What was the most important significance in the Frye v United States court case?

Brief Fact Summary. Mr. Frye (Appellant) was convicted of second-degree murder, after the lower court disallowed Appellant from introducing testimonial evidence relating to the results of a deception test Appellant had taken following the crime. Appellant appeals his conviction here.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a test (such as a systolic blood pressure deception test) has not gained scientific recognition from psychological and physiological authorities, expert testimony regarding the results of such a test is inadmissible. Facts. Appellant was charged with and put on trial for murder. At his trial, Appellant attempted to call an expert witness to testify that Appellant had taken a systolic blood pressure deception test, and to further testify as to the results of the test. The expert testimony was held inadmissible by the lower court, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder.

Issue. Was it error for the lower court to have excluded the expert testimony regarding the systolic blood pressure deception test at Appellant’s criminal trial?

Held. No; the test results Appellant attempted to introduce into evidence did not meet the requirement that such evidence be “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,” and therefore the test results were properly excluded by the lower court.

Discussion. The court reasoned that although the deception test at issue here has a scientific basis, “[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define . . . [and] the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs [to be admissible].” In other words, the court held that without an established place in science, the test was still in the blurred realm between experimental science and demonstrated science, and therefore inadmissible here. In the court’s words, as the deception test was not “sufficiently established,” the testimony related to it is inadmissible, and the lower court was correct to have excluded it.

In Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), Frye was convicted of second degree murder at trial. On appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred when it sustained the state's objection to the proposed testimony of the defendant's expert witness regarding the result of a systolic blood pressure "deception test" -- a crude precursor to the polygraph machine -- on the defendant. 293 F. at 1013-14. Defendant argued the expert testimony evidence should have been admitted under the traditional common-law test for admissibility of expert testimony because "the question involved does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge." 293 F. at 1014. In sustaining the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony, the court articulated the following test to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Id. The court held the polygraph test results inadmissible because the test had not yet gained sufficient standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities. Id. The Frye test of "general acceptance" was adopted in Arizona in State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), a case also involving the admission of results of a polygraph test administered to the defendant but introduced by the state pursuant to the parties' pre-test stipulation. Our supreme court surveyed the cases and literature since Frye and concluded that polygraph test results were inadmissible absent stipulation because of the test's continuing "scientific shortcomings," 91 Ariz. at 279-80, 371 P.2d at 898, and lack of acceptance of the technique by "a larger segment of the psychology and physiology branches of science." Id. at 280, 371 P.2d at 898. In Frye v. United States, a 1923 case, a defendant in a criminal trial wanted to use an expert witness to testify to the result of a "deception test" made upon the defendant. The "deception test" measured systolic blood pressure which allegedly is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness. The Frye court summarized the theory as follows: "In other words, the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes as the examination proceeds." (293 F at 1014.) The Frye court refused to allow the testimony of the expert as to the results of the deception test. The court found: "We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." (Id.) New York courts have restated and followed the principles of Frye and set forth a test as to the admissibility of expert testimony relating to scientific theory. New York courts permit expert testimony if it is based on scientific principles, procedures or theory only after the principles, procedures or theories have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific field, proffered by a qualified expert and on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror. (People v. LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 867 NE2d 374, 835 NYS2d 523 (2007).) Apparently, there is no reported case in New York or in the rest of the country which deals with the admissibility of the results of fMRI testing. The court inquired of counsel for both parties if they were aware of any reported cases and both advised that this is a case of apparent first impression. However, long established precedent under Frye as well as long established principles of jurisprudence provide the court with ample precedent and guidelines. The Circuit Court expressly stated, "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stage is difficult to determine and while Courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from well- recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." (293 F. at 1014.) The Court established a standard for the admissibility of expert testimony: expert testimony based on scientific principles or procedures is admissible in evidence where the principle or procedure has "gained general acceptance" in its specified field. The court stated in relevant part: "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." (Id. at 1014).

In 1923, in Frye v. United States1, the District of Columbia Court rejected the scientific validity of the lie detector (polygraph) because the technology did not have significant general acceptance at that time. The court gave a guideline for determining the admissibility of scientific examinations:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

Essentially, to apply the “Frye Standard” a court had to decide if the procedure, technique or principles in question were generally accepted by a meaningful proportion of the relevant scientific community. This standard prevailed in the federal courts and some states for many years.

1 293 Fed. 1013 (1923)

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The ruling set a standard for the acceptance of expert testimony in court that, by the early 1970s, was adopted by almost all state and federal courts.

In 1923 James Alphonzo Frye appealed his conviction for second degree murder. Frye, who had confessed and later retracted his admission, had been prosecuted by the federal government and convicted by a jury sitting in a Washington, D.C. trial court. At trial, the court refused to let Frye introduce evidence about his truthfulness through a "systolic blood pressure deception test," a crude precursor to what is now popularly known as a lie detector or polygraph test. The court also refused to let Frye introduce an expert witness to testify about the deception test.

The sole basis of Frye's appeal was the failure of the trial court to admit the deception test. In a unanimous decision, the three-judge Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ruled for the United States in a short opinion that became one of the most notorious opinions written by a federal appeals court.

In the opinion, written by Justice Van Orsdel, the court described how the machine operated and how, when attached to a subject, it supposedly could detect whether a subject was being deceptive. "It is asserted," said the court, "that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system." Frye argued that systolic blood pressure rose in a predictable curve when a subject was being deceptive and afraid that the falsehood could be detected. The curve, maintained Frye, corresponded "exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner."

The court characterized the information offered by Frye as a "theory" holding that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure." As there were no prior similar cases for use as guidance, the court was left to make up a rule on the admissibility in court of deception tests. Frye insisted that the deception test could be explained by a witness who was an expert in the field, but the court rejected this with these now-famous words:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

In the court's opinion, the systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained enough "standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities" to justify its admission as evidence in courts of law. The court approved of the exclusion of the deception test, and Frye's conviction was affirmed.