Page 2
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 3
Page 4
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 5
Page 6
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 7
Page 8
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 9
Page 10
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 11
Page 12
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 13
Page 14
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 15
Page 16
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 17
Page 18
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 19
Page 20
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 21
Page 22
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 23
Page 24
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).
Page 25
Page 26
turing entrepreneurship and free-market behavior at the grass-roots and enterprise levels of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If a genuine transformation of the Soviet political and economic landscape is to be achieved, however, the emphasis must be on constructing democratic and free market in
stitutions from the bottom-up. • Additional taxpayer credit guarantees primarily for agricultural pur
chases—and investment guarantees are pledged. The Bush Administration, for example, proposes to raise total U.S. taxpayer exposure in the former Soviet Union through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to $4.85 billion. It must be expected that the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation will similarly be urged to assume significant exposure. (Remember that in recent years, CCC and Eximbank were directed by the State Department and the White House to take steps leading to multi-billion losses in Iraq, part of which went to underwrite Saddam Hussein's weapons procure
ment program.) Such government guarantees are attractive to the Bush Administration for two reasons: First, it wants to portray as minimal the costs of aid to the former USSR that will have to be borne by the American taxpayer. In fact, as the domestic savings and loan scandal showed, contingent liabilities can soon lead to debilitating losses.
Second, U.S. government guarantees largely serve to enrich politically influential parts of the American business community-notably agribusiness conglomerates like the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and other exporters-even if they may not do much for the beleaguered peoples of the former Soviet Union. • The United States refuses to make tough political choices between
would-be recipients, choosing instead to delegate decisions to faceless multilateral institutions. While this approach-like the use of government guarantees—serves to disguise true taxpayer costs, it amounts to transferring undue authority to institutions that have, on balance, a poor track record when
it comes to transforming command economies into market ones. • Germany continues to exercise undue influence over the character, size
and timing of aid programs.—The United States' abdication of leadership, evident even before Germany took over the chairmanship of the G–7 last January, gave Bonn free rein to "go its own way." This so-called "Sinatra Doctrine, endorsed at the London and Houston Economic Summits, perpetuated Mikhail Gorbachev's misrule (perhaps by several years) and helped to saddle the people of the former Soviet Union with some $80-plus billion in debt-debt the Ger
mans are loath to forgive or even reschedule. • The Baltic states continue to suffer from Washington's benign ne
glect.—Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration refused to recognize or materially support Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for fear of irritating Gorbachev. Incredibly, these states are now being explicitly excluded from the benefits of the “Freedom Support Act," presumably on the grounds that they do not belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This pretext does not apparently apply to Georgia, however, which is permitted to benefit from the Act's largesse despite its non-membership in the CIS. The only explanation for such a disconnect is that the Administration views it as a sop to the region's once and future communist strongman, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his efforts at a political comeback. • The Administration persists in recklessly decontrolling exports of mili
tarily relevant technology.-In so doing, it is making available dual-use technologies that can help the former Soviet military-industrial complex remain a going concern—despite announced budget cuts. Alternatively, these lax export policies may create an irresistible temptation to those in the old USSR desperate for hard currency and willing to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies to malevolent pariah states and other third parties to get it.
DEBT RELIEF-WHAT THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD ENTAIL The centerpiece of a sound aid program should be multi-year debt rescheduling of 100% of interest and principal due Western government creditors for four-to-five years. In addition, there should be, at a minimum, a “voluntary” rescheduling of 100% of principal due commercial banks along with substantial interest rate reductions. Consideration should also be given to select forgiveness of debt for those cashpoor former Soviet republics actually performing on systemic transformation (along the lines of the 50% forgiveness of Polish debt which followed a series of reschedulings).