One of the first acts of the new Congress was to establish a Federal court system through the Judiciary Act signed by President Washington on September 24, 1789.
The founders of the new nation believed that the establishment of a national judiciary was one of their most important tasks. Yet Article III of the Constitution of the United States, the provision that deals with the judiciary branch of government, is markedly smaller than Articles I and II, which created the legislative and executive branches. The generality of Article III of the Constitution raised questions that Congress had to address in the Judiciary Act of 1789. These questions had no easy answers, and the solutions to them were achieved politically. The First Congress decided that it could regulate the jurisdiction of all Federal courts, and in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established with great particularity a limited jurisdiction for the district and circuit courts, gave the Supreme Court the original jurisdiction provided for in the Constitution, and granted the Court appellate jurisdiction in cases from the Federal circuit courts and from the state courts where those courts rulings had rejected Federal claims. The decision to grant Federal courts a jurisdiction more restrictive than that allowed by the Constitution represented a recognition by the Congress that the people of the United States would not find a full-blown Federal court system palatable at that time. For nearly all of the next century the judicial system remained essentially as established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Only after the country had expanded across a continent and had been torn apart by civil war were major changes made. A separate tier of appellate circuit courts created in 1891 removed the burden of circuit riding from the shoulders of the Supreme Court justices, but otherwise left intact the judicial structure. With minor adjustments, it is the same system we have today. Congress has continued to build on the interpretation of the drafters of the first judiciary act in exercising a discretionary power to expand or restrict Federal court jurisdiction. While opinions as to what constitutes the proper balance of Federal and state concerns vary no less today than they did two centuries ago, the fact that today’s Federal court system closely resembles the one created in 1789 suggests that the First Congress performed its job admirably.
Marbury v. Madison (1803) was the U.S. Supreme Court case that established the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review. (Read the opinion here). After President John Adams lost the 1800 election, but before he left office, he appointed Marbury as a justice of the peace and signed the commission. Soon thereafter, Thomas Jefferson became President of the United States and refused to allow Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury. Marbury sued Madison in the Supreme Court to get his commission via a writ of mandamus. Under Justice John Marshall, the Court specifically held that the provision in the 1789 Act granting the Supreme Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus was unconstitutional. More importantly, however, Marshall’s opinion established that the Supreme Court has the authority, under the Supremacy Clause and Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, to review legislative or executive acts and find them unconstitutional, i.e., the power of judicial review. The Court also delineated the limits of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, namely, stating that political questions are not reviewable by the federal courts. It also described the limitations on federal courts’ jurisdiction set forth in Article III of the Constitution. While Marbury v. Madison limited federal court’s jurisdiction, it cemented the Court’s status as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. [Last updated in April of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]
Marbury v. Madison (1803) is a legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court asserted for itself and the lower courts created by Congress the power of judicial review, by means of which legislation, as well as executive and administrative actions, deemed inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution could be declared unconstitutional and therefore null and void. State courts eventually assumed a parallel power with respect to state constitutions. Marbury v. Madison arose after the administration of U.S. Pres. Thomas Jefferson withheld from William Marbury a judgeship commission that had been formalized in the last days of the preceding John Adams administration but not delivered before Jefferson’s inauguration. Ruling on a request by Marbury, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it could not order the surrender of the commission because the law that would have empowered it to do so was unconstitutional. Marbury v. Madison strengthened the federal judiciary by establishing for it the power of judicial review, by which the federal courts could declare legislation, as well as executive and administrative actions, inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution (“unconstitutional”) and therefore null and void. The exercise of judicial review helped the federal judiciary check the actions of Congress and the president and thereby remain a coequal branch of government alongside the legislative and executive branches. Examine how Chief Justice John Marshall and his successor Roger Taney differed on states' rights issues Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.See all videos for this articleMarbury v. Madison, legal case in which, on February 24, 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court first declared an act of Congress unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review. The court’s opinion, written by Chief Justice John Marshall, is considered one of the foundations of U.S. constitutional law. In the weeks before Thomas Jefferson’s inauguration as president in March 1801, the lame-duck Federalist Congress created 16 new circuit judgeships (in the Judiciary Act of 1801) and an unspecified number of new judgeships (in the Organic Act), which Adams proceeded to fill with Federalists in an effort to preserve his party’s control of the judiciary and to frustrate the legislative agenda of Jefferson and his Republican (Democratic-Republican) Party. Because he was among the last of those appointments (the so-called “midnight appointments”), William Marbury, a Federalist Party leader from Maryland, did not receive his commission before Jefferson became president. Once in office, Jefferson directed his secretary of state, James Madison, to withhold the commission, and Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Madison to act. Marbury and his lawyer, former attorney general Charles Lee, argued that signing and sealing the commission completed the transaction and that delivery, in any event, constituted a mere formality. But formality or not, without the actual piece of parchment, Marbury could not enter into the duties of office. Despite Jefferson’s hostility, the court agreed to hear the case, Marbury v. Madison, in its February 1803 term. Some scholars have questioned whether Marshall should have removed himself from the case because of his prior service as Adams’s secretary of state (1800–01). Certainly, later judicial standards would have called for recusal, but at the time only financial connections to a case led judges to step aside, as Marshall did in suits regarding Virginia lands in which he had an interest. The Republicans, always quick to criticize Marshall, did not even raise the issue of the propriety of his sitting in the case.
All-American History Quiz Who was the original Edsel? When did a U.S. president first appear on TV? Go back in time for the all-American answers. The issue directly presented by Marbury v. Madison can only be described as minor. By the time the court heard the case, the wisdom of Jefferson’s desire to reduce the number of justices of the peace had been confirmed (and the Judiciary Act of 1801 had been repealed); Marbury’s original term was almost half over; and most people, Federalists and Republicans alike, considered the case to be moot. But Marshall, despite the political difficulties involved, recognized that he had a perfect case with which to expound a basic principle, judicial review, which would secure the Supreme Court’s primary role in constitutional interpretation. The chief justice recognized the dilemma that the case posed to the court. If the court issued the writ of mandamus, Jefferson could simply ignore it, because the court had no power to enforce it. If, on the other hand, the court refused to issue the writ, it would appear that the judicial branch of government had backed down before the executive, and that Marshall would not allow. The solution he chose has properly been termed a tour de force. In one stroke, Marshall managed to establish the power of the court as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, to chastise the Jefferson administration for its failure to obey the law, and to avoid having the court’s authority challenged by the administration. Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Subscribe Now Marshall, adopting a style that would mark all his major opinions, reduced the case to a few basic issues. He asked three questions: (1) Did Marbury have the right to the commission? (2) If he did, and his right had been violated, did the law provide him with a remedy? (3) If it did, would the proper remedy be a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court? The last question, the crucial one, dealt with the jurisdiction of the court, and in normal circumstances it would have been answered first, since a negative response would have obviated the need to decide the other issues. But that would have denied Marshall the opportunity to criticize Jefferson for what the chief justice saw as the president’s flouting of the law. Following the arguments of Marbury’s counsel on the first two questions, Marshall held that the validity of a commission existed once a president signed it and transmitted it to the secretary of state to affix the seal. Presidential discretion ended there, for the political decision had been made, and the secretary of state had only a ministerial task to perform—delivering the commission. In that the law bound him, like anyone else, to obey. Marshall drew a careful and lengthy distinction between the political acts of the president and the secretary, in which the courts had no business interfering, and the simple administrative execution that, governed by law, the judiciary could review.
Two Oregon settlers flipped a coin to decide whose hometown would be used to name their village. Had the man from Portland, Maine, not won, Oregon’s biggest city would now be named Boston. See All Good FactsHaving decided that Marbury had the right to the commission, Marshall next turned to the question of remedy, and once again found in the plaintiff’s favour, holding that “having this legal title to the office, [Marbury] has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.” After castigating Jefferson and Madison for “sport[ing] away the vested rights of others,” Marshall addressed the crucial third question. Although he could have held that the proper remedy was a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court—because the law that had granted the court the power of mandamus in original (rather than appellate) jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act of 1789, was still in effect—he instead declared that the court had no power to issue such a writ, because the relevant provision of the act was unconstitutional. Section 13 of the act, he argued, was inconsistent with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which states in part that “the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction” in “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,” and that “in all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction.” In thus surrendering the power derived from the 1789 statute (and giving Jefferson a technical victory in the case), Marshall gained for the court a far-more-significant power, that of judicial review. |
Why did the Supreme Court decide the 1789 law was unconstitutional?
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