots. I think it is part of the tradition of American Government and politics that you talk to people, whatever their ethnic group may be, and listen to their concerns. |
What term describes a cluster of decisions about what goals to pursue what actions to take and how do you use resources to achieve goals?
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